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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to extend the scope o f consideration o f the pre-oedipal or pre- 
symbolic mother-infant relationship by focusing on a ‘third’ space that exists between 
them, and the remains o f this space in the infant’s unconscious. Through the 
theoretical explication o f two non-concepts, the “third aesthetic” and the “O- 
Function”, the thesis endeavours to develop a framework, from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, which considers how the inauguration o f a trace is established so that the 
infant may seek out or create meaning at a later stage o f life following maturation or 
individuation. The thesis has not however insisted on defining the construct of 
meaning per se, which is invariably a subjective and existential endeavour or idiom, 
but is rather concerned with what may provide a possibility for subsequent meaning- 
making endeavours. The notion of a third space, which alludes to a meeting point of 
two subjectivities which in turn proliferates a third arena o f negotiation, considers 
other (liminal) spatial and temporal possibilities that exist (or rather ex-sist) between 
the mother and the infant. This third time-space (the “third aesthetic”), which takes its 
cue from “chora/khdra” (as explored by Plato, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida) 
and the “potential space” (as identified by the psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott), is 
developed through a consideration o f thirdness (or more specifically thirdness under 
erasure, and the refusal to enclose it within a triad), the aesthetic, metaphor and 
metonymy, and rhythm. What remains o f this third energetic body in the infant’s 
unconscious (the “O-Function”) is considered through the tropes of the trace, the gift 
and cinders, as well as through the ineluctably uncanny rhythms o f desistance (of the 
future-to-come). The thesis focuses critically on what tropological or metaphoric 
forums may be provided in service o f explicating these two ‘non-concept’ concepts 
given the problematics o f representation.
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1. THE FUTURE ANTERIOR OF THE PAST IMPOSSIBILITY: THE 
FRAME OF NON-SIMPLE PRESENCE
Instead of being light opposed to darkness, or knowledge opposed to ignorance, truth is light which 
does not give up mystery, light which illuminates without revealing; never total, never authoritarian or
dogmatic.
Luce Irigaray (2000:110)
This work, in its discontinuity, proceeds by means of two movements: the straight line (advance, 
increase, insistence o f an idea, a position, a preference, an image) and the zigzag (reversal, contradiction, 
reactive energy, denial, contrariety, the movement of a Z, the letter of deviance).
Roland Barthes (1977:90-91)
In order that something like cohesion, something like causality, that some kind o f meaning might be 
revealed and that it can in some way be told, the historian must invent units, a hero, a nation, an idea, 
and he must allow to happen to this invented unit what has in reality happened to the nameless.
Hermann Hesse (1972: 62)
The realist unmakes the coherent multiple world into a collection of random objects. He thinks of 
reality as that which has an objective existence, but understands no more about objective existence 
than that which he can touch and feel, sell and buy. A lover of objects and objectivity, he is in fact 
caught in a world of symbols and symbolism, where he is unable to see the thing in itself, as it really is, 
he sees it only in relation to his own story of the world... Reality is continuous, multiple, simultaneous,
complex, abundant and partly invisible.
Jeanette Winterson(1996:143; 151)
Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences
and save the honour of the name.
Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard (1984: 82)
For that future world and for that within it which will have put into question the values o f sign, word, 
and writing, for that which guides our future anterior, there is as yet no exergue.
Jacques Derrida (1976: 5)
Disseminating Prefacing: The Foreplay of the Outwork (Hors-Texte........ Hors
D*oeuvre)
In her rather monumental preface to the translation o f Jacques Derrida’s O f  
Grammatology, Gayatri Spivak (1976: ix) writes: “If you have been reading Derrida, 
you will know that a plausible gesture would be to begin with a consideration of ‘the 
question of the preface’”. So let me at least attempt to begin with this quasi­
injunction, as if it were/is/will be at all possible to begin from the beginning. I would 
like to stress in this section the problems o f introducing, o f constructing a pre-face, 
particularly in the case o f this thesis where the introduction was conceived after the 
body of the thesis had been written up. Derrida’s questioning o f all that pre-faces 
highlights the fundamental impasse o f attempting to gather up material into a 
coherent, reduced body and introduce or present it.
5
This (therefore) will not have been a thesis1 a thesis whose itinerary could be
recognised, whose continuity and underlying laws could be pointed out, whose 
overall concept or meaning could be squarely set forth. The textuality of this thesis is 
assembled otherwise; it proceeds otherwise and subverts the intention of presentation 
in that it can no longer settle the case of those residual writing processes which call 
the very form o f a thesis into question and threaten to dismantle it. To tamper with the 
precedence o f a reteived thetic form is, according to Derrida (1981: 3-4), to “disturb 
everything else”, and therefore by necessity one needs to redouble one’s endeavour in 
working out at every turn the question of the retention and preservation of names: of 
paleonymy. Must the effects of a new meaning, concept or object necessarily be 
eclipsed by a tradition, weighed down by the burden o f memory? Should “literature”, 
as an example, still designate that which “already breaks away from literature -  away 
from what has always been conceived and signified under that name -  or that which, 
not merely escaping literature, implacably destroys it?”. This question pertains to 
appellation, to designation, and whether what has always been conceived or signified 
in/as the name of ‘literature’ can coagulate into something “fundamentally 
homogenous, univocal or non-conflictual”. This latter configuration is predicated on 
the assumption o f the unity o f a concept affirmed by the autonomy of meaning and 
the ideal purity of abstraction, which in turn not only belies that which traverses 
closure, but also disavows the signifier’s simple exteriority to ‘its’ concept2. One 
cannot necessarily assume any “reassuring form”, whether it be a referent (what is 
anterior or exterior to a general system of textuality - its origin or cause), any mode of 
presence (meaning, essence, existence, substance), a fundamental or totalising 
principle, or even some kind of ‘outside’ of a system, its extra or meta-textuality, 
which may be able to “arrest the concatenation of writing”. In this way, one cannot
1 This introductory line takes its example from Derrida’s (1981: 3) opening sentence in his redoubtable 
text Dissemination: “This (therefore) will not have been a book”. Johnson (1981: xxxii) points out how 
the opening sentence of Derrida’s text indicates both a denial of the book and of the beginning. It is 
written in the future perfect tense, marking itself as a presentation ( ‘this’), anticipation (‘will’), 
negation (‘not’), recapitulation (‘have been’) and conclusion ( ‘therefore’). The opening sentence is 
“designed to map out the play of anticipatory retrospection and internalised exteriority involved in that 
metalinguistic moment of self-reflection traditionally known as the Preface”. As will be discussed, the 
preface inscribes itself in a “strange warp of both time and space” in that it disseminates within a 
preface on prefaces that simultaneously prefaces and subverts the very possibility o f the preface.
In Positions, Derrida (1981b: 71) reiterates this theme by suggesting that “a name does not name the 
punctual simplicity of a concept” but rather a “conceptual structure centred on a given predicate”. 
Ultimately, the possibility o f the name does not yet exist, it has yet to exist, because “the name is 
always in the future; you receive an old name from the past, but a name as such, as received from the 
past, remains a name-to-come” (Derrida, 1996b: 220).
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assume that what is named the ‘unconscious’, as an example, is a symmetrical 
negative or potential reservoir of consciousness because consciousness and the 
unconscious as opposite or auxiliary elements in a system never constitute a total or 
given system, but rather form part o f  a “dissymmetric, hierarchically ordered space 
whose closure is constantly being traversed”. Consciousness and the unconscious 
always already indicate a heterogeneity that proliferates the impossibility of 
“summing up” in the name o f an absolutist, full, self-contained system. They cannot 
be reduced to the homogeneity of a single unifying system. Moreover, they designate 
a problematic field, a kind of “war economy” which imports a radical sense o f 
otherness and a margin o f impossibility that refutes the operation o f mastery (Derrida, 
1981: 5). Any system o f purported binarity can no longer remain hermetically sealed 
or preceded by some identity, unity or an original simplicity which relieves (releve), 
resolves or appeases.
In (retrospective) anticipation of a preface (supposedly anterior though more likely 
posterior, apres coup) that outlines/presages (in general) the traces of this thesis in its 
textual permutations, the question immediately arises as to how to introduce, pre-face, 
something that “would announce in the future tense (‘this is what you are going to
read’) the conceptual content or significance  o f what will already have been
written. And thus sufficiently read to be gathered up in its semantic tenor and 
proposed in advance”. For Derrida (1981: 7), the medium o f the fore-word, “which 
recreates an intention-to-say after the fact”, functions as a written text that dissembles 
under the guise o f a present whereby a hidden omnipotent author (in full mastery o f 
his/her product) presents a disquisition to the reader as his/her future -  “Here is what 
I wrote, then read, and what I am writing that you are going to read”. The pre or fore  
makes the future present by representing it and drawing it closer, and thus reduces the 
future to the form o f a manifest presence. Writing however does not consist o f the 
present, past or future insofar as they are all modified presents because the possibility 
of indicating some single thematic nucleus or single guiding thesis would cancel out 
the textual displacement or dissemination in process by confining it to “the discursive 
effects of an intention-to-mean”. Inscribed within the movement of displacement is
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precisely the impossibility or resistance (restance3) o f reducing a text to its “effects of 
meaning, content, thesis or theme” which “can neither adapt nor adopt such a 
reduction”. Therefore, in the spirit o f Derrida, if I am to make use of the word 
‘preface’, or attempt to introduce this project, then it cannot come to signify a table or 
code, an annotated summary of prominent signifieds or an index of key words and 
proper names. The preface is otherwise and in itself divided whereby it refutes the 
declarative or predicative mode, and fosters, along the way, a certain protocol which 
subverts the future perfect4 and inscribes the structure o f a magic slate5 (Derrida, 
1981: 7-8). The preface cannot expose a frontal, preambulary facade of a certain 
space in that it does not exhibit the proto-face or sur-face o f a development that can 
be fore-seen and presented. It “divides and undoes the inaugural pretention o f the first 
page” [Johnson, 1981(TN): 8].
The preface is comprised o f residues of writing which remain anterior and exterior to 
the development of the content it heralds. It can only be exterior to the thing it 
appears to be talking about because it cannot absolutely reduce the thing itself to a 
form o f a particular and finite object-product that determines modes o f knowledge- 
production. Within the writing up o f the preface, there is always already something 
which falls away {la tombee), a textual surplus, a certain spacing between the concept 
and the thing itself which in turn obfuscates the preface’s intentionality to offer up 
“an introduction to the (true) beginning (of the truth)” (Derrida, 1981: 13). Whatever 
attempts I, as the purported author of this textual thesis, make in offering up a 
preface, it will never be able to keep abreast of the concept (which in turn endeavours 
to represent the phenomenon-in-itself) it introduces. There is something of the 
impossible about a preface since the ultimate acquisition, the finality of 
conclusiveness, the final revelation o f meaning, must already be its premise. It must
3 The French word ‘restance’, derived from the verb rester (to remain), signifies the act of remaining 
or of being left over.
4 Johnson (1981) indicates that the French designation of the future perfect tense, le futur anterieur, 
literally means the ‘prior future’ and is often used in French to express hypothesis or opinion.
5 Un bloc magique is a reference to Freud’s (199Id) comparison of the psychic apparatus to that of a 
“mystic writing-pad”. Johnson [1981(TN): 8-9) usefully sums up its description: The ‘mystic writing- 
pad’ or ‘magic slate’ is a “child’s writing toy composed o f a stiff dark waxed surface covered by a thin 
opaque sheet protected by a transparent piece of cellophane. Marks are made when pressure is exerted 
through all three layers, making the opaque layer take on the dark colour of the waxed surface. When 
the top two layers are detached from the wax, the mark disappears, but the wax surface retains a 
furrow. The ‘magic slate’, like the psychic apparatus, thus exhibits the capacity both to retain an 
imprint (memory) and to clear itself for the receipt of new marks (perception)”.
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announce from the beginning what it can know only at the end. There is however 
something, a “third term”, that cannot simply exist in the markings, marchings and 
margins of the thesis as text. It leaves a remainder that cannot be captured by pure 
form, content or a moment of meaning, and it marks a space that diverges and 
demarcates in a “remarkable threshold (limen) of the text” (Derrida, 1981: 14-16). 
This threshold of the liminal is “opened up by an inadequation between the form and 
the content o f discourse or by an incommensurability between the signifier and the 
signified” (Derrida, 1981: 18). It alludes to something between the form and the 
content of meaning that is “structurally irremediable”, the insistence o f a certain gap 
or discrepancy, an abyssal movement. For Derrida, the attempt to write a preface that 
is really a preface is ludicrous because semantic saturation'is impossible, a certain 
excess cannot be mastered, and “the semantic after-effect cannot be turned back into a 
teleological anticipation and into the soothing order o f the future perfect”. Moreover, 
the preface alludes to a “dehiscence between writing and wanting-to-say”. If  it 
appears inadmissible, then it is because it can no longer “enable anticipation and 
recapitulation to meet and to merge with one another” (Derrida, 1981: 20-21). The 
preface, as an after-effect o f meaning, cannot transform itself into an origin or 
envelop itself within a circularity that could determine without going outside itself, or 
return to itself in the movement of circular recomprehension. It is a recital of infinity 
that can neither be reduced to unity nor derived from a primary simplicity. It can 
never be enclosed or inscribed within a finite taxonomy or lexicon because it is 
subverted textually by infinite excess and the “restless exteriority” of writing that 
thwarts the possibility of meaning announcing itself (Derrida, 1981: 27).
The preface is “a completely other structure” that is necessarily and structurally 
interminable whereby its textuality is “freed from the authority of meaning or o f the 
concept” and it instead is able to account for effects (as opposed to causes) of 
meaning, experience and conceptuality. For Derrida (1981: 35), the preface that 
attempts to establish “the text within the element of its meaning from the outset” 
functions as “contrary to the necessity of the text” in that it cannot reduce the “chain 
of writing to its thematic effects or to the formality of its articulations”. The preface 
can no longer designate a simple inclusion within some ideal interiority of the corpus 
of the thesis. It is indefinitely dispersed and fractured and therefore it cannot 
circumscribe the textual economy of the corpus by offering a “naive opening” that
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links the thetic text to its thing or referent or even some final conceptual or semantic 
instance. The “left-ovemess (restance)” o f the preface as outwork, in its textual 
exteriority, introduces the question of the preface as seed that is “just as likely to be 
left out, to well up and get lost as a seminal difference, as it is to be reappropriated 
into the sublimity o f the father”. Derrida suggests that there is something of the 
preface that induces a narcissistic preening (“narcissism is the law, is on a par with 
the law”) whereby-' “it is the word of a father assisting and admiring his work, 
answering for his son, losing his breath in sustaining, retaining, idealising, 
reintemalising and mastering his seed”6. All effacement of seminal difference leads to 
the reassimilation and domestication of the left-ovemess o f the outwork which is 
internalised into the ontotheology of a grand discourse o f absolutism that digests, 
recites and orders the cycle of knowledge (Derrida, 1981: 43-45). When seminal 
difference is repressed, then the truth that speaks (to) itself within an enclosed 
circularity is “the discourse o f what goes back to the father”. It fails to “go beyond 
the always-already-constitutedness of meaning and of truth within the theo-logico- 
encyclopedic space, o f self-fertilisation with no limen”. When seminal difference is 
effaced, the ‘truth’ o f the preface closes in on itself and internalises its own negativity 
and difference to itself so that its teleological programme is internalised and 
reassimilated by the circle of its unfolding (Derrida, 1981: 48; 53).
Deconstruction: The Affirmation of Exorbitant Impossibility
So where to begin? One possibility would be to foreground a seminal
philosophical or meta-reflexive issue that ineluctably encompasses the scope o f the 
investigation o f this thesis. This thesis will be concerned with the problematics of 
representation or what Rosenau (1992) has identified as “the crises of representation” 
whereby epistemological assumptions, methodological conventions and knowledge 
claims are called into question. There is the acknowledgement that any representation 
may distort, signify an illusory mastery, concretise, finalise, and reduce or exclude
6 This quote recalls the Hegelian notion o f Aufhebung (translated into English as ‘sublation’ and French 
as ‘releve’) which describes a hierarchically ordered relationship where one term annuls the other and 
lifts it up into a higher sphere of existence. As Spivak (1976: xi) writes: “A successful preface is 
aufgehoben into the text it precedes, just as a word, is aufgehoben into its meaning. It is as if, to use one 
of Derrida’s structural metaphors, the son or seed (preface or word), caused or engendered by the father 
(text or meaning) is recovered by the father and thus justified”. Derrida makes room for a prefatory 
gesture that neither inseminates nor is recovered by the father, but rather scatters and disseminates.
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complexity and variability. Any all-encompassing explanation of reality or what 
Lyotard (1984: 81) considers as a “grand metanarrative” is questioned as a limited 
and self-contained framework of observation, rather than a revelation of an absolute, 
objective reality. In this way, as Lyotard suggests, “it is our business not to supply 
reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented”. This 
statement affirms the task o f attempting to negotiate that which may ultimately be 
rendered as unrepresentable. It is concerned with what frameworks one can create in 
light of a complex, fluid and multi-faceted reality -  an ever-changing reality in flux 
and motion. It does not seek to reduce, homogenise or objectify any possible 
interpretation, but rather “focus on the margins, highlight uniqueness, concentrate on 
the enigmatic, appreciate the unrepeatable” Rosenau (1992:117). The intention is to 
elaborate repertoires o f interpretation that stimulate several possibilities.
The above considerations allude to a deconstructive tendency or turn which unpacks 
or interrogates the process by which knowledge claims are constructed and 
represented. Deconstruction, a word-term inextricably associated with the work of the 
philosopher Jacques Derrida even though Derrida himself has not been particularly 
receptive to the term7, should not be seen as a school or taken to be an ism since “any 
attempt to define it will fail, or at least come undone, because all the defining 
concepts and means o f articulation and signification are themselves open to the 
effects of this thing” (McQuillan, 2000: 2)8. Royle (2003b) suggests that it would be 
perfectly possible to make use of Derrida’s oeuvre without resorting to the word 
‘deconstruction’9. However, I would like raise the notion of the impossible 
connection of ‘deconstruction’ which has been referred to by Derrida (1995: 43) as 
“the very experience o f the (impossible) possibility of the impossible”, and which I
7 In the past, Derrida (1983: 44) has suggested that deconstruction is “a word I have never liked and 
one whose fortune has disagreeably surprised me”.
8 Elsewhere, Derrida (1988c: 3) has written that deconstruction is neither an analysis nor a critique. 
Analysis, for example, implies the dismantling of a structure which indicates a regression towards 
some simple element or indissoluble origin. The values of both analysis and critique are “themselves 
philosophemes subject to deconstruction”.
9 One would have to appreciate the qualification (apology) offered by Royle (2003b: 25; 109) when he 
suggests that making claims about ‘Derrida’s work’ or ‘Derrida in general’ is in a sense a “very 
undeconstructive gesture”, though of course there is always the question of strategic usefulness and 
convenience. Further on in the text Royle reiterates this impasse by suggesting that “one o f the 
problems, perhaps the greatest problem of all, in trying to provide an introductory account of Derrida’s 
work lies in how to deal with the inevitable but quite misleading impression that his thinking, his texts
and ‘ideas’ can be boxed up, systematised or simply, in a word, described Derrida’s work is about
the ceaseless destabilisation of any context, the necessary possibility o f the unanticipatable that is the 
condition of any writing or reading”.
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think possesses relevance for this project. Derrida (1998: 54-55) writes: 
“Deconstruction, if there is any, is not a critique, still less a theoretical or speculative 
operation methodically carried out by someone; rather, if there is any deconstruction,
it takes place as experience o f the impossible” 10. Royle (2000: 11) proposes that
this experience of the impossible implies “what remains to be thought: a logic of
destabilisation always already on the move in ‘things themselves’ a logic of
speciality” Deconstruction resists any univocal definition or adequate description 
because it is, as Derrida (2001: 64) intimates, “what happens (ce qui arrive)”. It is an 
invention o f another signature that is not an entity or thing that lends itself to 
predicative forms or ontological categories which in turn produce sites that can be 
assimilated to something like a definable subject or act. It takes place as a writing that 
opens up to the coming (venue), the advent or incoming of the other (/ ’invention de 
Vautre) (Kronick, 1999)11. For Leavey (1980), deconstruction is nothing but writing -  
writing (and reading) and rewriting (and rereading) in a certain way whereby words, 
terms, concepts, predicates and logics are displaced, reread and rewritten. 
Deconstruction pertains to the invention of “something new in the form o f acts of 
writing”; it entails giving oneself to “a poetico-literary performativity at least 
analogous to that of promises” (Derrida, 1992c: 55). Deconstruction is a desire to 
describe and transform, undecidably, where description and transformation “has to 
do with language and with ‘more than language’” (Royle, 2003b: 27). If 
deconstruction is possible, then its possibility is predicated on a structurally necessary 
possibility of a non-fulfillable promise, the possibility that a promise could not be 
kept or realized. Deconstruction is haunted by the unthinkable, by uncanniness and 
irremediable disturbance that is marked by what precedes or exceeds language as a 
descriptive tool, and by what indicates the limits o f the linguistic turn. It has an 
interest in ‘the other o f language’, a “point at which the authority o f final jurisdiction 
is neither rhetorical nor linguistic, nor even discursive” (Derrida, 2001: 76). Derrida
10 In the first instance, deconstruction puts ‘out of joint’ the very authority o f the ‘is’ so that this 
movement of disjunction ensures that any statement about or description of deconstruction “is itself not 
itself, but disarticulated in the very attempt to articulate the definition, and so control the meaning of 
deconstruction” (Wolffeys, 1998: 57). As a disclaimer, definitive meanings or concepts that are offered 
in service of deconstruction are themselves open to deconstructive operations.
11 One should however bear in mind, as Derrida (1992b: 341-342) suggests, that “deconstructive 
inventiveness can consist only in opening, uncloseting, destabilising foreclusionary structures so as to 
allow for the passage toward the other. But one. does not make the other come, one lets it come by 
preparing for its coming”. As such, one cannot invent or bring the other about, but rather prepare for its 
coming by breaking open enclosures of the same (of circularity) and interrogating methods that 
reappropriate difference (Caputo, 1997).
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has referred to this prelinguistic, inscriptive mark as ‘writing’, ‘trace’, ‘text’, ‘force’,
‘differance’ and so on, and this will be discussed extensively during the course of this 
project.
“Deconstruction”, as Derrida (2001: 4; 82) writes, is “not only a search for, but itself 
a consequence of, the fact that the system is impossible”. Here, the notion of system 
indicates a certain syn which alludes to totalisation in a configuration, a continuity of 
all statements, a form  o f  coherence that entails the “syllogicity o f logic”, and the 
assemblage o f ontological propositions. What deconstruction unravels is “a force of 
dislocation, a limit in the totalisation, a limit in the movement of syllogistic
synthesis a certain dysfunction or ‘disadjustment’, a certain incapacity to close the
system”. Deconstruction is an “anachronism in synchronism” which highlights the 
effects of otherness whereby writing comes to disturb the very form o f the question 
‘what is?’ or ‘what does it mean?’ (Derrida, 1983). Royle (2003: 24) considers 
deconstruction as an “uncanny overflow” that renders apparently familiar texts as 
strange, and apparently unequivocal and self-assured statements as uncertain. It is 
haunted by a logic o f speciality that inscribes difference at the heart o f 
representation, shattering the ideality of pure self-presence and proliferating elements 
of undecidability which displace a sense of mastery through stable, settled and 
definitive meaning. Deconstruction is always what exceeds any method where 
method is taken as an inroad toward knowledge, an instrument of representation that 
is reductively applied to a given field from the outside. It remains “exorbitant to the 
totality of philosophical knowledge” in that it “proceeds from a certain point of 
exteriority to the whole of the region of all regions of philosophy so as to reinscribe 
or reground that totality in or with regard to what is exorbitant to it” (Gasche, 1986: 
122). The steps o f deconstruction, as Derrida (1981: 271) writes, “allow for (no) 
method', no path leads around in a circle toward a first step, nor proceeds from the
simple to the complex, nor leads from a beginning to an end We here note a
point/lack o f method {point de methode): this does not rule out a certain marching 
order”. Deconstruction is not formalisable and it cannot be transformed into a set 
programme or axiomatic model that would espouse theorems, tools, techniques or 
rules (Wolfreys, 1998). It instead affirms the opening up to the other, a certain 
responsibility to the other; it “marches ahead and marks a trail”, it comes to pass, 
though it never installs a theoretical assurance of absolutism or omnipotence (Derrida,
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1992b: 337). Deconstruction works against the possibility of completion in that it 
subverts any philosophy or theory that endeavours to anticipate all forms of otherness 
and transcendence by including within itself all the resources of its exterior (Derrida, 
1978). It attempts to “shake totality, to make it tremble in its entirety”. Moreover, it 
exposes a certain naivete o f a theoretical body which fails to question (or annuls or 
neutralises) the discrepancies, fissures, inconsistencies and contradictions o f its mise 
en scene (Gasch£, 1986: 179). The question of deconstruction is a question of 
questioning the structuring of parameters within which critical thought, analysis and 
interpretation unfolds (Wolff eys, 1998).
In attempting to offer some “schematic and preliminary reflections” on the impossible 
possibility o f deconstruction, it should be stressed that intentionality does not bring 
about a ‘deconstructive reading’, but rather deconstruction involves the reader in 
following the resources, contours, patterns and rhythms o f the text -  playing with 
possibilities within the text through reading (and writing). For Derrida (1988c: 1-3), 
deconstruction is not an act or an operation and it cannot be reduced to “some 
methodological instrumentality or to a set of rules and transposable procedures”. It 
does not await the deliberation of a subject who would take the initiative and apply it 
to a text, object or theme. All predicates, defining concepts, lexical significations and 
syntactic articulations that lend themselves to defining deconstruction are themselves 
“deconstructible, directly or otherwise”. While it may seem that deconstruction 
proliferates a type o f nihilism, it should be remembered that deconstruction “certainly 
entails a moment of affirmation”. It “always presupposes affirmation” in that it is a 
“positive response to an alterity which necessarily calls, summons or motivates it”. In 
this sense, deconstruction is a “vocation — a response to a call” o f otherness that 
cannot be contained or disclosed within a circular enclosure, and “it is in this rapport 
with the other that affirmation expresses itself’. Deconstruction attempts “to discover 
the non-place or non-lieu which would be the ‘other’ of philosophy”. It attempts to 
address the problematics of representation in a more radical light, from “another 
topos or space”, an other site, a non-site. It is “not an enclosure in nothingness, but an 
openness towards the other” where it is “above all else the search for the ‘other’ and 
the ‘other of language’”, an other which is beyond language but which also summons 
it (Derrida, 1984: 118; 112; 123-24).
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In my reading o f deconstruction, the dangers of conceptual nihilism, where 
knowledge claims are rendered as infinitely relative and where any possibility for at 
least a transient, stabilised position remains unattainable, gives way to what 
Winterson (1996: 50) suggests as a resistance against the “fixity of form, not to invite 
any easy chaos but to rebuild new possibilities”. These new possibilities are of course 
open further to the infinite rhythms of deconstruction. Deconstruction is what affirms 
the (impossible) possibility of the non-concept -  something (as no-thing) which 
cannot be defined in terms o f oppositional predicates since it is neither this nor that, 
and it is not reducible to a dialectical logic. However, whilst the realm o f the non- 
conceptual does not espouse a predicative or logical generality, it still cannot escape a 
certain linguistic determination from which it is inextricably bound. Indeed, there is 
“no conceptual realm beyond language” which would authorize the non-concept to 
possess “a univocal semantic content over and above its inscription in language”. The 
non-concept (as it is described through language) still remains inside the ‘closure’ 
{cloture) of language, though one should not view this notion o f inside as if one were 
inside a box or milieu, and the idea of closure does not indicate a circularity with a 
limit or simple boundary. For Derrida (1984: 111), the limit-boundary is not linear or 
circular in any indivisible sense. Instead it is divisible so that “the logical rapport 
between inside and outside is no longer simple” -  the non-concept is neither inside 
nor outside. The instant/instance of non-conceptuality will be explored extensively 
throughout the thesis, however in keeping with this theme (of the impossible 
possibility), I would like to offer up two textual examples of deconstruction in 
practice since deconstruction cannot be dissociated from its textual unfolding and 
remains intrinsic to the text without implying thematic or formal closure. 
Deconstruction is always already at work in the text. It is, as mentioned, “what 
happens if it happens (ce qui arrive si ga arrive)” (Derrida, 2000b: 288). This seems 
to imply, as Norris (1991: 31) suggests, that deconstruction is “an activity of reading 
which remains closely tied to the texts it interrogates, and which can never set up 
independently as a self-enclosed system of operative concepts” .
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The Agency of the Letter: The Possibility of ‘Without-Return’
As a first example o f the turn o f deconstruction, I would like to explicate Derrida’s 
reading o f Lacan’s reading of Poe’s “The Purloined Letter”. It should be stressed that 
this exploration is not a detailed literary explication of Poe’s text and by consequence 
a detailed discussion o f the psychoanalytic-literary nexus (which warrants a separate 
and extensive thesis in and of itself). Nor is the exploration an attempt to engage with 
the plethora o f secondary criticism (yet another thesis) that emerged after the analyses 
of Lacan and Derrida12. Instead it will focus on the tendency of psychoanalysis (as an 
interpretative framework and strategy, and as a body of knowledge relevant for this 
thesis) to prioritise its obsession with (metaphysical) content-based narratives or, to 
paraphrase Ellmann (2000), the endeavour of psychoanalysis to seek out and expose 
grand psychoanalytic narratives (Oedipus, castration, fixation, sublimation and so 
forth) supposedly encrypted in the depths o f a text, the eagerness o f psychoanalysis to 
loot the text’s purported psychoanalytic ‘truth’. This latter point seems to hold true 
even in the case of a psychoanalytic theoretician like Lacan who ostensibly is not 
interested in uncovering content-based solutions and actively disavows the 
confluence or fusion of signifier and signified. Derrida (1998: 54) suggests that it is 
possible to witness in the theoretical binding of Lacanian discourse, as one version or 
example of psychoanalysis, various motifs that in his view are decontructible 
(phonocentrism, logocentrism, phallogocentrism, full speech as truth and so on - see 
also Derrida, 1981b: 107-113). My focus will be on one such motif - what Derrida 
has classified as “the transcendentalism of the signifier (and) the circular return of 
reappropriation toward what is most proper about the proper place, whose borders are 
circumscribed by lack”. It may indeed be the case that Lacan’s ‘full speech’ is full of 
Derrida’s writing, where writing refuses the recourse o f speech and resists being 
‘lifted up’ by speech (Derrida, 1987: 150).
“The Purloined Letter” narrates the tale of a scheming minister who steals a 
compromising letter from a queen, and it is finally recovered or retrieved by a 
detective, Dupin, who finds it ‘hidden’ in full view on the minister’s mantelpiece.
12 Many of the commentaries have been assembled in Muller and Richardson’s (1988) collection 
entitled The Purloined Poe, a seemingly exhaustive anthology where the reader feels overwhelmed to 
the point of saturation, something akin to being seized by what Rabate (2001: 42) has identified as 
“metatextual vertigo”.
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Lacan (1988: 29; 39) proposes that Poe’s fable o f the purloined letter demonstrates a 
“truth”, something “propitious to pursuing a course of inquiry”, which not only makes 
the existence o f fiction possible, but also dramatises “the decisive orientation which 
the subject receives from the itinerary of the signifier”. The (purloined) letter 
functions as a “pure signifier” whose materiality does not “admit partition”, and it
■ * * . . .  I ?
remains indivisible in its uniqueness . It is precisely this singularity which Lacan 
(1988: 43-44) regards as “the true subject of the tale”. Moreover, the narrative 
confirms that this purloined letter “has been diverted from its path” in that its course 
has been prolonged and so, in accordance with an extended metaphor o f the post- 
office {poste restante), it functions as “a letter in sufferance”, a letter that has been 
dis-placed. Lacan reasons that if the letter can be diverted, then it “must have a course 
which is proper to it” since this is the “trait by which its incidence as signifier is 
confirmed”. The signifier sustains itself only through displacement whereby it 
necessarily is required to “leave its place, even though it returns to it by a circular 
path”. This very displacement traverses subjects and thus determines them in “their 
acts, in their destiny, in their refusals, in their blindness, in their end and in their
fate everything that might be considered the stuff o f psychology, kit and
caboodle, will follow the path o f the signifier”. Indeed, the unconscious signifies that 
the subject is inhabited by the signifier which gains pre-eminence over it. The fable is 
constructed to reveal that the letter and its diversion structures the protagonists in 
“their entries and roles”, whether it be an endurance o f the pain o f a letter “in 
sufferance”, or in the possession of the letter which in turn possesses them, or falling 
beneath the shadow o f the letter which renders that protagonist as its reflection. 
Ultimately however the “purloined letter”, or more precisely the “letter in 
sufferance”, always arrives at its (real) destination for “what is hidden is never but 
what is missing from its place”. This “something” which is “missing from its place” 
is as a result o f symbolic mediation and transformation14 because what Lacan regards
13 Muller and Richardson (1988: 58) understand this designation of ‘pure signifier’ as a signifier 
functioning completely independently o f its signified (i.e., its content), and through its displacement, 
the signifier serves as a “movable pivot around which revolves a shifting set o f human relations”. As 
will be discussed shortly, Derrida will not concur entirely with this reading, and his reading will detect 
an underlying narrative of lack driving the putative independence of the signifier.
14The symbolic order is a supra-personal structural order, governed by inexorable legalities, absences 
and exclusions, and it manifests as the cultural, social and linguistic realm of unity, binary oppositional 
structures and hierarchical forms o f organisation. The symbolic order imposes and enforces prohibition 
and subjugation, and is regulated by the paternal metaphor or Nom-du-Pere/Non-du-Pere (which 
translates as the Name/No of the Father) (Lacan, 1977). This metaphysical construct is reminiscent of
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as the pre-symbolic order of the “real”15 always remains in its place in spite of the 
upheavals it is subjected to.
In a trenchant reading o f Lacan’s seminar on the letter, Derrida (1988: 173) offers up 
his response in the form of an essay entitled, “The Purveyor o f Truth”, where he 
rather ironically subtitles [or (counter-)signs if you like] the first section of the essay, 
“Divested Pretexts8’. He playfully begins by suggesting that the endpoint of the quest 
of psychoanalysis seems to be an extraction and confirmation o f its own ‘truth’ or, as 
Johnson (1988: 245) puts it, “psychoanalysis as being always already mise en abyme 
in the text it studies” (a pertinent criticism for any body o f knowledge or discursive 
system):
Psychoanalysis, supposedly, is found.
When one believes one finds it, it is psychoanalysis itself, supposedly, that finds 
itself.
When it finds, supposedly, it finds itselfiis found -  something.............
Where then? Where does psychoanalysis, always, already refind itself, where is it to 
be refound?
That which psychoanalysis finds/founds (in finding itself) is what Derrida (1988: 
174-175) refers to as “text”, which invariably is accompanied by discursive 
inscriptions that pertain to language, writing, culture, history, mythology and so on16.
the violent primal father that Freud (1946: 204) evokes in his paper Totem and Taboo (a psychoanalytic 
contribution to anthropology which details the genesis of the myth of patriarchy), as the “dead father”, 
the “violent primal father” or the “father o f the individual prehistory” whose death leads to prohibition, 
and whose paternal authority is never so strong as in his absence or death.
15 The real is the order preceding the ego and the organisation of the drives, and is characterised by 
anarchic pre-oedipal component drives and polymorphous erotogenic zones, heterogeneous to 
meaning, truth, logic and representation. It is an order characterised by pure plenitude, an impossible 
place of fullness remaining exterior to language (Smith, 1996) where it could only be “inscribed on the 
basis of an impasse o f formalisation” (Lacan, 1998b: 93). It is important to note that the real is not the 
same as reality delineated through symbolic representations. It can never be accessed as such, and it 
alludes to “the mystery of the speaking body, the mystery of the unconscious” -  the enunciating subject 
of jouissance with the inevitable possibility for corporeal rupture, slippage and meconnaissance 
(Lacan, 1998b: 131).
16 Elsewhere, Derrida (1979: 81-84) offers a useful description of how he comes to understand the 
notion o f ‘text’. He suggests that one assumes that if one is to approach (aborder) a text, then it must 
have a an edge, a shoreline, a necessary boundary comprised o f the supposed beginning and end of a 
work, the unity of a corpus, the title, the margins, the signatures, the referential realm outside the 
frame, and so on. For Derrida, however, this has been transformed through a sort of overrun 
(debordement) which “spoils all these boundaries and divisions and forces us to extend the accredited
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Yet what happens if the very text that psychoanalysis seeks to decipher (diminish), 
always already explicates itself or inscribes within itself “the scene of the 
deciphering”, or says more about itself than the psychoanalytic deciphering? What 
happens when the supposed deciphered text “deploys more force in placing onstage
and setting adrift the analytic process itself. o f situating analytic activity
grappling with the truth?”. What happens if the deciphered text delimits the analytic 
reading, assigns the analyst to a position, exposes his quest for the truth and then 
proffers “the discourse on truth, the truth on truth?”. While these provocative 
questions are not necessarily accompanied by cogent or satisfying answers, they 
allude to the potential hegemony and mastery o f psychoanalytic deciphering which 
purports to reveal the ‘primary’ content beneath the secondary revision -  “denuding 
the meaning behind the formal disguises”. The “familiar acrobatics of the metaphor 
o f  truth” (or truth o f metaphor/metaphor o f metaphor/ truth of truth) endeavours to 
exhibit, denude, undress and unveil all in anticipation o f the naked truth of the text or 
truth as nakedness. While Derrida (1988: 177) acknowledges that Lacan’s “style” 
keeps in check any access to isolatable content or unequivocal and determinable 
meaning beyond writing, he takes Lacan to task on his proposition that “the lack has 
its place {manque a sa place) in this atomistic topology o f the signifier” whereby if 
what is missing occupies a determined place within defined contours, then the letter
will “always refind its proper place the letter will be where it always will have
been, always should have been, intangible and indestructible via the detour o f a 
proper, and properly circular, itinerary”. Derrida detects in Lacan’s seminar “the 
classical landscape o f applied psychoanalysis” whereby Lacan makes use of Poe’s 
text as an example destined to illustrate “a law and a truth” [the (circular) itinerary of 
the signifier], as a text “brought into an illustrative position” where the text functions 
in service o f a particular and taught truth, as an illustration, example, testimony or 
confirmation in terms o f knowledge, truth and law.
Derrida (1988: 179-181) suggests that the psychoanalytic attempt to decompose Poe’s 
text into its elements, origin and destination as well as uncover its ‘truth’, leads to the
concept, the dominant notion of a ‘text’ a ‘text’ that is henceforth no longer a finished corpus of
writing, some content enclosed in a book or its margins, but a differential network, a fabric of traces 
referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces”. The text, in this sense, 
overruns all imposed limits assigned to it. These limits are not submerged into a “undifferentiated 
homogeneity”, but rather are rendered as infinitely more complex, multiple and divisive.
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reification of a story (histoire) of a letter (signifier) and its displacement, which in 
turn promotes the exemplary content and meaning of the text whilst excluding “the 
complex structure of the scene of writing played out within it” (writing remains in 
excess of content and meaning and it leaves irreducible residues). The agency and 
scene of the signifier in its letter and its subsequent displacement is effectively 
reconstituted as, or reconstructed into, a signified, a recounted object of the story 
which in turn misses the invisible and structurally irreducible ‘frame’ around the text. 
For Johnson (1988: 229-231), this frame pertains to “the stratum of narration through 
which the stories are told, and, ‘beyond’ it, o f the text’s entire functioning as 
ecriture”. The frame signals something of textuality’s “unframability” and 
indetermination, a borderline which not only highlights the “limits of spatial logic as 
it relates to intelligibility” but also prevents the signifier from being totally 
transformed into a signified. Psychoanalysis has the tendency to focus on “the content 
of a representation, the internal meaning of a story, the all enframed, which demands 
all the attention, mobilises all psychoanalytic schemas (Oedipal ones here), and pulls 
toward its centre the entire deciphering enterprise”. As a result, psychoanalysis fails 
to elaborate on the problematics o f the frame which consequently renders writing into 
the written and production into product. The text is greatly diminished when its 
‘truth’, its exemplary message, is allegedly deciphered. It is reduced at the very 
moment when it is related to a condition of truth which invariably entails the 
extraction of semantic content. For Derrida (1988: 182-185), the signifier-letter “in
the topology and psychoanalytico-transcendental semantics has a proper place
and meaning which form the condition, origin, and destination of the entire 
circulation, as the entire logic of the signifier”. The letter refinds its proper meaning 
in its proper place via a proper itinerary (destiny as destination) so that the meaning 
of the signifier-letter and the agency of its itinerary are determinable in truth, as truth. 
The truth of the letter has a proper place of destination (its place has an essential 
relation to its meaning) that is not a subject, but rather, according to Derrida’s reading 
of Lacan’s reading of psychoanalysis, a hole or lack on the basis of which the subject 
is constituted. The proper place o f the letter is the place of the grand recit of 
castration, the truth o f the phallus, which is to say the truth of castration, of castration 
as truth. The discourse on castration functions as the terminus of the signifier-letter’s 
circular itinerary and in this way truth is not only dissociated from any “essential 
dislocation and irreducible fragmentation”, but it is also encompassed within a
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“bizarre kind o f hermeneutic circle which is literally phallogocentric” (Howells, 
1999: 105). For Derrida, castration-truth brings the signifier-letter into its oikos[1, its 
familiar dwelling and proper place of circular return, into the circle of a restricted 
economy which comes to function as the very antithesis of or antidote for 
fragmentation: “that which is missing from its place has in castration a fixed, central 
place, freed from all substitution. Something is missing from its place, but the lack is 
never missing from it”. The place o f lack, captured in the topos of castration as truth, 
does not have any place in dissemination, but instead in the determination of the 
circulation of the proper which in turn renders the “truth of the purloined letter as the 
truth o f ‘The Purloined Letter”’.
The purloined letter is ‘contained’ within the text not only as an object whose proper 
itinerary is delineated, or as a signifier that functions as the theme or signified of the 
text, but also “as the text producing the effects of the frame”. Derrida (1988: 186-188) 
proposes that one needs to concede that perhaps “if there is something like a 
purloined letter”, it has a supplementary trap with no fixed location or definable hole 
or assignable lack. The letter could always possibly not be found, or found less in the 
content of the story that psychoanalysis seeks to unpack (the framed content of the 
“real drama”, a hidden or sealed interior) and more ‘in’ the text which escapes 
psychoanalytic appropriation. This remainder that escapes “divests the letter of the 
text from whoever deciphers it, from the facteur of truth who puts the letter back into 
the circle of its own, proper itinerary”. The endeavour to determine the letter’s proper 
location and itinerary as if one could locate it “here or there as on a map” fails to 
consider the map itself; not the map that the text describes at one moment or another, 
but the map that the text “is... itself’ -  a dissemination without promise of topos or 
truth. For Derrida, the letter’s divisibility (in contrast to Lacan’s conception of the 
letter as indivisible), its “always possible partition”, ensures that the “letter can 
always not arrive at its destination” and that it remains fragmented without return 
[Major (2001: 303) speaks of the “wandering destination” of the signifier and of the 
letter, or their “destinerrance”]. The system of castration-truth effectively attempts to 
protect the letter from this fragmentation. This however is not to say that the letter 
never arrives at its destination, but rather that “it belongs to the structure of the letter
17 The Greek word ‘oikos’ signifies house or dwelling, and is also the root from which the word 
‘economy’ is derived.
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to be capable, always, o f not arriving”. Truth cannot mean a “readequation or 
reappropriation as the desire to stop up the hole”. It cannot be equated with a circular 
return from the signifier’s detachment to its place of reattachment. It would be 
necessary for the letter not to admit "partition’ if it is to be kept and make its return 
because if it were divisible then it may be lost (disseminated) en route. It is always 
against this possible loss that the signifier’s indivisible singularity is constructed. 
Derrida regards this notion o f indivisibility as an ideality (of the signifier) that resists 
destructive division and permits the singularity of the letter to be maintained. The 
indivisibility of the letter is concerned with its elevation towards an ideality of 
meaning, even if one knows very little o f its content. This is as a result of the fact that 
the “content must be in relation to the original contract that it simultaneously signifies 
and subverts. And it is this knowledge, this memory, this (conscious or unconscious) 
retention which form its properness {propriete) and ensure its proper course toward 
the proper place”. When castration as truth is unveiled, the guiding value is that of 
propriation which effectively excludes the failure-without-retum or divisibility which 
“definitively rebels against the destination of lack {la destination du manque)” 
(Derrida, 1988: 195-197).
To summarise, the other scene o f the letter’s remaining is the possibility o f the 
“without-possible-retum” of its “disseminal structure” . It may function as an 
“interminable drift”, an elliptical adrift with “no possible approach or bordering”, 
cutting across the space o f a restricted economy. The letter as divisible is “what 
chances and sets off course, without guarantee o f return, the remaining {restance) of 
anything whatsoever: a letter does not always arrive at its destination, and from the 
moment that this possibility belongs to its structure one can say that it never truly 
arrives, that when it does arrive its capacity not to arrive torments it with an internal 
drifting”. For Derrida, the letter may evade an assignable destination, and it is this 
very unassignableness that rejects the possibility of “bringing a meaning to its 
destination” (Derrida, 1988: 197-206). In this way, the signifier or the letter resists 
against “a certain capacity, a certain determined pertinence o f psychoanalytic 
concepts” that endeavour to calibrate and master through detection and elaboration. 
The text ‘itself may possess a “deconstructive capacity greater than certain 
psychoanalytic discourses which apply their theoretical apparatus to these texts, or 
‘apply’ a given state o f their theoretical apparatus, with its openings, but also with its
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presuppositions, at a given moment of its elaboration” (Derrida, 1981b: 112). This 
latter quote seems to allude to an act of violence (through reduction) that 
psychoanalysis (as a discursive body of knowledge) may commit in the process of 
determining/presupposing some template for the text, and it also refers to the 
dissemination o f the text that always already escapes the framing of interpretation 
through its textual residues. Howells (1999) suggests that while there is something of 
a poetic appeal about Lacans’ conceptualisation of a ‘migratory signifier’, his ‘happy 
ending’ in which origin and end are reunited in teleological bliss remains entrapped 
within a metaphysical enclosure of circularity and determination. The signifier may 
never come back to some (original) referential point or centre, an inevitable point of 
return. Ultimately the writer-reader is forced into an impasse that emerges as a 
consequence of his/her dogged persistence (a detected disclaimer if you like): “Like 
the purloined letter itself, Poe’s story continues to change hands, placing everyone 
who seizes it at risk of being duped and dispossessed” (Ellmann, 2000 : 219).
The Unexperienced Experience: Dying Without Death
I have selected this second instance of ‘deconstruction-in-action’ as I feel it to be 
useful in highlighting the possible variations o f an experience or event/advent of the 
impossible, something with which deconstruction is intimately connected. It involves 
an exploration of Derrida’s discussion o f an extraordinary text by the writer Maurice 
Blanchot entitled, The Instant o f  my Death. The text narrates the tale of a young man 
“prevented from dying by death itself’. This young man is captured by the Nazis 
during World War II and lined up to be executed. As the Nazis await their final order, 
“already aiming” at the young man, as this young man awaits his death, “as if 
everything had already been done”, he experiences something unanalysable and 
indescribable. The text flounders in attempting to pinpoint this ‘experience’, this 
“encounter of death with death?” which invokes/provokes a feeling o f “extraordinary
lightness, a sort of beatitude sovereign elation?”. Possibly a sudden invincibility
or perhaps ecstasy. From that moment on, the young man, who was supposed to come 
to death, remains “bound to death by a surreptitious friendship”. The young man was 
supposed to come to death, death was inevitable, it had arrived, however at that very 
instant of the inevitable arrival of his death, there is an “abrupt return to the world”, 
and the young man manages to escape owing to considerable noise from a nearby
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battle which distracts the Germans. After this episode, “at the moment when the 
shooting was no longer but to come”, there remains for this young man a feeling of 
lightness which cannot be translated: “freed from life? the infinite opening up? 
Neither happiness, nor unhappiness. Nor the absence of fear and perhaps already the 
step beyond”. What remains o f existence may possibly be transformed by this
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unanalysable feeling, “as if the death outside of him could only henceforth collide 
with the death in him. ‘I am alive. No, you are dead’”. What remains of existence for 
this young man, all that remains, is the “instant of my death henceforth always in 
abeyance” (Blanchot, 2000: 3-11).
Derrida (2000: 28) proposes that this short text by Blanchot espouses an 
(auto)biographical truthfulness/tremulousness of a witness who claims to recount not 
only his life but also his death, a quasi-resurrection that testifies at the limits of a 
without-thing, that testifies to an indeterminable or undecidable limit where 
something (that is no-thing) must “suffer everything precisely because it is not itself ’. 
The Instant o f my Death is a narrative or testimony that signs itself in accordance with 
every possible tense:
I  am dead, or I  will be dead in an instant, or an instant ago I  was going to be dead. 
Someone intends to speak, to speak to us, not only o f  his death, but o f  his death in the
sense of the Latin de, in the sense of from  his death: not of my life from my
life, but on the contrary, one might say, from  my death, from  the place and from  the 
taking-place, better yet, from the having-taken-place, already, of my death (Derrida, 
2000: 45).
The instant of this young man’s death, of death in life, rests on the “very thing no 
ontology could essentialise” and receives its “determination from something other 
than itself’ that does not remain at home abidingly (a demeure), that does not 
maintain itself abidingly if at least the notion of abode designates some essential 
stability. It belongs to quite a different space and comes from a different order. Indeed 
the instant of impossible death and of dying prohibited testifies, at this very instant, to 
the singularity of a secret (of the instant, o f the impossible) which is ‘ftemporalised 
without being temporalised permanently (a demeure)”. The notion of a secret 
testimony however may be a contradiction in terms in that to testily, to bear witness,
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implies or entails the movement of rendering public (“How can one testify to what, in 
principle, is destined to refuse itself in testimony?"). Derrida therefore puts forward 
the possibility of “attesting to there being some secret without revealing the heart of
the secret”, the possibility of “testifying to the absence of attestation to an
attestation’s not being possible — and that there is here a secret to keep or a secret that 
one cannot not keep: the avowal of a secret having remained secret”. The instant of 
the secret, the ungraspability of its instance, is instantaneously divided, shattering the 
condition of possibility for a “determinate, indivisible instant” whereby the instant is 
always divided at the very point of its writing, it “is always on the verge {en instance) 
of being divided”. This secret instant o f death in life takes one beyond categories, 
which are invariably rendered as “problematic, fragile, uneasy” (Derrida, 2000: 28- 
33; 40-43). Ultimately, the secret can never be broached/breached and it is “non- 
thematisable, non-objectifiable, non-sharable”. It cannot be constructed into a 
formalisable, expressible relation and it “interminably disqualifies any effort one can 
make to determine it” (Derrida, 2001: 57-58). It is not something that can be detected, 
demystified or unveiled (for such a possibility would imply that the secret is linked to 
representation), and it remains “inviolable even when one thinks one has revealed it”. 
To speak of the secret, to create narratives, discourses and stories around/about it, is 
not enough to disrupt it because the secret will remain secret and silent, non-reductive 
and out of reach. It is not a reserve of potential knowing and it is heterogeneous to all 
manifestation (Derrida, 1995: 26).
One should not be able to testify to one’s own death, but rather only to the imminence 
of one’s death, to its instance as deferred imminence. One should only be able to 
testify to a delay preceding the “thing” that is pending {en instance), that cannot be 
long in coming, that is on the point o f arriving. Interestingly, Derrida (2000: 46) 
draws the reader’s attention to the analogy o f the letter that is held in general delivery 
and therefore remains “’on hold {en instance) ’ awaiting delivery, and this sufferance 
of the letter is also the passion of the being in abeyance (de I ’etre en instance) ”. For 
Derrida, “an instance in abeyance {un instant en instance)”, the imminence of 
impossible dying, form part o f what elsewhere Blanchot (1995: 67) has referred to as 
the “unexperienced experience” which speaks of something that takes place without 
having taken place, a strange event that is “abyssal, elliptical, paradoxical, and, for 
that matter, undecidable”. The young man of the text was supposed to die. Death had
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already arrived, it had been decreed and decided, it was imminent and inescapable, 
and yet the very order to die comes to prevent this man from dying - “From dying, he 
is prevented by death itself” (Derrida, 2000: 53-54). Being “prevented from dying by 
death itself’ (Blanchot, 2000: 3) comes to testify to this realm of an unexperienced 
experience - “the young man, the other, the one who will die without dying”18. 
Moreover, this unexperienced experience testifies to the possibility that “what will 
happen will have opened another time. Absolute anachrony of a time out of joint” 
(Derrida, 2000: 57; 61). In the space of a few moments of the narrative of The Instant 
o f my Death, “a man still young” is rendered “already less young” (Blanchot, 2000: 3- 
5), yet according to actual, temporal chronology barely a few seconds have elapsed. 
This, according to Derrida (2000: 61), comes to testify to “two times, that of
objectivity and that of phantasm or fictional simulacrum, which remain
absolutely incommensurable”. There is a disturbance in the measure of time, “neither 
synchrony nor diachrony” but rather “an anachrony of all instants” (Derrida, 2000: 
81). This anachrony is “there where time would fall, fragile fall” in accordance with 
“an outside of time in time” (Blanchot, 1992: 1). In the face of the unexperienced 
experience all knowledge comes to tremble so that “instant lightness, elation, 
beatitude remain the only affects that can take measure of this event as ‘an 
unexperienced experience’”, and it is these very affects that come to testify to “an 
ecstatic wrenching from common temporal existence, an immense orgiastic 
jouissance”. The experience of the unexperienced testifies that “dying will finally 
become possible -  as prohibition. All living beings have an impossible relation to 
death: at the instant death, the impossible, will become possible as impossible” 
(Derrida, 2000: 65; 68; 65).
The young man of the text was a witness to “death that came at him”, and it is this 
“inexorability of what was coming at him, of what was imminent” that unleashes a 
trembling where “everything only may be” (Derrida, 2000: 66-69). From the very 
stigma of the verdict that condemns this young man to death (without an ensuing 
death), there will be for him “a death without death and thus a life without life. Life 
has freed itself from life; one might just as well say that life has been relieved of life”.
18 Elsewhere, Blanchot (1995: 136) suggests how “to die forsaken by death” elicits “enigmatic 
proportions” in writing which is placed and tested at the limits of “un-knowledge — not a lack of 
knowledge or even knowledge of the lack, but rather that which escapes or exceeds knowledge and 
ignorance alike.
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The young man lives yet he is no longer living, and his existence comes to embody 
the logical and textual matrix of “X without X” (to live without living, to die without 
death, the instant of death without death). He is “alive and dead, living-dead”. For 
Derrida, the “without” in this model “X without X” signifies a “spectral necessity” 
which overflows the opposition between real and unreal, actual and virtual, factional
and fictional, and it allows “what does not arrive to arrive with a virtuality that
can no longer be opposed to actual factuality”19. Hence the death of which the 
narrative speaks has taken place even if it did not take place in what is commonly 
referred to as ‘reality’ (Derrida, 2000: 89; 97; 92). Blanchot (1992: 52) offers up a 
useful point when he suggests that death is merely a metaphor that aids one in 
“crudely represent(ing) the idea of limit to ourselves, while the limit excludes any 
representation, any ‘idea’ of the limit”. The possibility of death without death or life 
without life is not a matter o f knowing because it is a secret that remains irreducible 
and inaccessible in its alterity as well as incommensurable with the economy of 
representation. The ‘eventness’ o f the event of the instant of death consists of a 
certain non-knowledge (or ‘un-knowledge’ as Blanchot suggests) that, as Kronick 
(1999) points out, is not ignorance or indifference but rather a structural submission 
to the heterogeneity o f not-knowing and a referral to the other. It is an event that 
remains anterior to all narrativity in that it ‘functions’ as a “non-arrival of what is to 
come”. What was coming or supposed to come -  in this instance, death -  never 
actually arrives and does not give way to the order o f the present. However, the 
coming that never arrives testifies to “a certain structural openness, undecidability, 
unaccomplishment, non-occurrence, noneventuality” (Caputo, 1997: 78) that ensures 
the instant of death always in abeyance. The whole order of this coming belongs to an 
other time, an other language that cannot be absorbed within an actual-historical or 
linear-temporal narrative. It belongs to the enigma o f a Tightness’ that calls the 
present beyond (au-dela) itself and that cannot be captured in the grossness o f the 
order of the present or the actual. It is part of the unexperienced which escapes the 
very possibility o f a comprehensible experience and functions at the limits of writing 
in that it “de-scribes”. The instance/instant o f this young man’s dying without death 
“flees and pulls indefinitely, impossibly and intensively” whereby the intensity of
19 Rather usefully, Caputo (1997: 100) points out that the strange syntax o f the ‘without’ (sans) in the 
matrix of “X without X” is “not a simple negation, nullification, or destruction, but a certain 
reinscription ofX , a certain reversal o f the movement ofX  that still communicates with X’ .
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dying as the push of the impossible is ‘‘always a step over the edge, it rules out every 
conclusion and all ends ’ so that “he who masters death (finite life) unleashes the 
infinitude o f  dying” (Blanchot, 1995: 47-48; 40).
The Excluded Necessary: The Veil of the Imaginary
Before I attempt the somewhat complicated task (given the impossibility of mastering 
textual dissemination) o f offering a synopsis of the central themes and tenets of this 
research thesis as well as the structure of each of the following chapters, I think it is 
important to attend to what perhaps warrants the apposite phrase, ‘the polemics of 
style'. Broadly speaking (and in the interests o f convenience), this thesis is inspired 
by the French poststructuralist psychoanalytic and philosophical traditions (primarily 
the work of the philosopher Jacques Derrida and the linguist and psychoanalyst Julia 
Kristeva), which may present itself as rather daunting and foreign to the uninitiated 
reader. The philosophical orientation is such that it is virtually implausible to 
dissociate style or form from epistemology (the process by which knowledge comes 
into being and proliferates) because the stylistic approach remains a critical forum in 
gesturing towards any potential knowledge claims. Indeed, the style in which a 
narrative is constructed remains a central driving-force in the exploration of the 
content and the textuality of that particular narrative20. Hobson (1998: 2) identifies 
this approach as the “relation o f argument to mode of writing” whereby “the import 
of an argument made can be modified not just by its words, but by other factors, like 
the structure induced on it by the order in which it is advanced, and repetition”. The 
mode of writing frequently serves to highlight the problematics of language, the 
nuance and slippage in meaning, and the difficulty in selecting one particular 
adjective or phrase in service o f the description o f a multi-faceted phenomenon. It 
resists the rendering o f canonised and closed interpretations so that the text is not 
conceived in terms of the notion o f a work as a reductive or hermetic product, but 
rather, as Barthes (1981) suggests, the text functions as a production which renders it 
as a disseminative and equivocal space where a multiplicity of meanings and tensions
20 It should be noted that I am focussing on style in this section though of course the scope o f this 
question extends to the play o f language and its inherent slipperiness irrespective of the mode chosen to 
express some idea. The play of language calls into question any putative self-contained discursive 
system whereby it highlights inter alia the intricacies and multi-referential quality of the signifier. The 
permutations and complexities of language will be discussed extensively during the course o f this 
thesis.
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intersect. Style is the “beginning of writing” which “sketches the reign of the 
signifier”. It “serves to praise a new value, writing, which is excess, overflow of style 
toward other regions o f language” (Barthes, 1977: 76). Any discursive discipline 
cannot evade the question o f its language since it does not operate in an ideal domain 
of pure truth and therefore it deludes itself if it claims to present Truth independent of 
the language it uses to express this truth (Howells, 1999). In this tradition, there is 
also an endeavour to create a critical juncture or dialogue through a dialectical 
interchange between the humanities and the social sciences, where distinctions are 
highlighted as artificial and constructed as opposed to inherently valid. There is an 
attempt, as Norris (1990: 74) suggests, “to resist the habit of compartmentalised 
thinking”. Derrida (1984: 114), for example, proposes that philosophy is prevalent in 
many academic disciplines and that “the only justification for transforming 
philosophy into a specialised discipline is the necessity to render explicit and thematic 
the philosophical subtext in every discourse”. The transmission of knowledge cannot 
retain a level o f integrity without interrogating itself philosophically, that is, without 
acknowledging subtextual premises that may include engaging with and investigating 
unspoken interests, values and discourses.
Underlying the need to compartmentalise or segregate various disciplines 
(particularly those disciplines subject to the discourses of the scientific endeavour), 
one may discover an inveterate desire to expel those impure elements broadly 
categorised as ‘literary’ or ‘poetic’. Indeed, Le Doeuff (1989: 1-5) proposes that the 
characterisation o f philosophical discourse “meets with reference to the rational, the 
concept, the argued, the logical, the abstract”. Philosophy certainly does not waver in 
defining what it is not21. It is “inscribed and declares its status as philosophy through 
a break with myth, fable, the poetic, the domain of the image”. It is a certain logos 
that defines itself through opposition to other types o f discourse. However, this 
putative philosophy o f the logos that excludes is never found in its pure form because 
it remains saturated with a “whole pictorial world” - the “philosopher’s image-
21 It should be noted, in accordance with Le Doeuff, that the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘theory’ will be 
used interchangeably in this thesis. It seems as if  the Anglo-American preference for the word ‘theory’ 
(unless specifically describing the academic discipline of Philosophy) gives way to a Continental 
preference for the term ‘philosophy’ for both the discipline of Philosophy and for interdisciplinary 
theoretical studies. In a conference organised around the subject matter of ‘life after theory’, for 
example, Derrida (2003: 8) proposes that he would translate this conference title into French as ‘life 
after philosophy’.
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album”. Usually, these images are viewed as nothing more than decorative, extrinsic 
to the theoretical work, merely anecdotal, but in fact these strands of the imaginary 
are essentially and intrinsically linked to the points of tension in a work, the 
“sensitive points of an intellectual venture”22. The imagery/imaginary of 
philosophy/theory remains inseparable from the difficulties that a text encounters. Yet 
meaning conveyed through the imaginary of myth, metaphor, the poetic and so on, 
works both for and against the system that deploys it because the imaginary sustains 
something which the system itself cannot justify and is therefore necessary for the 
system’s functioning, but it also signals that its properties as imaginary will remain 
incompatible with the system’s discursive possibilities in that the imaginary always 
remains in excess of the system’s descriptive capacity and conceptual mastery. The 
imaginary “occupies the place o f theory’s impossible”, and this in turn problematises 
philosophy’s “right or task of speaking about itself, o f having a discourse about its 
own discourse and its (legitimate or other) modes, writing a commentary on its own 
texts” (Le Doeuff, 1989: 6). Philosophy’s attempt to establish a process of self­
foundation and self-validation always already entails the establishment of an 
imaginary construct. There is no such thing as a self-founding discourse without 
recourse to the poetics o f the imaginary. Philosophy, in the “administration of its own 
legitimacy” and the “establishment o f its own value”, is drawn into “defining and 
designing its own myths” and making use of “spatial or narrative plans and layouts” 
(Le Doeuff, 1989: 171). Still philosophy frequently attempts to exclude or exorcise 
“this inner scandal” (of the imaginary), the “non-philosophical character of thought 
images” by projecting this “shameful side of philosophy on to an Other” (primitive, 
archaic, irrational thought, folklore, old wives’ tales, nursery stories, the intuitive, the 
uncultivated, uneducated mind, deficient culture, and so on). It attempts to master 
through understanding (and prevent this fixed understanding from wandering off 
elsewhere), assigning understanding to its proper, empirical employment.
Rigour, objectivity and precision are desired attributes o f a philosophical system, 
whereas metaphor, allusion or style are considered as decorative embellishments that
22 While Le Doeuff never specifies a definition for the notion of the ‘imaginary’, Grosz (1989) suggests 
that the imaginary refers to the image as opposed to the ‘pure’ content of a theoretical concept. It is a 
‘thinking-in-images’ within theoretical discourse, and alludes to the knots and binds of textuality, the 
unsayable or unnameable.
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could be easily excised without loss to the fundamental concepts they represent23. The 
imaginary of philosophy is considered as alien or extrinsic even though theoretical 
disciplines are unable to rid themselves o f their dependence on images which remain 
constitutive and ineradicable. In order to articulate what it is unable to say in other 
terms, when it “flounders on its own presuppositions” (Grosz, 1989: 190), philosophy 
is forced to rely on discourses which may be labelled as poetic, visionary, literary, 
fabulous, figurative or tropic. As a result, these images come to function as 
philosophy’s necessary underside, its unacknowledged supports, philosophically and 
pedagogically necessary in the proliferation and elaboration of a theoretico- 
conceptual system. Yet there still remains a resistance (or in the most extreme form a 
disavowal) to recognise the ineluctability of the imaginary which is frequently 
regarded as superfluous or inessential, a “cryptopoetics, a poetic perversion of 
philosophy” which replaces evidences and proofs with analogies and possibilities, 
and thus functions as a castration (emasculation) o f reason and rigour, making “a 
corpse of reason”. The philosophical imaginary is considered as “perverting 
philosophy into poetry”, permitting “literary mystagogy” to pollute the purity and 
truth of philosophy so that philosophy is confused with literature (Derrida, 1993c: 
136-140). However, it may possibly be that while philosophical discourse puts 
everything into question, it is “tripped up (achopper)” by the poetics of the imaginary 
which is the question that eludes (echapper) it since the imaginary is where the 
system does not close (Blanchot, 1995: 63). The imaginary is simultaneously “the 
place where the system constitutes itself, and where this constitution is threatened by 
the heterogeneous, and by a fiction no longer at the service of truth”. It participates in 
participation and non-participation whereby there is a double postulation o f an 
imaginary as “participation that which in no case allows itself to be reappropriated by 
participation, and thus by a philosophical system” (Derrida, 2001: 5-6). In short, the 
imaginary alludes to the locus o f philosophy that fails to be what it wants to be, that 
fails to add up to the sum o f its desired totality. It signals theory at the limits, fissured 
and displaced, and yet it is precisely the acknowledgement of this essential limitation 
that permits any theoretical discourse to reflect upon the nature o f its discursivity
23 For an interesting contextualisation of how Freudian psychoanalysis “devotes itself to the 
imaginative interpretation” and is informed by metaphoric and idiographic (hermeneutic knowing) 
principles rather than nomothetic (positivist knowing) approaches, the reader is referred to chapter VII 
(pp 37-49) of Bruno Bettelheim’s (1985) text, Freud and M an’s Soul.
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(what constitutes its status as a body o f knowledge-production) and to interrogate the 
frame of its textual possibilities and permutations.
The Seductions of an Introduction: From Blindness to the Supplement
In attempting to honour a more traditional structure o f an opening section of a thesis, 
I will offer up an outline of the content of each chapter, bearing in mind that I am 
presenting to you, in precis form, something that has already been written, which is 
thus in the past, as your future under the “under the false appearance of a present” 
(Derrida, 1981: 7). In place of an introduction (to circularity), one can only add more 
of an elliptical blow which defeats in advance the teleology of an introduction and 
“undecides its circle”. Derrida (1980: 108) suggests how any attempt to introduce 
should not intrude (s'introduire) or saturate the corpus of the text with reading. So 
possibly a disclaimer a la Derrida is needed/required: Beware, the introduction may 
attempt to read (seduce) the corpus o f the text with the consequence, the ineluctable 
probability, that the textuality o f  the text may deviate (differentiate and defer) further 
from the ‘it’ o f itself in this attempted reading. In addition, as Derrida (2003: 44) 
proposes in qualification for the possibility o f meaning (and thus truth), “for someone 
to mean what he or she says, the possibility must remain always open for not 
meaning, for meaning something else”. Language is constituted as such by the 
structural possibility that what we say or write may signal something else, something 
other. “For truth to be true and for the meaning to be meaningful the possibility o f a 
misunderstanding or lie or something else must remain, structurally, always open”. 
Opening up meaning to the possibility o f otherness, to the (in)coming of the other, 
requires a certain hospitable way “of giving to be read (donner a lire)”. As Derrida 
(2001: 31) suggests:
If something is given to be read that is totally intelligible, that can be totally 
saturated by sense, it is not given to the other to be read. Giving to the other to be 
read is also a leaving to be desired, or a leaving the other room for an intervention by 
which she will be able to write her own interpretation: the other will have to be able 
to sign in my text.
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Opening up to the writings o f Derrida is, as Royle (2003b) suggests, a matter of 
reckoning with the incalculable, the unforeseeable, the unknowable, because his 
writings constitute a “strange strategy without finality” (Derrida, 1981: 7). Derrida is 
concerned with a supplementary logic whereby an author can always say “more, less, 
or something other than what he would mean (voudrait dire)” (Derrida, 1976: 158). 
Intentionality does not necessarily add up to mastery or control because “there (is) 
always one more, a supplement” (Derrida, 1996b: 218), and it is this supplement 
which signals the “mark o f an emptiness”, a certain exorbitant exteriority that cannot 
“emerge out o f its strange penumbra” (Derrida, 1976: 145; 149). “We speak its 
reserve”, as Derrida writes, so that “the presence that is thus delivered to us in the 
present is a chimera”. Signs, images and representations which are supposed to 
supplement this non-simple presence are mere “illusions that sidetrack us” (Derrida, 
1976: 149; 154). Even if I desire to bring this introductory chapter to a conclusion, I 
have to keep in mind (to hold onto what is fundamentally ungraspable?) that my 
desire is circumvented and undermined by that, the haunting of a ghostly trace, the 
singularity o f the other, which problematises the very notion of introductions and 
conclusions, beginnings and endings. However, in/for the interests of convenient 
necessity (for the thetic, for the academy), I shall circumvent this spectral elusiveness 
(of nonconceptuality) and push on in the illusion of my desire -  after all, all is as it 
should be for the deluded subject of the symbolic, according to Lacan!
The next chapter attempts to provide a philosophical and psychoanalytic backdrop or 
context within which the thesis operates. Derrida (1984: 108) suggests how he has 
always systematically endeavoured to find a “non-site {non-lieu)” from which to 
question philosophical premises. This non-site or alterity remains radically irreducible 
to philosophy (thereby presenting the problem of its situation within philosophical 
language, not to mention the inevitability of the mark of philosophical language on 
it), and it attempts to manoeuvre philosophy into appearing “to itself as other than 
itself’ so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself. The chapter will offer an 
explication o f Derrida’s development o f certain ‘non-concepts’ (as philosophical aids 
or monitors if you like), which attempt to promote the possibility for this non-site, 
this “necessary free space”. It will focus specifically on Derrida’s writings on aporia 
(the possibility o f the impossible), the mythology o f metaphoricity and his seminal 
essay on differance. The exploration of psychoanalytic theory will attempt to
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establish precedence for this project by focussing on certain phenomena that have 
challenged the very boundaries o f psychoanalytic mastery. It will offer readings of 
some of the Lacaman ‘fundamentals o f psychoanalysis’ — cause, lack and desire, 
Kristeva’s poetical (and revolutionary) musings on melancholia and abjection, and it 
will investigate the ‘navel’ or knot in/of dream interpretation and the enigmatic 
question o f the death drive.
Chapters 3 and 4 will attempt to extend the scope o f consideration of the pre-oedipal 
or pre-symbolic mother-infant relationship by focusing on a ‘third’ time-space that 
exists between them, and the remains o f this space in the infant’s unconscious 
respectively. Through the theoretical explication o f two non-concepts, what I have 
termed the “third aesthetic” and the “O-Function”, I have endeavoured to develop a 
framework, from a psychoanalytic perspective, which considers how the inauguration 
of a trace is established so that the infant may seek out or create meaning at a later 
stage of life following maturation or individuation. The chapters are not however 
interested in defining the construct o f meaning per se, which is invariably a subjective 
and existential endeavour or idiom, but are rather concerned with what may provide a 
possibility for subsequent meaning-making endeavours. The notion of a third space, 
which alludes to a meeting point o f two subjectivities which in turn proliferates a 
third arena of negotiation, considers other (liminal) spatial and temporal possibilities 
that exist (or rather ex-sist) between the mother and the infant. This third time-space 
(the “third aesthetic”), which takes its cue from “chora/khdra” (as explored by Plato, 
Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida) and the “potential space” (as identified by the 
psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott), will be developed (or in line with an introduction 
that was conceived a posteriori perhaps it should be written “was developed”) 
through a consideration o f thirdness (or more specifically thirdness under erasure, and 
the refusal to enclose it within a triad), the aesthetic, metaphor and metonymy, and 
rhythm. What remains (restance) o f this third energetic body in the infant’s 
unconscious (the O-Function) will be considered through the tropes of the trace, the 
gift and cinders, as well as through the ineluctably uncanny rhythms of desistance (of 
the future-to-come).
Chapter 5 investigates how the third aesthetic and the O-Function are effected by the 
configuration of the “dead mother” (as theorised by the French psychoanalyst Andre
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Green), a mother who remains psychically or psychologically unavailable for the 
infant. It will explore how the mother’s recognition of the infant’s otherness and a 
certain ethic o f (silent) love that she imparts to the infant, remain critical in 
generating and sustaining the momentum of the third aesthetic. In the instance of the 
dead mother, the mother remains ‘out o f tune’ with the infant, which in turn obstructs 
the passage and flow of the energetics of the third aesthetic so that its fluidity and 
mobility are supplanted by the solidified mechanics of paralysis and cadaverisation.
In the last chapter, I will attempt to imagine what type of approach to writing would 
be needed in order to explore the impossible possibility of the non-concept. This will 
involve a consideration o f Derrida’s musings on psychical or dream writing, Cixous’s 
work on the poethics o f writing and Barthes on the signifiance o f textuality. The 
chapter will investigate how these writers have endeavoured to open up a space for 
the imaginary traces of the writing body. To end off, the chapter will offer a 
recapitulation o f the central themes, or more precisely, the central aporias of the 
research project.
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2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DELIMITATION: THE REFUSAL OF CONCEPT
If I knew the names o f things o f acts of places, I would not write, I would name, and everything would 
be said. If I knew your name, I would call you, I would cry out the name that summarizes you, and so
it would be Sunday and I could rest.
Helene Cixous (2004: 5)
As soon as it thinks itself, language becomes corrosive.
Roland Barthes (1977: 66)
What terrifies you? The lack of closure. From which springs your struggle against in-finity. Origin and 
end, form, figure, meaning, name, the proper and the self: these are your weapons against that unbearable
infinity.
Luce Irigaray (1992: 71)
To risk meaning nothing is to start to play.........
Jacques Derrida (1981b: 14)
Only a political or theoretical commitment that can confront its own internal paradoxes, its inherent or 
constitutive inconsistencies, and its necessary if changeable limits can be said to have come of age.
Elizabeth Grosz (1997: 73)
No-Thing as Something or Something is Nothing
This chapter aims to map out some o f the key (meta-) philosophical positions of this 
thesis, as well as trace certain phenomena and ideas that have radically challenged the 
capacity of psychoanalysis to construct and represent, fuelling at times a debilitating 
nexus of language and that which problematises conceptualisation (the ‘non-concept’ 
being one possible name for this confounding configuration). The chapter’s attempt to 
foreground a particular philosophical or meta-theoretical approach inspired by the 
writings of Jacques Derrida is effectively an attempt to engage with the problems of 
making use o f language to describe that which may ultimately be extra-linguistic or 
pre-linguistic. It explicates three central themes in Derrida’s writings focussing 
particularly on the movement of what he provisionally calls ‘differance’ which he 
regards as neither a word nor a concept since differance has no proper name in our 
language. It then moves on to explore several areas in psychoanalysis (Lacan’s work 
on cause, lack and desire, Kristeva on melancholia and abjection, the ‘navel’ in dream 
interpretation, and the death drive) which have irrefutably challenged its omniscient 
(omni-scientific) status. While the exploration o f these areas are not directly relevant 
to the theoretical developments in the following chapters, I think that it is important 
to nevertheless offer them up for consideration so as to create a precedence for this
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research project, a historical legacy of potentially non-conceptual phenomena (lest we 
forget that psychoanalysis was founded on the radical discovery of the unconscious) 
which highlight the difficulty that psychoanalysis would have in falling prey or 
succumbing to any all too easy reductionism particularly when it comes to these areas 
which have refused simple conceptualisation.
To begin with and as a point o f departure in approaching (the more substantial 
possibility o f rapprochement remaining a possibly unattainable ideal) that which may 
in the end signal a certain non-conceptuality, I will briefly discuss Heidegger’s (1993: 
96-97) meditation on nothingness which functions as a useful example as/of an 
example of the way in which theoreticians/writers/philosophers have endeavoured to 
engage and create some kind o f (ultimately) non-reciprocal dialogue with something 
as no-thing, which in turn inspires a vacuum, gap or abyss in knowledge and 
consciousness. What remains are seemingly insurmountable or unanswerable 
questions. Heidegger suggests how the “nothing” is rejected and abrogated by science 
whereby it is concerned exclusively and insistently with beings, motion, essence, 
something1. For science, the nothing may inevitably be an “outrage and a phantasm” 
that it wishes to know nothing about. With a “studied indifference” science abandons 
this nothing as “what there is not”. However, as Heidegger perceives, perhaps one is 
conceding this (the) nothing by giving it up and not concerning oneself with it 
(assuming that one can speak of concession when nothing is conceded). The 
engagement and elaboration of the question of the nothing (“How is it with the 
nothing?”, “What is the nothing?”, for example) should render one into a position 
where an answer manifests as a possibility, or the impossibility of an answer remains. 
But more fundamentally, an enquiry into the nothing creates an impasse in that it 
automatically and in advance is positing the nothing as a being, as something that ‘is’ 
such and such. Interrogating the nothing “turns what is interrogated into its opposite”, 
but the question (What is the nothing?) deprives itself of its own object because every 
answer to this question remains impossible from the start because it necessarily 
assumes a form -  the nothing ‘is’ this or that - that is an object. “Thinking, which is 
always essentially thinking about something, must act in a way contrary to its own 
essence when it thinks o f nothing”. To add insult to injury, if the nothing is nothing
1 Elsewhere, Heidegger (1971: 170) writes that “science always encounters only what its kind of 
representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science .
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and thus represents total indistinguishability, then it is impossible to obtain a 
distinction between the imagined and the ‘proper’ nothing. These are just a few of the 
problems and conundrums that may present themselves in contending with what 
resists and defies conceptual encoding. However what frequently emerges is that this 
supposed ‘nothing’ is indeed not nothing but rather ‘something’, though this 
‘something’ designates “no presence at a distance”. It is an “index of an irreducible 
exterior”, a movement, a dissemination that indicates an “absolutely irreducible 
alterity” (Derrida, 1981b: 91-92). It remains a motif of heterogeneity that cannot be 
exhausted o f all meaning and exceeds any appropriation, interiorisation, idealisation 
or the promise of a monolith of full and present Meaning2. The overwhelming 
reliance on language in service o f description invariably problematises the very scope 
of attempting to determine or delimit such alterity which ideally requires some 
‘genre’ exterior to language -  a meta-language -  an unlikely possibility -  an ultimate 
impossibility as possibility.
THE (META-)PHILOSOPHICAL CONNECTION
Derridean Poetics
In his text, Archive Fever, Derrida (1996) cites Nietzsche as claiming to recognise 
thinkers of the future by their capacity to espouse the modality of perhaps. This 
citation seems rather apt in light o f Derrida’s oeuvre because to engage with it in its 
vibrancy and ebulliency, “to capture it without trying to hold it captive” (de Nooy, 
1998: 3), is an inherently precarious enterprise given that Derrida works at the limits 
of language, at the ungraspable other of thought. There is a quest to locate a ‘mode’
2 Interestingly, after outlining the numerous binds and aporias that emerge in relation to the nothing, 
Heidegger finally does suggest that in the fundamental mood of anxiety, and only for a very transient 
moment, one is able to attune to the nothing itself, one is brought before the nothing itself. Anxiety in 
this sense does not signify anxiousness or fearfulness. It differs from fear in that one becomes afraid in 
the face o f  this or that particular being which threatens in a particular way. There is thus fear in the
face of something in particular. In contrast, anxiety is anxiety in the face o f.. , not in the face of this
or that thing - “Anxiety in the face of...is always anxiety for , but not for this or that”. There is
something that cannot be determined, an essential impossibility of determination. It is precisely this 
indetermination that comes to the fore whereby one “can get no hold on things”. In the slippage, the 
receding of beings, it is this “no hold on things” that overwhelms. This certain anxiety can awaken at 
any moment, needing no unusual event to rouse it. It is always (al)ready, though it only manifests very 
seldomly whereby “we are snatched away and left hanging” and in its face all utterance falls silent 
(Heidegger, 1993: 101-102; 106). For Heidegger, the compulsive talk that is utilised to shatter the 
vacant stillness o f the malaise o f anxiety merely confirms the presence of nothing.
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that does not fall within the realm of ontological grammar — a fundamental impasse 
that Derrida (1992: 18) identifies as the “problem of language before linguistics”. 
Moreover, Derrida's (1981b: 62; 83; 78) texts are punctuated by lacunae which mark
“the sites of a theoretical elaboration which remains still to come” so that nothing
can be immediately given, and this in turn limits effective transformation and the 
proliferation of motifs of homogenous volumes. The still to come imposes “the 
determined blank or playing space” o f textuality. The determination o f Derrida’s texts 
is insistently otherwise, necessarily fissured so as to facilitate something other than a 
circular closure o f interpretation and representation. It is concerned with the 
“movement by means of which (the) text exceeds its meaning, permits itself to be 
turned away from, to return to, and to repeat itself outside its self-identity”. In 
Derrida’s (2003: 17-18) texts, there is a dimension of “undecidability” with “many 
ways o f hearing and understanding a sentence” so that one is compelled to “change 
the rules, to read differently, if only at another rhythm”3. This approach is informed 
by the inevitable refutation o f the promissability of language, o f a language that 
would be able to contain or retain the repletion o f meaning - “Language or speech 
promises, promises itself but also goes back on its word, becomes undone or 
unhinged, derails or becomes delirious, deteriorates, becomes corrupt just as 
immediately and just as essentially” (Derrida, 1989: 93-94).
Levinas (1996: 55) questions whether Derrida’s work constitutes a line of 
demarcation which separates the dogmatic from the critical. Indeed, Derrida’s 
concerns demonstrate a growing awareness of the difficulty of thinking. Derrida’s 
oeuvre is where one treads “a no-mans land, an in-between that is uncertain even of 
the uncertainties that flicker everywhere. Suspension o f truths! Unusual times!”. It 
inaugurates a new mode of thought which entails an inversion of the abyss into 
condition, o f the limiting concept into precondition, of defect into source. It seems as 
if nothing is left inhabitable for thought. Levinas (1996: 56-57) terms this “a new 
frisson, Derrida’s poetry”, which in the aftermath signals a desertion of an impossible 
presence, “a project impossible o f accomplishment, ever deferred, a messianic future
3 Cixous (1984: 151) suggests that this undecidability in Derrida’s texts pushes “his work to the limit 
where logic vacillates”. The undecidable is where “nothing cuts, decides, where everything is 
unhinged” so that it obeys a new law o f  the “logic of non-logic”. The undecidable also implies that as 
soon as one attempts to arrest or coin a concept it should rather quickly be placed back “into that 
general movement o f oscillation in order not to make of it a master concept”.
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as that missing present”. A desertion o f presence carried out to the extreme point of a 
desertion of truth implies that meanings are no longer responsive to the “summons of 
Knowledge”. Truth no longer functions at the level of the eternal or omni-temporal. 
Meanings no longer converge on truth, signifiers function without signifieds, 
language no longer possesses full meaning guides. All, as Levinas suggests, is 
otherwise -  wholly otherwise. Derrida’s deconstruction of presence, his liberation of 
the temporal from the subordination o f the present whereby the past and future are no 
longer modifications or modulations o f the present, possesses broad implications for 
consciousness which in effect looses its Cartesian privilege as a consciousness of self­
presence, unity and mastery.
In his essay, “The Double Session”, Derrida (1981: 194) offers a warning in the 
course o f a discussion on potential Hegelian or Platonic overtones o f the word “Idea” 
in Mallarme’s writing: “But a reading here should no longer be carried out as a 
simple table of concepts or words, as a static or statistical sort of punctuation. One 
must reconstitute a chain in motion, the effects o f a network and the play of syntax”. 
For Johnson (1981), this warning applies equally well to Derrida’s own writing which 
is constructed as a moving chain or network which assiduously frustrates and thwarts 
the desire for conclusion or stasis. Derrida’s writing mimics the movement as opposed 
to the fulfilment of desire, refusing to stop and totalise itself. As Derrida (1993b: 199) 
proposes: “I never write or produce anything other than this destinerrancy of desire, 
the unassignable trajectories and the unfindable subjects”. His texts espouse 
ambiguities, parentheses, unnamed allusions, mystifications and disseminative logic. 
In endeavouring to deconstruct the ‘either/or logic’ that encompasses the spectrum of 
occidental metaphysics, Derrida’s writing attempts to create an “other” logic. He is 
concerned with certain textual marks which he terms “undecidables” (Derrida, 1981: 
42) that can no longer be incorporated into discursive binary oppositions. These 
undecidables resist and disorganise any neat dichotomies without ever constituting a 
third term so that neither/nor is simultaneously either/or. As an example, one could 
cite the word supplement which appears frequently in Derrida’s lexicon. In French, 
the word supplement means both “an addition” and “ a substitute” so that “instead of 
‘A is opposed to B’ we have ‘B is both added to A and replaces A ’. A and B are no 
longer opposed, nor are they equivalent. Indeed, they are no longer even equivalent to 
themselves. They are their own differance from themselves”. The logic of the
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supplement thus wrenches apart the very structure o f the binary and espouses a 
subversion o f meaning whereby “the shadow presence o f the other meaning is always 
there to undermine the distinction” (Johnson, 1981: xiii). The doubleness of the word 
supplement in turn proliferates the text’s signifying possibilities. Moreover, two 
seemingly oppositional terms come to function in a nexus o f supplementarity 
whereby, as Derrida (1982: 17-18) points out in Freud’s oeuvre as an example, “every 
apparently rigorous and irreducible opposition (for example the opposition of the 
secondary to the primary) comes to be qualified, at one moment or another, as a 
‘theoretical fiction’”. All oppositions appear “as the other different and deferred”. 
Derrida’s (1978: 352) oeuvre signals an other way which interrogates the very 
“structrality of structure”, calling into question what reduces the signifier to thought, 
the conferment o f a centre, a fixed locus or origin, and a privileged reference which 
seeks to orientate, balance and organise a structure and which in turn limits the play 
of that structure. His work functions at the limits o f the discursive.
One possibly limited attempt at dealing with the limitations of language is a certain 
exigency that motivates Derrida to write “sous rature”, which Spivak (1976: xiv) 
translates as “under erasure”. This process entails writing a word, crossing it out, and 
then printing both the word and the deletion. Since the word is inaccurate, it is 
crossed out. However, since it is necessary (in an endeavour to foreground some 
concept or notion through a linguistically flawed system), it remains legible4. As an 
example, Derrida (1976: 19) writes: “ ...the sign is (“is” is crossed out) that ill-named 
thing (“thing” is crossed out), the only one, that escapes the instituting question of 
philosophy: ‘what is....?”. This linguistic orientation highlights the necessity of both 
using (the written declaration, the printing of a word) and erasing (the crossing out) 
language simultaneously. Spivak (1976: xviii) suggests how the process of this 
curious practice alludes to a strategy “of using the only available language while not 
subscribing to its premises”, or “operating according to the vocabulary of the very 
thing that one delimits” (Derrida, 1982: 18). For Derrida (1978), language contains 
within itself the necessity of its own critique, the resources for its deconstruction. 
This notion illuminates writing “under erasure” whereby one is forced to proceed by
4 Elsewhere, Derrida (1989: 2) has described this process as “writing without writing, using words 
without using them: in quotation marks, for example, under a non-negative cross-shaped crossing out, 
or again in propositions of the type: ‘If I were yet to write a theology, as I am sometimes tempted to 
do, the word ‘Being’ ought not to appear in it,’etc”.
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ellipses and relinquish the very concept that language describes at the very moment 
that it is mobilised and utilised in the process of description. In addition, the crossing 
out signifies the mark o f contortion and the strain of linguistics as a system that fails 
to capture the ‘thing’, the absolute presence of a concept. Within and through 
language, there is always difference, heterogeneity and lost presence. As Derrida 
(1976: 18) writes: “The order o f the signified is never contemporary, (it) is at best the 
subtly discrepant inverse or parallel -  discrepant by the time of a breath -  from the 
order of the signifier”. Language cannot bring forth presence, it is the place where 
'‘the completely other is announced as such -  without any simplicity, any identity, 
any resemblance or continuity -  within what is not it” (Derrida, 1976: 47). Word and 
thing can never fall within the realm o f unity. The structure o f language is predicated 
on an other trace which remains non-simply present and cannot be captured in its frill 
being.
Aporias
In Aporias, Derrida (1993: 1-3) explores if one is able to transgress the borders, 
edges, extremities and ends o f truth, “letting oneself be carried beyond the limits of 
truth”. The expression “the limits o f truth” implies that truth is precisely limited, 
finite and confined within its borders. As a result, the truth “is not everything one 
would say, for there is more, something else or something better: truth is finite (finie). 
Or worse: truth is finished (c ’est fin i)”. Derrida investigates the discursive nature of 
truth and death in this text in order to reveal how such concerns allude to the 
“rhetoric o f  borders”, the lines of delimitation pertaining to proprietorial rights over 
one’s existence, the proper (possibility) o f our existence, “a treatise about the tracing 
of traits as the borderly edges o f what in sum belongs to us (nous revient), belonging 
as much to us as we properly belong to it”. He questions the nature o f borders as they 
pertain to death and truth, “wander(ing) about in the neighbourhood” of these 
questions. With the threshold o f death, for example, one is engaged with a certain 
possibility of the impossible, a certain impossibility as nonviability, as nontrack or 
barred path. Derrida (1993: 22) suggests how the word “death” is absolutely 
“unassignable or unassigning with respect to its concept and to its thingness”. When 
speaking about death, everything transpires at the limits o f truth and untruth. Derrida 
is interested in what is involved in the crossing o f the ultimate border, crossing the
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threshold, passing the term of one’s life. The crossing of borders always announces 
itself in accordance with the motion of a certain step which crosses a line of 
indivisibility . Yet as Derrida (1993: 8) perceives, is such a crossing possible and can 
one testify to it? This concern places one on the path o f the aporia, that which is “the 
difficult or the impracticable, here the impossible, passage, the refused, denied, or 
prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can in fact be something else, the 
event of a coming or o f a future advent which no longer has the form of the 
movement that consists in passing, traversing, or transiting”. The aporia refers to a 
precarious positionality which highlights the problem o f that, something other, which 
signifies a potential refusal of disclosure, that which may be indelibly lost and which 
cannot be colonised, and that which may ultimately be dissociated from any possible 
originary configuration or the possibility o f a movement that can be diachronically 
coded.
The “nonbelonging” (Derrida, 1993: 8-9; 12-13) of aporia “trembles in an unstable 
multiplicity” so that any possible context is not rendered as absolutely saturable or 
saturating. No context is able to appropriate or determine “meaning to the point of 
exhaustiveness”. The aporia signals that which exceeds meaning and the pure 
discursivity o f meaning. What is at stake in aporia is the “not knowing where to go”, 
an enduring impasse that ‘positions’ one before “a door, a threshold, a border, a line, 
or simply the edge or the approach o f the other”. In the extreme, aporia obfuscates the 
way and separates one in the very place where it would no longer be possible to 
constitute a problem , the very project or problematic task remaining impossible. 
Derrida questions whether one is even able to speak o f the experience of the aporia 
(and if so, in what sense) because one is absolutely exposed without protection, 
without a possible problem or substitution, “disarmed, delivered to the other, 
incapable even of sheltering ourselves behind what could still protect the interiority of 
a secret”. In the place o f the extremity of aporia, there is no longer any problem. This 
is not as a result o f the fact that the problem has been solved or solutions found, but 
rather one can no longer find a problem that would constitute or sustain itself, a 
problem that one “would keep in front of oneself, as a presentable object or project,
5 Derrida (1993: 10) highlights how the French word ‘pas’ signifies not only step as in “the gait, the 
pace, the rhythm, the passage, or the traversal” but also inaugurates a mark of negation, a certain ‘not’. 
This negation suggests the difficulty o f passage or journey - a forbidden venture.
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as a protective representative or a prosthetic substitute, as some kind of border still to 
cross or behind which to protect oneself’. The esoterics of the aporetic are central to 
Derrida’s work which highlights the traces of undecidability, paradoxical dislocations 
and conditions o f impossibility, as well as the edges of borders that proliferate the 
liminal. The aporia o f the impossible calls upon a temporal structure where there is an 
instantaneous dissociation from the present, a “differance in being-with-itself of the 
present” (Derrida, 1993: 17; 20-21). Something in the present is thus always 
differentiated, unknown, temporally deferred or delayed6. The heterogeneous iogic’ 
of the aporia fosters a paradoxical effect so that “the partitioning (partage) among 
multiple figures o f aporia does not oppose figures to each other, but instead installs 
the haunting of the one in the other”. In one instance, the aporia is rendered 
impermeable, derived from “an opaque existence o f an uncrossable border”, where 
the door remains permanently barred or only opened in accordance with an 
unbeatable condition. In another case, the aporia is derived from the fact that there is 
no limit, there is no longer a border to cross, since the limit remains “too porous, 
permeable, indeterminate”. Yet another instance or variation of aporia signifies that 
which is impossible whereby it functions as a nonpassage which “does not allow for 
something that could be called passage, step, walk, gait, displacement, or 
replacement, a kinesis in general. There is no more path”. The impasse is rendered 
impossible since the future advent o f an event bears no relation to the passage of what 
happens or comes to pass. The aporia may thus come to signal a refusal of trajectory - 
the end of trans (transport, transposition, transgression, translation). In short, it is that 
which “cannot pass {passer) or come to pass (se passer): it is not even the non-pas, 
the not-step, but rather the deprivation o f the pas” (Derrida, 1993: 23).
Derrida (1993: 32-33) proposes that the question o f knowing what it is “to experience 
the aporia”, to put the aporia into operation, remains. This however is not necessarily 
a failure or simple paralysis, “the sterile negativity of the impasse”, but is instead a 
question of inherency and insurmountability. A solution for escaping the bind o f the 
impasse is more than likely to be equated with a cessation o f understanding. The 
aporetic elicits a plethora o f questions without concomitant answers or solutions. 
Does one pass through the aporia? Is one immobilised before the threshold, to the
6 This notion o f the deferral o f presence to itself will be considered in detail throughout the thesis.
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point of having to turn around and seek another way? What takes place with the 
aporia? Is the aporia there where it is impossible to go? All of these questions 
function as indices o f the “coming to pass” when it is met by a limit. Throughout 
Derrida s text on the aporetic, there seems to be the adoption of a form of positing — 
the posing o f numerous questions that in the end may signal their own 
unanswerability. In addition, the notion of impossibility adds an impossible 
complement, a complement o f impossibility to possibility, so that one is faced with a 
paradoxical proposition o f the possibility of an impossibility [the aporetic supplement 
of the possible, the “paradoxical possibility of a possibility of impossibility” (Derrida, 
1993: 70)]. There is an absolute heterogeneity in the modality of the possible. This 
leads Derrida once again to question whether it is plausible to situate the aporia in the 
impossibility or in the possibility o f an impossibility, which cannot necessarily be 
equated with impossibility, for the latter scenario accedes to a possible gesture of an 
impossibility as opposed to merely conceding an impossibility which would bar 
absolutely. Therefore in the proposition o f the possibility of an impossibility, “the 
impossibility would be possible and would appear as such, as impossible, as an 
impossibility that can nevertheless appear or announce itself as such” (Derrida, 1993: 
73; 76). The limits o f the as such allude to the limits of truth and the possibility of 
truth. Death (to be expected, a laquelle s ’attendre) is the most unique and ultimate 
occurrence of this possibility of an impossibility because the nonaccess to death as 
such (nonaccess functioning as the only possible access) signals “access only to the 
aspect of the border that can only be the threshold”. The access to death is thus as 
nonaccess to a nonborder. Interestingly, as Derrida points out, death (an aporetic form 
of the nonsaid) is always the name o f a secret since it signs the irreplaceability of 
absolute singularity (no one can die in my place). It puts forth the common, public 
name of a secret. The aporetic is ultimately interminable, without end, foiling “every 
methodological strategy and every stratagem of delimitation” (Derrida, 1993: 79-80). 
It is indeed a “strange topography o f edges” where rigorous specificity remains 
untenable.
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White Mythology
Derrida (1982: 219-220) is a philosopher who is deeply engaged with the problem of 
the aporetic and his concern with metaphor, with attempting to decipher the figure of 
metaphor in the philosophical text through some kind o f systematic treatise, 
highlights the need “to recognise in principle the condition fo r  the impossibility of 
such a project”. Effectively the aporia emerges in the attempt to account for (the 
concept of) metaphor by making use o f metaphor to explicate it. Metaphor issues 
from and corresponds to a system of tropes or figures which remain in “systematic 
solidarity” to, or contemporaneous with, the tropes or figures in the system that 
metaphor would seek to dominate through explication. Metaphor colludes with the 
discourse it would seek to dominate. It thus remains in the impossible (aporetic) 
position of attempting to dominate that from which it is a derivative, to saturate that 
which can never entirely be saturated. Metaphor is so deeply enveloped in the field 
of the text that one would, in attempting to account for it as the concept of the 
concept, require some kind of ‘metaphor’ that remains outside the system or field - 
the impossible aporetic o f “the metaphor of metaphor”, a “meta-metaphorics” 
(Derrida, 1982: 224), an extra metaphor that remains extraneous to the entirety of the 
system that it circumscribes. This would imply and call for a language to reflect on 
language, a meta-language (since the delineation of metaphor is constituted by the 
fabric o f language), something outside o f language (but as and through a language 
with an intention to account for or convey) to reflect on and describe the permutations 
of the linguistic condition. What will become clear during the course of this thesis is 
the aporetic bind o f attempting to explore that which exists (ex-sists) outside the 
system of language. In his essay on ‘white mythology’, Derrida is keenly interested in 
the ways in which metaphor is implicated in philosophical (theoretical) language, the 
usure o f metaphorical puissance in philosophical exchange, “metaphor in the text of 
philosophy”. Derrrida makes use o f the word usure as an indication (an ineluctably 
metaphorical one at that) o f that which constitutes the very history and structure of 
the philosophical metaphor. Usure in French signifies both usury, the acquisition of 
too much interest, and using up, deterioration through usage. The “metaphor of (the) 
usure (of metaphor)” thus inscribes an irreducible effect of both profit and loss. The 
involvement with metaphor reveals “how metaphysics’s eternal attempt to profit from
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its ventures is based upon an irreducible loss, an ‘expenditure without reserve’” 
(Derrida, 1982: 209-210). Derrida cites Anatole France’s The Garden o f  Epicurus, 
which explores how the sensory figure is sheltered and used (up) in every 
metaphysical concept whereby abstract notions always hide a sensory figure. Indeed, 
metaphysics is connected with “the erasure of the efficacity of the sensory figure”, the 
sensory image being “deflowered and deteriorated by the history of the concept” 7. 
The text suggests how conceptual encoding effaces an “original figure”, that which is 
beneath the metaphor which simultaneously hides and is hidden. For France (cited in 
Derrida, 1982: 210), the sensuous figure remains determinable however hidden it may 
be. It is possible to reactivate the primitive inscription whereby the process is 
analogous to chemists who have reagents which render the effaced meaning of a 
papyrus or parchment visible again: “If an analogous process were applied to the 
writings o f the metaphysicians, if the primitive and concrete meaning that lurks yet 
present under the abstract and new interpretations were brought to light, we should 
come upon some very curious and perhaps instructive ideas”. Derrida (1982: 211) 
however is not convinced o f such a possibility and suggests that the primitive, 
sensory figure is not exactly a metaphor because it is “a kind of transparent figure, 
equivalent to a literal meaning {sens proper)”. It manifests as a metaphor only when 
philosophical/theoretical/conceptual discourse puts it into circulation. In this very 
process, the first meaning and the subsequent displacement are then forgotten. The 
metaphor is no longer noticed and it is taken for the proper meaning at the expense of
7 Metaphysics is concerned with aspects o f reality that frequently lie beyond the grasp of empirical 
certainty -  time and space, being and knowing, truth and presence and so forth. It endeavours to 
capture truth in an ultimate and unified point, an ultimate origin (the logos), and is thus logocentric in 
its quest for this undivided origin. The imposition of the binary oppositional structure remains 
fundamental to this epistemological tradition. Metaphysical thought bisects ‘reality’ along oppositional 
lines by setting up two opposites (a thesis and an antithesis). These traditional oppositions are lodged 
in a violent hierarchy where one pole invariably takes a privileged or superior position in relation to 
the other. In such a dichotomy, the primary term is typically considered the subject or locus of 
meaning, while the secondary pole is cast as its negation, exclusion, a/object or other. One pole is 
assumed to be prior and superior to the second which is inevitably considered to be external, 
derivative, and accidental in relation to its first. Bennington (1993: 16-17) suggests that the 
construction o f discursive structures is predicated on an unquestioned value of presence so that the 
metaphysics o f presence thinks in two moments: “presence first, of the world to a gaze, of 
consciousness to its own inspection, o f a meaning to a mind, of life to itself, of a breast to a mouth; 
absence next -  the world veiled, consciousness astray, non-sense, death, debauchery, language, 
weaning”. If one thinks the second moment as a derivation of the first, then one returns the complex to 
the simple, the contingent to the necessary and so on, and it is this that marks the order of logos. 
Derrida’s work endeavours to unfix metaphysical thinking by disrupting its foundations and dislodging 
its certitudes so that thought is no longer ordered according to a hegemonic schema. The pervasiveness 
of metaphysics in the occidental intellectual tradition, however, ensures that one can never entirely 
escape its paradigms in that no critique can ever entirely evade what it attempts to criticise.
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the effacement of the original figure. Consequently, we become “unwitting 
metaphysicians in proportion to the usure o f our words”. The Garden o f Epicurus 
suggests how “any expression o f an abstract idea can only be an analogy. By an odd 
fate, the very metaphysicians who think to escape the world of appearances are 
constrained to live perpetually in allegory. A sorry lot o f poets, they dim the colours 
of the ancient fables, and are themselves but gatherers of fables. They produce white 
mythology. Their output is mythology, an anemic mythology” (Cited in Derrida, 
1982: 213). White mythology, as Derrida (1982: 213) explains, has “erased within 
itself the fabulous scene that has produced it, the scene that nevertheless remains 
active and stirring, inscribed in white ink, an invisible design...”. White mythology 
alludes to the hidden history o f a metaphoric concept, something ‘originary ‘which 
has been lost in metaphoric construction and development. Language thus becomes 
originarily metaphorical in that it is metaphor that relates language back to its 
‘origin’. This origin however is in a sense a pseudo-origin for the ‘originary origin’ is 
permanently effaced by this metaphorically constructed origin, so that this latter 
origin is the only ‘origin’ that may be considered through language as such.
Derrida endeavours to engage with this notion o f ‘white mythology’ not in order to 
reject what has been proposed, but rather for the purposes of reconsideration. He 
suggests how the movement o f The Garden o f  Epicurus implies a continuist 
presupposition in that it considers the developmental mutation of a sensory meaning 
which is ultimately rendered metaphorically. This delineation however fails to take 
into cognisance that perhaps this ‘originary figure’ is indelibly deracinated from its 
origin and cannot be recuperated. As Derrida (1982: 215) writes: “The history of a 
metaphor appears essentially not as a displacement o f breaks, as reinscriptions in a 
heterogeneous system, mutations, separations without origin, but rather as a 
progressive erosion, a regular semantic loss, an uninterrupted exhausting of the 
primitive meaning: an empirical abstraction without extraction from its own native 
soil”. The concept o f usure, the simultaneous profit-loss configuration, is implicated 
in the constituents o f metaphor itself and therefore something which originally 
signified a “tropic and prephilosophical resource” (Derrida, 1982: 229) is transformed 
into a metaphysical-metaphoric configuration which arises at the expense o f the 
“archaeological simplicity o f a proper origin, the virginity o f a history of beginnings” 
(Derrida, 1982: 229). Between the erasure of the sensory and the movement of
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metaphorisation, there is an energetic absence, an enigmatic division, which in turn 
renders it implausible to make use of something other, from the exterior, to 
interrogate the metaphoricity o f metaphor, the construction of metaphor as metaphor. 
I think that Paul Ricoeur (2002: 203) usefully sums up the impasse when he suggests 
that there is “no discourse on metaphor that is not stated within a metaphorically 
engendered conceptual network. There is no metaphorical standpoint from which to 
perceive the order and the demarcation of the metaphorical field. Metaphor is 
metaphorically stated”. Metaphoricity is absolutely uncontrollable in that “there can 
be no principle for delimiting metaphor, no definition in which the defining does not 
contain the defined” . In this way, any discourse can never wield absolute authority 
over its metaphoric productions, or perhaps it can only do so “around a blind spot or 
central deafness” (Derrida, 1982: 228). Any discursive genre is a product of 
metaphor in that the entire discursive delimitation of metaphor already lends itself to 
being constructed and worked by ‘metaphors’.
Metaphor always risks carrying itself elsewhere, disrupting semantic plenitude, 
wandering off and no longer designating “the truth which attunes it to its referent”. 
Even if it espouses a mimetic function (an attempt to imitate some-thing through 
analogy which would offer resemblance or similarity or likeness8) there is always 
already the possibility that it may stray from this condition o f knowledge in service of 
truth. It may venture forth alone, “unloosed from the very thing it aims at”. It may 
accentuate the gap between “the nonmeaning preceding language (which has 
meaning)” and the “truth of language which would say the thing such as it is in 
itself’. In nonmeaning, “language has not yet been bom”, whereas in the truth, 
“language is to be filled, achieved, actualised, to the point of erasing itself, without 
any possible play, before the (thought) thing which is properly manifested in the 
truth”. ‘Nonmeaning’ alludes to a space which is prior to appropriation by/through 
language. ‘Truth’, on the other hand, manipulates and manoeuvres language so that it 
is assumed to no longer be multi-referential but rather refer absolutely to the thing-in- 
itself. In accordance with this nonmeaning-truth delineation, meaning still resides and 
exists in nonmeaning, yet in this ‘nonmeaning’, the truth “still might be missed”, and 
the thing may not manifest itself “in the truth” (Derrida, 1982: 241). Hence, the
8 Mimesis is what “gives us to see in action that which nonetheless is not to be seen in action, but only 
in its very resembling double, its mimemd” (Derrida, 1982: 239).
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possibility for meaning in nonmeaning signals the possibility of a detour where truth 
(actualisation o f the thing) may be (forever) lost. Metaphor may never find its proper 
analogy, its truth and its presence, what it is supposed to resemble. It is never 
exhausted in the history o f its meaning nor the visible or invisible presence o f its 
theme. In metaphor there is something elliptical which “gets carried away with itself’ 
and cannot be what it is “except in erasing itself’ (Derrida, 1982: 268; 271). The 
movement o f metaphor invariably risks an irrevocable loss of meaning since it cannot 
necessarily appropriate an unnameahle articulation which remains irreducible. There 
is a “wearing away” (Ricoeur, 2002: 202), a fading of the sensuous/sensible as the 
metaphysico-metaphoric concept gains ascendancy.
Differance
Metaphor signals an ineluctable loss o f meaning-truth and alludes to the difficulty of 
exploring metaphor with or through the framework of metaphor. It highlights the 
aporetics of ‘meta-metaphorics’, and adds to (as supplement) Derrida’s preoccupation 
with what precedes or exceeds language, with “the other of language without which 
language would not be what it is” (Derrida, 1978: 31), with what is “neither rhetorical 
nor linguistic, nor even discursive”. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Derrida 
has introduced a penumbra o f non-concepts to “mark the limits o f the linguistic turn” 
(Derrida, 2001: 76), which he has variably termed as ‘trace’, ‘text’, ‘writing’, 
‘dissemination’, ‘spectre’, ‘hymen’ and so on. It is important to note that while these 
‘non-concept’ concepts (given the difficulty o f escaping the bind of conceptualisation 
when attempting to describe even that which may ultimately resist, refuse or evade 
conceptualisation) form a chain where each may be substituted for the other, they are 
not, as Spivak (1976: lxx) reminds the reader, exactly the same because “each 
substitution is also a displacement and carries a different metaphoric charge”. In this 
section, I would like to explore the aporetic challenge that Derrida’s non-concept of 
what he provisionally calls ‘differance’ has posed to his thinking and writing. In his 
seminal essay entitled “Differance”, Derrida (1982: 3-4) immediately notifies the 
reader to a “silent lapse in spelling” in the word ‘differance’. The insertion o f the 
letter a signals a “mute irony”, an “inaudible misplacement”, which in turn fosters an 
“insistent intensification of its play”. The graphic difference (a instead of e), the 
marked difference between two apparently vocal notations, cannot be apprehended in
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speech9. 4Differance’ is neither a word nor a concept. Instead, it facilitates the 
“possibility of conceptuality, o f a conceptual process and system in general” (Derrida, 
1982: 11). It cannot represent the calm, present, and self-referential unity of a 
concept. From the outset, Derrida foregrounds the difficulty of utilising or explicating 
such a notion (“in principle and in the last analysis this is impossible, and impossible 
for essential reasons...”). He endeavours to reconstruct and reassemble in the 
configuration o f a sheaf the “different directions” in which he has provisionally 
negotiated this precarious nomination of differance. He insists upon the word sheaf 
because, inter alia, it aptly captures “a complex structuring of a weaving, an 
interlacing which permits the different threads and different lines of meaning - or of 
force - to go off again in different directions, just as it is always ready to tie itself up 
with others”. Differance bypasses the order o f apprehension in general and it is 
offered “by a mute mark, by a tacit monument”, remaining “silent, secret and discreet 
as a tomb”. It is a tomb that “cannot even be made to resonate”, a “pyramidal 
silence”, and a “strange space”. For Derrida (1982: 5-6), the endeavour to 
conceptualise differance is infused with equivocation and instability. As he playfully 
intimates:
What am I to do in order to speak o f the a o f differancel It goes without saying that 
it cannot be exposed. One can expose only that which at a certain moment can 
become present, manifest, that which can be shown, presented as something present, 
a being-present in its truth, in the truth o f a present or the presence of the present. 
Now if differance is (and I also cross out the “is”) 10 what makes possible the 
presentation o f the being-present, it is never presented as such. It is never offered to 
the present. Or to anyone. Reserving itself, not exposing itself, in regular fashion it 
exceeds the order o f truth at a certain precise point, but without dissimulating itself as 
something, as a mysterious being, in the occult of non-knowledge or in a hole with 
indeterminable borders (for example, in a topology o f castration)11. In every
9 A central issue that Derrida’s work addresses is the speech/writing binary whereby western 
metaphysics has exalted speech as the privileged medium of meaning (phonocentrism) at the expense 
of writing which is seen as its derivative, a threat to the true carrier of meaning, a tainted substitute for 
the sovereignty and supremacy of speech. In this way, writing implies repetition, risk of loss, absence, 
distance, ambiguity and death.
10 The “is” is crossed out in Derrida’s original text in order to gesture towards the impossibility of 
representation in presence. Differance cannot be implicated in the immediacy of presence.
11 As mentioned in the first chapter, Lacan’s “typology of castration” assigns the hole or lack to a place 
and therefore institutes a metaphysical position (albeit a negative one) of constructing absence, the
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exposition it would be exposed to disappearing as disappearance. It would risk 
appearing: disappearing.
The above passage highlights the detours, locutions and syntax in which the text is 
forced to take recourse (refuge). From the beginning, Derrida has had to “delineate 
that differance is not, does not exist, is not a present-being (on) in any form; and we 
will be led to delineate also everything that it is not, that is, everything; and 
consequently that it has neither existence nor essence. It derives from no category of 
being, whether present or absent”. Differance cannot be reduced to any ontological 
appropriation, yet in the very opening o f the space in which ontology produces its 
process, differance mysteriously inscribes and exceeds ontology “without return”. As 
a consequence, there is nowhere to begin to trace the sheaf o f differance because 
“what is put into question is precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute 
point of departure, a principal responsibility”.
Differance does not operate according to principles, postulates, axioms or definitions, 
nor does it proceed along a linear trajectory. In the etching of differance, “everything 
is strategic and adventurous” (Derrida, 1982: 7). It is strategic because no 
transcendent truth is able to colonise the totality of the terrain or field. It is 
adventurous because the strategy adopted is not a simple strategy that develops tactics 
according to a final goal, theme or destination. One is forced to develop a strategy 
without finality, “blind tactics”, because differance proliferates the concept of play 
which in turn announces “the unity o f chance and necessity in calculations without 
end”. Differance, which maintains a certain necessary relationship with the structural 
limits of mastery, alludes to that which is most irreducible. Although it is neither a 
word nor a concept, Derrida attempts a semantic analysis in order to explicate what is 
at stake. The verb differer (from the Latin verb differre) possesses two meanings12. 
The first meaning or motif refers to “the action o f putting off until later, of taking into 
account, of taking account of time and o f the forces of an operation that implies an 
economical calculation, a detour, a delay, a relay, a reserve, a representation...”. 
Differer in this sense is to temporise, to take recourse in the tem poral and
lack, the hole, as a transcendental principle that can be pinned down as such and thereby govern a 
theoretical discourse.
12 In English, the two distinct meanings of the Latin differre have become two separate words: to defer 
and to differ.
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temporising mediation o f a detour” which suspends accomplishment or fulfilment (of 
desire, will and so on) and simultaneously, in this very process of suspension, annuls 
or tempers its own effect. It is the “temporising detour o f deferral”, a “kind of 
infinitesimal and radical displacement” (Derrida, 1982: 14). The other meaning of 
differer refers to that which is not identical, a “dissimilar otherness”, whereby an 
interval, a distance, spacing, must be produced between. Derrida (1982: 8-9) proposes 
that if one were to conceptualise differance in adherence with classical strictures, it 
could be said “to designate a constitutive, productive and originary causality, the 
process o f scission and division which would produce or constitute different things or 
differences”.
Derrida suggests that if one accepts the form of the question, what is differance?, then 
one is forced to conclude that differance has been derived, has happened, can be 
governed, mastered and controlled. Moreover, one must examine and interrogate this 
question as it appropriates the status of a question and turn it back on itself otherwise 
one automatically retreats into what one has endeavoured to disengage from, that is, a 
quest to construct knowingness through differance. Differance is never present as 
such in that “each element appearing on the scene o f presence, is related to something 
other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and 
already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element” 
(Derrida, 1982: 13). Differance is what disrupts the possibility of a linear or 
chronological temporality so that, in one o f Derrida’s (1993: 14) majestically playful 
conundrums, “the now is and is not what it is. More precisely, it only ‘scarcely’ is
what it is. Insofar as it has been, it no longer is. But insofar as it will be,  it is not
yet” 13. In this way, Derrida posits presence as a “determination and as an effect”, a 
determination or an effect within a system that is no longer that o f presence but of 
differance, where the binaries of activity/passivity, cause/effect,
determination/indetermination, no longer hold. This reconsideration of presence also 
impacts on the understanding o f consciousness as the perception o f self in presence. 
Freud, as Derrida suggests, was a writer who “put consciousness into question in its 
assured certainty of itself’. He called the authority of consciousness into question and 
thus the primacy o f presence as consciousness. More significantly, he did so on the
13 The convolutions of Derrida’s commentary on temporality will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4 
on the O-Function.
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basis of the motif o f  differance — “All the oppositions that furrow Freudian thought 
relate each of his concepts one to another as moments of a detour in the economy of 
differance. One is but the other different and deferred, one differing and deferring the 
other. One is the other in differance, one is the differance of the other” (Derrida, 
1982: 18-19). As an example, Derrida suggests that the difference between the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle is “only differance as detour”. Indeed, the 
pleasure principle and the reality principle do not oppose each other as thesis and 
antithesis (emerging into synthesis), but rather form “an alterity that is even more 
irreducible than the alterity attributed to opposition”. For Derrida, the only instance 
that seems to contradict pleasure is the pleasure principle itself in that it is divided 
from itself, different and deferred in relation to itself, so that it “unleashes in itself the 
absolute other” (Derrida, 1987: 283-85). Derrida cites Freud (1991a: 278) in Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle:
Under the influence o f the ego’s instincts o f self-preservation, the pleasure principle 
is replaced by the reality principle. This latter principle does not abandon the 
intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure, but it nevertheless demands and carries 
into effect the postponement o f satisfaction, the abandonment of a number of 
possibilities o f gaining satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure as a 
step on the long indirect road to pleasure.
Derrida (1982: 19) proposes that the above cited passage o f Freud’s text, Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, touches on the “point o f greatest obscurity, on the very enigma of 
differance, on precisely that which divides its very concept by means o f a strange 
cleavage”. This is as a result o f the fact that one is forced to contend simultaneously 
with differance as the economic detour which aims at coming back to the pleasure 
that has been deferred by calculation, and differance as the “relation to an impossible 
presence, as expenditure without reserve, as the irreparable loss of presence, the 
irreversible usage o f energy, that is, as the death instinct, and as the entirely other 
relationship that apparently interrupts every economy”. In this proposition, Derrida is 
speaking of a relationship between a differance that is able to make profit on its 
investment (an economical configuration that is able to retreat back to the pleasure 
that was deferred), and a differance that misses its profit (the noneconomical 
‘position’ that signals the death o f pleasure which remains indelibly lost). The
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economic character o f differance however in no way implies that deferred pleasure 
can always be found again because, as Derrida (1982: 20-21) suggests, “we must 
conceive o f a play in which whoever loses wins, and in which one loses and wins on 
every turn”. Moreover, if the deferred pleasure remains implacably and indelibly 
postponed, it does not mean that a certain presence remains absent or hidden because 
differance is what “maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily 
misconstrue, and which exceeds the alternative o f presence and absence”. That which 
exceeds all putative oppositions is excluded from every process of presentation by 
means of which it would be possible to call upon it to show itself. As a result, the 
unconscious, for example, is not “a hidden, virtual, or potential self-presence. It 
differs from, and defers, itself’. It is woven o f differences and sends out delegates, 
representatives and proxies but without necessarily the guarantee that it “might be 
present, be ‘itself somewhere, and with even less chance that it might become 
conscious”, that it might be a virtual and masked consciousness. The radical alterity 
of the unconscious is marked by an irreducibility so that the language of presence and 
absence (absence constructed and assumed as a consequence of the absence of 
presence) is wholly inadequate in the description and reading of its traces. It cannot 
be reduced to the simplicity o f the living present as “an originary and unceasing 
synthesis”, a synthesis assiduously directed back on itself. The unconscious does not 
allude to the horizon of reconstructed - past or future - presents. Instead it signals the 
“‘past’ that has never been present, and which never will be, whose future to come 
will never be a production or a reproduction in the form of presence”. Like 
differance, unconscious traces cannot be thought on the basis of the presence of the 
present. The unconscious trace is never as it is in the presentation of itself because it 
erases itself in presenting itself. In short, differance challenges the possibility of 
delimiting the ontology o f presence which it continuously dislocates and displaces. It 
carries itself beyond in a movement that dissociates being and knowing, existence and 
knowledge. It is a fracture o f the Cartesian cogito which confers knowledge on what 
and who I am. Not only is there no kingdom o f differance, but differance instigates 
the subversion of every kingdom “which makes it obviously threatening and infallibly 
dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presence of 
a kingdom” (Derrida, 1982: 22 -24). There is no essence to/of differance, and it 
remains foreign and unnameable, not provisionally so but rather because there is no 
name for it at all. There never has been and never will be “a unique word, a master-
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name , a primary prescription or the prophetic annunciation o f an imminent and as 
yet unheard-of nomination . That which is termed X (differance, for example) is 
written completely otherwise.
While Kristeva (1984: 140) acknowledges the radicality of differance, its capacity to 
indicate the “exorbitant mobility” o f logocentrism and push it “further and 
elsewhere”, she nevertheless takes up (and on) a full critique of differance in her 
seminal text, Revolution in Poetic Language, under a chapter entitled “Non­
contradiction: Neutral Peace”. This critique warrants elaboration in that it presages 
what will be developed in this research project. Kristeva’s arguments indicate a head- 
on confrontation (a revolution) as opposed to the “non-contradiction” o f Derrida’s 
position. From her point o f  view, differance is neither positive nor negative and 
therefore lacks the force and productivity of either pole. As a consequence, 
heterogeneity, or what Kristeva (1984: 141-142) terms ‘negativity’, “has become 
positivised and drained o f its potential for producing breaks”. It holds itself back in a 
process of delaying (;retardment) or deferment and thus becomes merely positive and 
affirmative in its inscription and institution through retention, as opposed to being 
able to produce genuine rupture. Through this ingathering (recueillement), differance 
absorbs oppositions and contradictions which are rendered as efficacious through a 
negativity that “concatenates, reactivates and generates”. Kristeva further suggests 
that differance, and its concomitant effacement, is a movement that “retreats before 
the thetic” and therefore it cannot assure a position for the subject to engage within 
symbolic structures14. Sheltered by the pre-symbolic realm (what Kristeva terms the 
‘semiotic’15), differance “denounces the economy of the symbolic function and opens
14 The break into, and boundary of, the symbolic order is the thetic. The thetic is a rupture which 
distinguishes the semiotic (drives and their articulations) from the symbolic order, marking the 
“threshold o f language”. It produces the positing o f signification, enunciation and proposition 
(Kristeva, 1984: 45). It represents moments when the unstable semiotic is harnessed to provide 
organisation, structure and order, and it organises the drives into symbolically amenable forms (Grosz, 
1989).
1 5  The semiotic and the symbolic are two heterogeneous orders in the production of discourse, 
constitution o f the subject, and regulation o f social relations. Their interaction is dialectic and together 
they provide the energy and impetus for all individual, social and textual experience. The two orders 
permanently and dynamically coexist and are inseparable from the signifying process that constitutes 
language (Kristeva, 1984). In order to discover the semiotic, one needs to go beyond the “theatre of 
linguistic representations” and consider “pre or translinguistic modalities o f psychic inscription” 
(Kristeva, 1987b: 5 ). It consists o f  drive-related and affective meaning organised according to primary 
processes whose sensory aspects are often nonverbal - sound and melody, rhythm and colours, odours 
and so on (Kristeva, 1995). The semiotic is thus correlated with pre-oedipal pulsions remaining 
heterogeneous to symbolic representation (Kristeva, 1984). It signals its presence in discourse through
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up a space that the latter cannot subsume ’. Therefore it is forced to give up on the 
subject and his/her functioning as social practice, as well as the subject’s capacity for 
jouissance or disintegration because the subject needs to be anchored within the 
symbolic in order to be decentred. Moreover, “neutral in the face of all positions, 
theses and structures”, differance invariably remains “equally restrained when they 
break, burst or rupture”, demonstrating “disinterestedness towards (symbolic and/or 
social) structure”, and remaining “silent when faced with its destruction or renewal”. 
Kristeva regards the “neutral peace” o f differance as an abdication of responsibility 
that “gives up on the subject” in that it fails to implicate itself directly in socio- 
symbolic structure or its collapse, except as an oblique anteriority, an a priori 
movement that engenders possibilities and openings for symbolic structures. De Nooy 
(1998) suggests how the assignation of the label of ‘neutral peace’ to Derrida’s 
philosophy is situated antithetically to the Kristevan position of revolution where 
there is no place for a non-committal movement that blurs the contrasting opposing 
forces. Derrida is more concerned with conceiving common ground and the 
differance o f irreducible differences.
Kristeva (1984: 143-144) further proposes that differance “brushes aside” drive 
residues and corporeal pulsions which “return, heterogeneous, to interrupt its 
contemplative retention”. Instinctual heterogeneity, which Kristeva regards as neither 
deferred nor delayed, is “precisely that which enters into contradiction with 
differance and brings about leaps, intervals, abrupt changes, and breaks in its spacing 
(iespacementf. For Kristeva, contradiction is the irruption of the heterogeneous which 
“cuts short” any differance. Moreover, the drive residuals highlight an impossibility 
of gathering up heterogeneity into differance without leaving any remainders so that 
the return o f the heterogeneous element in the movement o f differance “brings about 
the revolution of differance: expenditure, semantico-syntactic anomaly, erotic excess,
effects of rhythm, nonsense, alliteration, wordplay, repetition and the dominance of sound over sense 
(Graybeal, 1994). The semiotic is the repository of drives in language, being the precondition of 
language itself and the element in signification that recuperates the body back into the very structures 
of language. It therefore manifests as the subversive and revolutionary potential of all signification, 
radically subverting discursive structures (Kristeva, 1980; 1984). In short, it is the repressed condition 
of symbolically regulated language (Grosz, 1990). Kristeva’s description of the symbolic relies heavily 
on Lacan (as explicated in the first chapter). It is in their elaborations of the pre-symbolic mode that 
they opt for different directions. For a discussion of pre-symbolic differences between Lacan and 
Kristeva, the reader is referred to Gallop (1982) Feminism and Psychoanalysis: The Daughter’s 
Seduction (see especially pg 124).
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social protest, jouissance ". The heterogeneous element poses a direct threat to the 
barrier which protects the trace and its effacement and indeed ‘fosses it aside” 
through the expenditure o f non-defened energy charges that can no longer be held in 
abeyance. Instead o f maintaining the scene o f differance, the energetic forces and 
discharge o f the heterogeneous element, which fosters a sense of scission and 
division, produces “flashes, ruptures and sudden displacements” (Kristeva, 1984: 
145) which could “pierce and abolish ’ differance, and therefore because it retreats 
before the thetic, all symbolic functioning would cease and the way for psychosis 
would open up. Differance risks terminal rupture when the instinctual heterogeneity 
of the drives, the explosive force o f negativity (which operates within and against 
differance), breaks in and cuts it short. Owing to its retreat before the thetic function 
and its refusal to anchor itself within symbolic positioning, differance may be swept 
away entirely by a sea o f madness. Kristeva also considers another possibility 
whereby heterogeneity may be indefinitely deferred by differance so that the latter 
confines itself “within a non-rertewable, non-productive redundancy, a mere precious 
variant within the symbolic enclosure: contemplation adrift”. This would in turn 
render differance as superfluous and stagnant, a mere esoteric “device of the 
signifier’s drifting” whereby “emptied o f its heterogeneous contradiction, withdrawn 
from material discontinuity and social imbrication, the flow of the drives is merely 
mimed within a simulacrum and its unfolding, a sidestepping”. In this way, there 
would be a “hollowing out o f  the drives” (Kristeva, 1982: 98-99). As mentioned, 
Kristeva’s critique o f Derrida’s differance highlights a seminal difference in their 
work in that she views heterogeneity as an invasive tactic of opposition, 
contradiction, struggle and revolution, whereas for Derrida this heterogeneity remains 
somewhat evasive, escaping in a non-oppositional way16. De Nooy (1998) points out 
that Kristeva’s disagreement with Derrida emerges out of the proposition of 
positionality, o f positions and the positing o f theses. For Kristeva, some type of 
provisional position needs to be affirmed against which heterogeneity can launch its
16 Kristeva’s notion o f opposition however should not be confused with a simple binarity. Instead, as 
de Nooy (1998) points out, it is an opposition within sameness that creates alterity. For Kristeva, the 
notion of alterity stemming from the same does not preclude opposition or even contradiction. She 
stresses, for example, the inextricable nexus, and interdependence between the semiotic and the 
symbolic in her work whereby each manifests aspects of the functioning of the other. The symbolic 
requires the creative transgression of the semiotic for renewal and regeneration, whereas the semiotic 
requires symbolic containment and regulation in order to avoid a descent into psychosis. Nevertheless, 
they remain “two heterogeneous realms” (Kristeva, 1984: 48).
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assault. Derrida, on the other hand, prefers to avoid positionality in favour of 
movement, slippage, deferral and detour. Differance is a form of movement that 
eschews any set direction so that it “unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of 
differing and deferring substitutions” (Derrida, 1982: 26). It avoids the engagement of 
a position in opposition. I have cited Kristeva’s critique of differance as a preface to a 
section in the following chapter (see “Meditation on Athetic Retreats”) where I will 
address these concerns in more detail once I have developed the non-concept of what 
I will term the ‘third aesthetic’ which remains inextricably connected to the 
movement o f differance, and is thus subject to the same critical considerations and 
negotiations.
PSYCHOANALYSIS AT THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE 
Strangers to Ourselves: Cause, Lack and Desire
As mentioned in the introduction o f this chapter, I would like to explore several areas 
within psychoanalysis which have radically challenged its capacity to reduce, 
categorise and conceptualise in a definitive, precise and comprehensive manner. 
Given the enormity o f the task o f attempting to address the implications of the 
cardinal thread o f the fabric o f psychoanalysis -  the unconscious - I would like to 
focus specifically on Lacan’s consideration o f the unconscious which I think not only 
pushes, subjectivity, knowledge, epistemology and so on to the extreme, but also 
vehemently refuses any neat concretisation or oversimplification. I think that it is 
sometimes easy to forget (or perhaps convenient to do so given the empirical 
demands of the scientific endeavour and those who consider it necessary to classify 
psychoanalysis within the discursive parameters o f ‘science’) that this founding 
variable o f psychoanalysis, the unconscious, gives psychoanalysis its distinctive 
character in that it opens up the space for writers like Frosh (2002: 123; 129; 135) to 
consider and advocate psychoanalysis as a “discipline dealing with the eccentric, the 
erratic and the excessive -  with all that is ‘out o f step’ with the apparent rationality of 
social circumstances”. Indeed, events frequently exceed the accounts that can be 
given of them so that something remains in excess (other than or more than), 
irreducibly extra-discursive, which signals that the “passionate intensity of 
unconscious fantasy can often/always be found hovering at the fringes of identity,
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energising it but also battering it down”. Psychoanalysis may reveal a point where 
language fails, where language in all its guises is characterised by its insufficiency 
rather than its expressive capacity, where what is known in and by a person lies quite 
simply outside symbolisation’ . Moreover, as Frosh (2001: 631) suggests, the 
existence o f the unconscious not only implies that “each o f us is unaware of aspects 
of ourselves, but by its very nature the unconscious blocks the process of knowing, 
actively creating symptoms and blind spots all the time. If  this is so, then not only is it
impossible to know anything absolutely but the nature of knowledge becomes
cloudy, infiltrated by all sorts o f ‘irrational’ impulses”. Psychoanalysis imbues 
subjectivity and experience with an element o f the foreign,' the uncanny. The German 
word ‘unheimlich’, translated in Freud’s work by the English word ‘uncanny’, 
literally translates as ‘unhomely’. The subject of the uncanny gestures towards the 
province of that which elicits dread and horror, repulsion and distress, with the 
negative ‘w«’ signifying something “eerie, weird, arousing gruesome fear”. Freud 
(1955: 224; 220; 244) suggests how the uncanny is “that class of the frightening 
which leads back to what is known o f old and long familiar”, what is “secretly 
familiar”, because the uncanny is something which has become alienated from the 
psyche as a result o f repression. There is thus an element o f the unhomely 
(unheimlich) in the homely (heimlich), something foreign and unfamiliar in the 
familiar. The word ‘heimlich’ belongs to two sets o f ideas, signalling what is familiar 
and agreeable, as well as what is concealed and kept out o f sight. A similar ambiguity 
attaches itself to the English word ‘canny’ which refers not only to what is ‘cosy’, but 
also to that which is endowed with occult or magical powers. In the notion of 
homelike, belonging to the house, homely, heimisch (native), there is thus a trace of 
something surreptitious that remains recalcitrant in the face o f knowledge and insight. 
Heimlich is a word whose meaning develops in the direction o f ambivalence until “it 
finally coincides with its opposite, unheimlich”. As an example, Freud (1955: 226; 
237) cites the perpetual recurrence o f the same thing, an unintended recurrence o f the 
same situation, as that which creates the impression of the uncanny. It is precisely the 
“factor of involuntary repetition which surrounds what would otherwise be innocent 
enough with an uncanny atmosphere, and forces upon us the idea o f something fateful 
and inescapable, when otherwise we should have spoken only of chance . For 
Derrida (1996: 46) everytime that the word unheimlich appears in Freud’s text, one is 
able to “localise an uncontrollable undecidability in the axiomatics, the epistemology,
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the logic, the order o f the discourse and o f the thetic or theoretic statements”. The 
uncanny is, as Royle (2003: 1) suggests, a “crisis of the proper” in that it entails a 
critical disturbance o f  what is properly one’s own and pertains to a certain 
strangeness o f framing and borders, an experience o f liminality.
Lacan (1998: 18) is psychoanalyst who shatters the notion of any sense of familiarity 
in that his work promotes an irreducible knottedness in human experience, a radical 
disjunction and extremity in or estrangement o f being. He pushes psychoanalytic 
concepts to a proximity o f rupture, to a zero point, and in doing so he espouses a 
conceptual resistance where he plays with “the refusal o f the concept”. Lacan 
suggests how the conceptualisation o f the concept is not entirely dissimilar to 
approaches imposed on one by infinitesimal calculus because “it is only by a leap, a 
passage to the limit” that a concept created is able to correlate with or realise the 
reality it is supposed to apprehend. Bowie (1991:171-72) astutely perceives how the 
Lacanian project is “uncommonly audacious” in that it endeavours “to write into the 
text of psychoanalysis the terms and conditions o f its own impossibility”17. Lacan 
seeks to construct a theory within which uncertainty and unknowingness are able to 
play themselves out, circulate freely and “rescue the sciences of mind from their 
myths of plenitude and redemption”. In this way, a conceptual elaboration of the 
unconscious must take into account the failure o f omniscience. This notion affirms 
Lacan’s (1998b: 97) conceptualisation o f Freud’s innovations in that he suggests that 
what is novel in Freud’s propositions ofras knowledge is that there is no presumption 
that the Other as the locus o f language and understanding “knows anything about it” -  
‘it’ being a certain knowledge that resists the implication that it is already available as 
knowledge, that it falls within the ambit of symbolic language, and that it is able to be 
acquired. For Lacan (1998b: 119; 125; 139), thinking does not necessarily enable 
conceptual precision. There is “some relationship o f being that cannot be known” 
where knowledge is said to be impossible, forbidden and prohibited (interdit). 
However, Lacan plays with equivocation whereby this supposed forbidden 
knowledge is not really so if “it is said between the words, between the lines”. Lacan 
attempts to “expose the kind o f real to which it grants us access” where there is an
17 Lacan (1998b: 34) rather provocatively suggests that the reader “is not obliged to understand (his) 
writings. If you don’t understand them, so much the better -  that will give you the opportunity to 
explain them”. While this may open up the domain for creative struggle, it more than likely also leads 
to a degree of meconnciisscince — explanation without understanding, being duped by the signifier.
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attempt ‘to  show where the shaping (mise en forme) o f that metalanguage — which is 
not, and which I make ex-sist — is going. Something true can still be said about what 
cannot be demonstrated”. Knowledge ultimately remains an “enigma presented to us 
by the unconscious” whereby the latter evinces knowledge that escapes the speaking 
being. As a result, the unconscious cannot be merely viewed as a dynamic and 
descriptive concept since it is also a function o f cause which designates a locus of 
opacity. Cause alludes to the notion that “the unconscious is not the fact that being 
thinks” (Lacan, 1998b: 104). It is ultimately that which remains almost unanalysable 
and impossible to understand by reason because there remains essentially in the 
function of cause a certain gap, something non-conceptual and indefinite. In the gap 
characteristic o f  cause, there is something o f the order o f the non-realised so that 
between cause and that which it affects, there remains something that may not be 
determined, something “that doesn’t work”, an impediment where something 
stumbles. The unconscious is thus experienced as discontinuity, vacillation, split, 
rupture and lack, which in turn facilitates a certain ‘absence’ as non-simple presence. 
Even if the unconscious is ‘presented’, “this discovery becomes a rediscovery and, it 
is always ready to steal away again, thus establishing the dimension of loss” (Lacan, 
1998: 22-25). The unconscious, where “something other demands to be realised”, is 
always manifested as that which vacillates in a split in the subject. The gap of the 
unconscious is however pre-ontological in that it does not lend itself to ontology and 
it remains ontically elusive and fragile. It is neither being nor non-being, but rather 
the un-realised - that which does not lend itself to ontologisation and representation.
The intricacy o f the unconscious as cause exemplifies the difficulty of neatly 
capturing the utility value or function o f the unconscious, as well as the complexity o f 
easily determining its trace or influence on psychic development whereby it eludes 
and transcends absolute definition and empirical grasp and subsequently renders a 
space which overwhelms linguistic/textual appropriation and confluence. As a result, 
what remains is the potential for the unconscious to be misrepresented in the slippage 
and rupture of meaning. All such attempts at conceptual precision must be couched 
and framed tentatively and with considerable uncertainty because, according to 
Lacan, the unconscious assiduously subverts and undermines any potential position of 
all-encompassing knowledge and illumination. It properly thwarts the myth of a 
subjective cohesion” (Rose, 1982: 30) and continues to operate from a position of
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challenge and radical revision so that any sense of subjectivity is necessarily 
accompanied by an irreducible foreignness and alterity [As Lacan (1977: 23) states: 
I is an other ]. This rendition o f radical otherness contains broader implications for 
the dynamics o f subjectivity in that the subject is displaced from a position of 
mastery, authority and control. The gesture towards otherness puts the self into 
question. Rose (1982) stresses that Lacan viewed the Freudian reading of division and 
precariousness within subjectivity as pivotal to psychoanalysis’s most radical 
insights. Lacan (1977) has made a substantial contribution to the exploration of how 
the unconscious thwarts and subverts the self s coherence and unity. His (and indeed 
Kristeva’s) emphasis on the ego’s meconnaissance or delusional mastery, his 
conceptualisation o f the subject as being petrified by the signifier, his proposition that 
the subject is governed by split, gap (beance), and lack {manque), all motion towards 
the position that the subject is primarily an effect as opposed to an agent of the 
unconscious. There is something which transcends the agency or the capacity of the 
individual to colonise and appropriate, to know as such. There is an 
acknowledgement that knowledge is necessarily accompanied by that which shadows 
edification, an irreducible otherness and unknowing, something which is indelibly 
lost in the moment of linguistic construction and conceptualisation. It is indeed a case 
of undoing any omniscient referent and contending with the abyss of the veil, the void 
of uncertainty. It is, as Irigaray (2000: 8) poetically conveys, “like a silent word, a 
living mystery, a dialogue beyond words”.
The notion o f cause also emphasises an essential feature of psychoanalytic 
epistemology whereby, as Le Guen (cited in Perron, 2001) points out, absence or lack 
manifests as a necessary signifier o f being. Lack is regarded as an integral source of 
representation, as well as implicated in the process o f symbolisation whereby the 
child begins to symbolise as a result o f the sense that something is lacking. For Lacan 
(1998), the experience o f the subject at the level of lack, the central lack being 
facilitated by the subject as desiring which is fundamentally insatiable, manifests as 
an inescapable ontological experience. Mitchell (1982: 5) proposes that the Lacanian 
subject is not an entity with an identity, but rather “a being created in the fissure of a 
radical split”, an entity “actually and necessarily created within a split”. Lack is 
accentuated by the individual’s desiring function and capacity, by the loss of the order 
of the real which signals the “lack of a lack’ (Lacan, 1998: xli). The dimension of
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desire proliferates as a consequence of primordial absence which signals something 
fundamentally impossible about satisfaction itself. The object that is longed for is 
always accompanied by a concomitant loss, and as a result any possible satisfaction 
will always contain this loss within it (Mitchell, 1982). Moreover, the demands (of 
love especially) that the child makes on the mother are imbued with a loss that will 
continue to plague and “persist over and above anything” (Rose, 1982: 32) that the 
mother could possibly confer, reciprocate, respond, say and so on. The demand in 
itself “bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for” (Lacan, 1977: 286) 
so that, as Rose (1982: 32) points out, each time the demand of the child is answered 
by the satisfaction o f its needs, “so this ‘something other’ is relegated to the place of 
its original impossibility”. This impossibility inaugurates the desiring function which 
alludes to something which is always left over, in excess, a ‘remainder’ of the subject, 
but which has no content as such. The scenario is rendered as “the problematics of 
desire...involving an impossible object” where an object does not exist except insofar 
as it is designated as an eternally missing object (Dor, 1998: 192). For Fink (1995), 
desire in its strictest sense has no object and it is therefore a continuous quest for 
something else where no specifiable object is capable o f satiating it. The only object 
implicated in desire is that which causes desire, a cause, a constitutive moment that 
brings it into being, though, as Bowie (1991) astutely perceives, ‘source’, ‘aim’ and 
‘object’ never enter into alignment when desire comes into ‘being’. Desire is 
inherently caught up in a metonymic movement and deferral of one signifier to 
another. It is radically and fundamentally elsewhere, always in motion and indelibly 
referring to an indefinite series o f signifiers (Dor, 1998).
• 18Lacan takes this notion o f lack even further in his writings m Seminar XX, Encore , 
where his struggle with limits (of knowledge, language, jouissance) is exemplified. 
Here Lacan (1998) refers to an other as opposed to a phallic jouissance (the only type 
of jouissance available to the subject o f the symbolic), where the latter implicates the
18 Fink (2002) points out that ‘encore’ refers to the idea that something more or still is needed, an 
experience is not sufficient, not enough, and therefore it needs to be repeated. Encore has to do with 
“the discordance between knowledge and being” whereby “we are still {encore) caught up in the 
insufficiency of knowledge”. This lack is what “directs the game of encore -  not that by knowing more 
about it, it would direct us better, but perhaps there would be better jouissance, agreement between 
jouissance and its end” (Lacan, 1998b: 120).
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subject in the dialectic and circuit o f desire19. Other jouissance “ex-sists” in the “not- 
whole of the Other o f  the signifier, and refers to what the subject loses at the advent 
of the entrance into the symbolic order20. Moreover, this ex-sistence implies a 
retroactive determination whereby “the not-whole is an aftereffect, nachtraglich, only 
to be delineated by the impact o f the Other o f the signifier, which tries to establish a 
totalising effect through the One o f the phallic signifier” (Verhaeghe, 2002: 113). 
This other jouissance ex-sists within the phallic economy and has to do with what 
remains outside o f the symbolic order albeit from the inside (operating retroactively 
once the level o f language o f the symbolic order comes into play) as an ex-istence of 
a foreign body (of uncanniness). The two types of jouissance, phallic and other, 
“have a strange internal relationship to each other” (Barnard, 2002: 176) so that, as 
Verhaeghe (2002: 133) suggests for explanatory purposes, “a ‘primary’ element 
becomes delineated retroactively through the operation o f the ‘secondary’ element, in 
which the primary is included, albeit as a foreign body”21. This other jouissance 
remains the Other’s other, part o f  the lack in the Other, a supplementary (as opposed 
to complimentary which would render it within a spherical whole) jouissance that
19 For Lacan (1998b: 55; 92), there is “no other apparatus than language. That is how jouissance is 
fitted out (appareillee) in speaking beings”. Language is posited as an apparatus of (phallic) jouissance 
which in turn renders it as deficient (en defaut) and limited, “something about it mustn’t be working”, 
it never fails to falter, to come up short. It is therefore “questioned, evoked, tracked and elaborated 
only on the basis o f a semblance” -  a semblance that alludes to something in excess, a semblance that 
indicates the direction towards which jouissance inevitably fails. Phallic jouissance is inherently 
fallible and disappointing, it fails to fulfil, it “lets you down, comes up short” (Fink, 2002: 38), and 
always leaves something more to be desired. It is merely “a semblance, an envelope around something 
else” (Verhaeghe, 2002: 119).
2 0  The Other is the locus in which the chain o f the signifier is situated. For Lacan (1977), everything 
emerges from the structure o f the signifier, which in turn makes the subject an effect of the signifier, 
which is located in the realm of the Other. This relation o f the subject to the Other is produced in the 
process of a gap or lack so that there is no reciprocity in the dialectic between the subject and the 
Other. The Other, as the locus o f language, precedes the subject and is the first cause of the subject. 
The definition of the subject and the Other clearly constitutes an alienation whereby the subject can 
only be construed in terms of the locus o f the Other which does not reciprocate. The alienated subject 
is thus a divided subject. There is no way to define the subject as an entirely self-conscious entity. 
Instead, the signifier producing itself in the field o f the Other makes manifest the subject of its 
signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject to being no more than a signifier. 
In short, the union o f the subject and the Other leaves a loss so that if the subject tries to find itself in 
the Other, it will ultimately fail. The subject is literally petrified by the signifier which results in a loss 
of some of one’s being. The destiny o f the subject is vacillation between petrification by the signifier 
and indeterminacy within the slippage o f meaning. This manifests as the impasse of the subject as a 
product of the Other o f the signifier.
This notion goes to the heart o f Lacanian epistemology where for Lacan (1998b: 62) the ideas of 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ are illusions in that what is said to be primary does not appear first but is 
rather established once repression comes into being. Something may be primary only retroactively, 
once the locus of the signifier in the symbolic order (and hence the modality of repression) is firmly 
established. Repression is always that which “speaks o f something else .
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escapes the totality o f the phallic function, a ‘knowledge’ that is acquired by the body 
in experience where experiencing causes its inscription on the body. Ultimately 
however Lacan (1998b: 4; 24; 74; 116; 7-8) insists that this other jouissance “remains 
a question” because if it could be articulated through signifiers then it inevitably 
would be capable o f  missing the mark. It is “something else altogether”, something 
more (en plus), though Lacan cautions against attempting to designate this *more’ any 
better. We should instead “rough it out”. This other jouissance is ineffable, something 
we can’t quite yet “put our fingertips on”. It is “promoted only on the basis of 
infinity” where it alludes to a realisation o f a “fault (faille) or gap” in phallic 
jouissance, to what escapes the locus of the Other.
Kristeva’s Uncanny: Melancholia and Abjection
“To think the unthinkable: from the outset this has been Julia Kristeva’s project” 
(Moi, 1986: vi). Kristeva, following on from the Lacanian project of exposing the 
complexity and labyrinth-like quality o f subjectivity, is certainly a writer who boldly 
ventures into tracing the aporetics of the unnameable, the unrepresentable, so that 
“alterity, otherness, and the stranger are always at the centre of her texts” (Oliver, 
1993: 12). Roland Barthes (cited in Kristeva, 1984: 10) was once quoted as saying: 
“Several times you (Kristeva) have helped me to change, particularly in shifting away 
from a semiology o f products to a semiotics of production”. Kristeva (1980: x) sets 
herself an “exorbitant wager” which involves an endeavour, as Rose (1993b: 42) 
suggests, “to confront language at the point where it undoes itself, pushing against 
that illusion o f safety through which alone it can function, uncovering the psychic 
forces which sustain that illusion but which equally put it at risk”. Kristeva’s 
endeavours are inherently risky in that gestures towards the unnameable invariably 
bring it back from the beyond and place it within the bounds o f linguistic description. 
One therefore comes up against the perils and paradoxes of such a project. De Nooy 
(1998: 3) however suggests that both Derrida and Kristeva “make no claims to seize 
and squeeze the incomprehensible but find provisional ways of stalking what hops 
beyond their grasp”. The only possibility is to posit provisional ways of indicating 
questions and ultimately limits within the horizon of the unconquerable. Kristeva s 
work on melancholia, as an example, explores the possibilities of being engulfed by 
the unnameable, the invisible. “On the frontiers o f life and death”, melancholia is a
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noncommunicable grief remaining a “black sun”, which emerges out of an “eerie 
galaxy’ so that its “invisible, lethargic rays” compel one “to silence, to renunciation” 
(Kristeva, 1989: 3). There is a nostalgic, elegiac search to recuperate something lost, 
which in turn perpetuates the perils of a loss of self and language. The pain of 
melancholia is exacerbated by the impression o f having been deprived of an 
unnameable, supreme benevolence, o f something unrepresentable. Kristeva proposes 
that the melancholic mourns not an object but the “Thing” which does not lend itself 
to signification, being the centre o f attraction and repulsion. It is inscribed within one 
without memory (unspecified, unseparated, though the “buried accomplice of our 
unspeakable anguishes” Kristeva, 1989: 13-14) and becomes an object of desire, a 
vague indeterminate something. It is “an insistence without presence, a light without 
representation: the Thing is an imagined sun, bright and black at the same time”. The 
Thing “in-itself’ ultimately “always remains to be conveyed”. It is rendered as the 
silence of asymbolic existence. Melancholic persons are atheistic in the sense that 
they are deprived o f meaning and value, and become prisoners of affect which 
manifests as their thing. Kristeva (1989: 14-15) considers these melancholic 
individuals to be mystics in that they are “mute and steadfast devotees of their own 
inexpressible container”, devoting their tears and jouissance to “this fringe of 
strangeness”, “an archaic other that still eludes representation and naming”. 
Melancholic individual’s cannot endure Eros, the life giving force, and their 
mourning for the Thing inextricably links them to Thanatos, the death drive, against 
which they remain defenceless - “Messengers of Thanatos, melancholy people are 
witness/accomplices o f the signifier’s flimsiness, the living being’s precariousness” 
(Kristeva, 1989: 20). Triumph over sorrow alludes to the ability to no longer identify 
with the lost non-object, and identify with a third party which gives shape, form and 
schema. Such an identification, which Kristeva suggests could be termed phallic or 
symbolic, ensures the subject’s entrance into the universe o f signification which is 
positioned in opposition to the Thing as non-signifiable.
The speech o f the melancholic is often repetitive, monotonous, interrupted, arbitrary, 
evasive, uncertain and exhausted. Melancholic persons indeed speak of nothing 
because they are glued to the total and unsignifiable Thing and are thus without 
objects — “Depressed speech, built up with absurd signs, slackened, scattered, 
checked sequences, conveys the collapse o f meaning into the unnameable where it
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founders, inaccessible and delightful, to the benefit of affective value riveted to the 
Thing” (Kristeva, 1989: 52; 64). Through the expression of their empty speech, 
melancholics “assure themselves o f an inaccessible...ascendancy over an archaic 
object that thus remains, for themselves and all others, an enigma and a secret”. For 
Kristeva, successfully working through the process o f mourning depends on the 
possibility o f concatenating signifiers, o f linking signifiers in a meaningful network 
or chain. When melancholic persons give up signifying and submerge in the silence 
of pain, they are celebrating the reunion with the Thing to which they are painfully 
riveted. The affect o f  sadness is the “ultimate yet mute witness” (Kristeva, 1989: 64) 
to having lost the archaic Thing. One however can only indirectly mourn for the 
archaic Thing - through and beyond the shadow of the actual bereft object. Even 
sublimation, which exemplifies an attempt to reach the Thing, ‘"through melody, 
rhythm, semantic polyvalency, the so called poetic form, which decomposes and 
recomposes signs”, is only able to secure an uncertain hold over the Thing (Kristeva, 
1989: 14). By denying the signifier, the melancholic denies the paternal function 
which ensures the continuity and generativity of the signifying network. The 
melancholic maintains a disavowed, weakened, ambiguous and devalorised paternal 
signifier which is deprived o f its phallic power. As a result, depressed signs seem 
absurd, delayed and ready to be extinguished because o f the splitting that effects 
them. At the level o f  the sign, splitting separates signifier from referent. It thus 
maintains the anguish o f annihilation because it gradually eradicates the signifying 
system which manifests as the life-giving force o f the symbolic individual - without it 
one would be forced to confront the terrifying abyss o f emptiness. The “spectacular 
collapse o f meaning” (Kristeva, 1989: 53) assumes that the melancholic person has 
had difficulty in integrating the universal signifying sequence. They are therefore, as 
Kristeva proposes, foreigners in their maternal tongue. They have lost the meaning, 
the value, of their mother tongues. The dead language which they articulate “conceals 
a Thing buried alive”, though this Thing “will not be translated in order that it not be 
betrayed; it shall remain walled up within the crypt o f the inexpressible affect...with 
no way out”. Affect remains pivotal in the melancholic’s life because it is the only 
means of object constancy that ensures a nonverbal hold over a nonobjectal Thing. 
Moreover, the melancholic’s “alien, retarded or vanishing speech leads to a skewed 
or warped temporality whereby they remain riveted to the past, and despite the fact 
that life progresses, they remain faithful to bygone days. There is no future. Instead
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there is only an overinflated, hyperbolic past which infiltrates all dimensions of
psychic continuity. This is undoubtedly a means for capitalising on the Thing, and
brooding over it within the “enclosure o f an exitless, personal vault” (Kristeva, 1989: 
60).
I have cited fairly extensively from Kristeva’s text on melancholia not only so that the 
reader is able to gain some sense of the difficulty in attempting to yield an exact 
description for the non-concept o f  ‘the Thing’, but also as an indication of language 
in poetical captivation, o f (perhaps the necessity of) resorting to metaphor, to the 
“imaginary of philosophy”, at crucial moments in the discussion. Kristeva’s text on 
melancholia demonstrates how the imaginary is essentially and inescapably linked to 
points of tension and aporias within the text whereby there is recourse to the poetics 
of the imaginary in an attempt to adumbrate the elusiveness of the Thing, in an 
attempt to describe through language that which remains still to be conveyed. The
text also emphasises subjective experience which remains caught by something that
fuels the potency o f psychical process, without quite being able to grasp what it is, to 
render it symbolically, to nominate it linguistically. There is an invasion of 
foreignness, an explosion o f strangeness, without the possibility for its domestication 
and taming, without the possibility for the comforts of representation. The individual 
is bombarded by the “powers o f horror” (Kristeva, 1982), annihilatory anxiety in the 
face of a non-object as no-thing. Abjection is yet another example o f Kristeva’s 
fascination with the unnameable, with the aporetics o f conceptualisation, although 
here Kristeva extends this radical alterity to general developmental experience as 
opposed to confining it to a specific group of melancholically entranced individuals. 
Abjection delineates a peculiar time marking the threshold o f language and a stable 
enunciative position. Understanding abjection involves understanding the ways in 
which the space between self and other is constituted. It is elaborated through a 
failure of recognition where “nothing is familiar, not even the shadow of a memory” 
(Kristeva, 1982: 5). Abjection “preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-objectal 
relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated from 
another body”. In Kristeva’s account, it is not a lack of hygiene or cleanliness that 
causes abjection, but rather something that “disturbs identity, system and order” 
where it remains undecidable, ambiguous and marginalized (Kristeva, 1982: 10; 4).
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Kristeva (1982: 1-2) offers a poetic prelude in introducing the “massive and sudden 
emergence o f uncanniness” o f the abject which is neither subject nor object:
There looms, within abjection, one o f those violent, dark revolts of being, directed 
against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected 
beyond the scope o f  the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, 
but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which, 
nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced.....
The abject threatens binaries and is not an object that corresponds to an ego, an object 
that can be named or imagined (there is nothing “objective or objectal to the abject” 
Kristeva, 1982: 9); rather it is what is excluded by the superego. The abject is 
therefore a “pseudo-object” that “is made up before but appears only within the gaps 
of secondary repression” (Kristeva, 1982: 12). It signals the “violence of mourning” 
for an “’object’ that has always already been lost”. It is the recognition of something 
impossible which possesses the quality of being opposed to I, and it functions as a 
radically excluded, jettisoned ‘object’ that beckons the subject towards a place where 
meaning collapses (it “beseeches and pulverises the subject” Kristeva, 1982: 15; 5). It 
is located “outside, beyond the set”, on the “edge of non-existence and hallucination”, 
in a space that is “never one, nor homogenous, nor totalizable, but essentially 
divisible, foldable, and catastrophic” (Kristeva, 1982: 8). The symbolic can only 
maintain its borders through the imposition o f polarities and dichotomies, yet the 
abject threatens and points to the precariousness o f these borders (it is a “terror that 
dissembles” Kristeva, 1982: 4-5). The threat o f the abject is what is expelled by the 
symbolic and it therefore becomes the underside of a stable symbolic identity, an 
abyss at the borders o f the subject’s existence. The abject shatters the wall, the bar of 
repression, and “takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, 
in order to be, the ego has broken away -  it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, 
and death” (Kristeva, 1982: 15). In short, the abject attests to the impossibility of 
clear borders, lines o f demarcation or divisions between the semiotic and the 
symbolic. It does not negate but rather excludes. However, what is excluded can 
never be fully obliterated but hovers at the margins and borders of subjectivity, 
continually threatening with disruption and potential dissolution.
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On Not Being Able to Interpret
It seems as if psychoanalysis works against the ideality of Weltanschauung, “an 
intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on 
the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question 
unanswered and in which everything that interests us finds its fixed place” (Freud, 
1991b: 193). In this last section of the chapter, I would like to focus on two more 
phenomena in psychoanalysis — the ‘navel’ of dream interpretation and the death 
drive -  which render it as ineluctably interminable, without an end in sight. The 
‘navel’ of dream interpretation is “the place where it plumbs into the unknown”, 
though of course the world o f dreaming, o f sleeping, o f waking - a “psychic no man’s 
land of waking and not waking” -  offers up rich material in considering the 
problematics or aporetics o f conceptualisation whereby, as Jacqueline Rose (2003: 
109; 114; 106) suggests in an essay entitled “On not being able to sleep”, 
psychoanalysis may psychically overreach itself22. Derrida proposes that when Freud 
speaks of the navel o f  the dream (alluding to the “Dream o f Irma’s Injection”) in his 
seminal text The Interpretation o f  Dreams, he confesses a feeling, a premonition 
which is located in a note added after a certain delay. In this note, Freud (1991c: 186, 
n2; 671-672) has a premonition that something, an inaccessible secret, exceeds or 
inhibits the analysis: “I had a feeling that the interpretation o f this part of the dream 
was not carried far enough to make it possible to follow the whole of its concealed 
meaning. If I had pursued my comparison between the three women, it would have 
taken me far afield. There is at least one spot in every dream at which it is 
unplumbable -  a navel, as it were, that is its point o f contact with the unknown”. 
Later on Freud once again reiterates this notion:
There is often a passage in even the most thoroughly interpreted dream which 
has to be left obscure; this is because we become aware during the work of 
interpretation that at that point there is a tangle o f dream-thoughts which cannot be 
unravelled and which moreover adds nothing to our knowledge o f the content of the 
dream. This is the dream’s navel, the spot where it reaches down into the unknown.
2 2  Pqj- 3  reconsideration o f Freud’s monumental text The Interpretation o f  Dreams, the reader is 
referred to Rose’s (2003: 105-124) essay which teases out the ‘uncanny’ elements that are implicated 
in the process of sleeping and dreaming, and waking (awakening) between — the place of transitional 
states that lead us back to the deepest recesses of the psyche.
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The dream-thoughts to which we are lead by interpretation cannot, from the nature of 
things, have any definite endings; they are bound to branch out in every direction into 
the intricate network o f our world o f thought. It is at some point where this meshwork 
is particularly close that the dream-wish grows up, like a mushroom out of its 
mycelium.
Derrida s (1998: 11) reading o f the above citation gestures towards something that 
resists analysis23. In this way, the navel o f the dream no longer offers a provisional 
limit, a reserve o f delayed meaning. Instead it “concerns rather a night, an absolute 
unknown that is originarily, congenitally bound or tied...to the essence and to the 
birth of the dream, attached to the place from which it departs and of which it keeps 
the birthmark: the umbilicus...”. Every dream therefore contains within it a navel, at 
least one place, one marked topos, that remains impenetrable and unfathomable, 
detached from the context o f the dream. This navel alludes to what is knotted, 
suspended into the unknown, remaining a “knot-sear that keeps the memory of a cut 
and even of a severed thread at birth”.
Lacan is also interested in this gap, this umbilical hole. In The Four Fundamental 
Concepts o f  Psychoanalysis, Lacan (1998: 23; 43-44) proposes: “What Freud calls the 
navel -  the navel o f  dreams, he writes, to designate their ultimately unknown centre -  
which is simply, like the same anatomical navel that represents it, that gap of which I 
have already spoken”. The Lacanian conceptualisation o f the unconscious positions it 
in “profound, initial, inaugural” relation to the function of the cut. Lacan stresses the 
pulsative function o f the unconscious, “the need to disappear that seems to be in some 
sense inherent in it -  everything that, for a moment, appears in its slit seems to be
2 3  As I will make use of a considerable amount of Derrida’s readings of Freud, I think that it is 
important to foreground these readings in terms o f the acolyte (the follower) and its apparent opposite, 
the anacoluthon (what fails to follow, what is non-sequential, quite literally ‘without-following’). True 
to the Derridean spirit, one cannot claim any simple polarity between the two terms because while they 
may be logically opposed, “what appears as a necessity is that, in order to follow in a consistent way, 
to be true to what you follow, you have to interrupt the following”. Hence Derrida’s relation to Freud 
is one of fidelity and betrayal in that he endeavours to understand and to do justice to what Freud 
writes “as far as possible and as closely as possible, up to a certain point”. However, there is always 
the moment when he betrays Freud in that within the experience of following there is “something 
other, something new, or something different which occurs”, and which Derrida signs by counter­
signing — the counter-signature functioning- as the “strange alliance between following and not 
following, confirming and displacing”, the capacity for Derrida “to write in my turn (Derrida, 2003: 
7; 9-10; 13). Derrida’s attempts to locate a break, an interruption, some inconsistency or inarticulation, 
functions as a “force of resistance which resists the authority o f a given grammar so as to disorganise 
it, “not as something absolutely wild but as some other force which compels us to write differently .
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destined, by a sort o f pre-emption, to close up again upon itself’. The unconscious is 
essentially constituted by that which is refused, and not by what consciousness may 
“evoke, extend, locate, bring out of the subliminal”. As such, there are aporetic 
‘configurations’ which remain beyond consciousness and which in turn problematise 
the possibility for representation or interpretation. For Derrida (1998: 11), the navel is 
a knot that cannot be untied, that indelibly exceeds the analysis - it cannot be easily 
contained within logocentric enclosures. It is “a thread that, even if it is cut, like an 
umbilical cord, nevertheless remains forever knotted, right on the body, at the place 
of the navel”. The navel is a knot against which analysis is rendered inefficacious. 
Nevertheless, it inaugurates the birthplace to which the wish or desire of the dream is 
assigned. Like a mushroom out of its mycelium, Freud asserts how the dream-wish 
emerges and surges forth out o f the densest point o f this knotted meshwork which is 
destined for opacity and irreducibility. The place of origin o f this desire, according to 
Derrida (1998: 15), is precisely “the very place where the analysis must come to a 
halt, the place that must be left in obscurity” because this place is “a knot or tangled 
mass o f threads, in short, an unanalysable synthesis”. In this way, the very source and 
structure of the dream-wish is potentially situated by a radically heterogeneous, 
insoluble knot that in its very secret cannot be rendered or confirmed by signification. 
Yet it is this ultimate knotted unknown that fuels the dream-wish and puts it in 
motion, makes it possible and presupposes it. Psychoanalysis is forced to contend 
with what remains indissoluble and therefore it is virtually impossible for it “to gather 
itself into the unity o f a concept or a task” (Derrida, 1998: 20). There always already 
remains an unanalysable constraint, something radically incompatible and 
contradictory.
The Death Drive
Freud introduces his polemical concept o f the death drive [the “operation of 
tendencies beyond the pleasure principle, that is, of tendencies more primitive than it 
and independent o f it” (Freud, 1991a: 287)] in an essay entitled, ‘Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle’, which ushered in a radical transformation in his thought. The pleasure 
principle follows from the principle o f constancy, and possesses a tendency towards 
stability. However, it is incorrect to assume that the pleasure principle dominates the 
course of psychical processes. Instead there is a strong tendency towards the pleasure
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principle, but this tendency is opposed by certain other forces which create 
discomfort and unpleasure. One of these forces of inhibition is the reality principle, 
which does not abandon the intention of ultimately gaining pleasure, but nevertheless 
demands the postponement o f satisfaction and the temporary toleration of unpleasure 
for a period of time until it is appropriate to derive pleasure. After observing his 
grandson during what Freud subsequently termed the ‘Fort-DcC game, he proposed 
the centrality of the death drive in the constitution of the subject24. The game, which 
was “repeated untiringly” (Freud, 1991a, 284-285), involved the monotonous action 
of making a cotton reel disappear (signalling the departure of his mother) and then 
return. According to Freud, the game related to the child’s “great cultural 
achievement - instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation o f instinctual 
satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without 
protesting”. He compensated himself for this through the game of making the cotton 
reel, the object, appear and then disappear. However, the mother’s departure could 
not have possibly been viewed by the child agreeably or indifferently. Indeed, a 
substantial part of what is re-experienced under this compulsion to repeat elicits 
unpleasure within the ego because it illuminates the activities of repressed instinctual 
impulses. But this unpleasure does not necessarily contradict the pleasure principle 
for what is unpleasurable in one system may simultaneously satiate another. What is 
however a radical discovery for Freud is that “the compulsion to repeat also recalls 
from the past experiences which include no possibility o f pleasure, and which can 
never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which 
have since been repressed” (Freud, 1991a, 290-293). Freud describes how patients 
repeat unwanted situations and painful and distressing emotions in transference, and 
“revive them with the greatest ingenuity”, thus interrupting the course of a still 
incomplete treatment. There seems to be a “perpetual recurrence of the same 
(unpleasurable) thing” which leads Freud to assume that “there really does exist in the 
mind a compulsion to repeat which over-rides the pleasure principle”.
The compulsion for repetition remains “more primitive, more elementary, more 
instinctual”, and it overrides the pleasure principle. Moving from this notion, Freud
2 4  The German word ‘fort’ means ‘gone’ and correlates with the ‘o-o-o-o’ sound the child makes when 
throwing the cotton reel. ‘Da’ signifies ‘there’ and it is a joyful expression utilised to hail the 
reappearance of the cotton reel.
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(1991a, 309) postulates that “it seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in 
organic life to restore to an earlier state o f things which the living entity has been 
obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind 
of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in 
organic life”. Freud acknowledges that this statement automatically would strike one 
as peculiar for it implies an expression of the conservative, regressive nature of 
instinct working against progress and development; conservative instincts impelling 
towards repetition and thus rendering the aim of all life in death. The self-preservative 
instincts, which are attributed to living beings, are positioned antithetically in relation 
to the hypothesis that instinctual life aims to bring about death and a return, as 
regression or devolution, to an earlier state of inorganic existence. As a consequence, 
“Eros operates from the beginning of life and appears as a ‘life instinct’ in opposition 
to the ‘death instinct’ which was brought into being by the coming to life o f inorganic 
substance”. These two instincts, Eros and Thanatos, are continuously “struggling with 
each other from the very first” (Freud, 1991a, 334 nl). Critically, the death drive, as 
an intrapsychic phenomenon, remains mute and barred. As Freud (1963: 22) suggests: 
“So long as that instinct operates internally, as a death instinct, it remains silent; we 
can only come across it after it has become diverted outward as an instinct of 
destruction”. Derrida (1996: 10-11) suggests that because the death drive always 
operates in silence, it never leaves any traces or archives of its own. It destroys in 
advance its own archive. “It works to destroy the archive: on the condition o f effacing 
but also with a view to effacing its own ‘proper’ traces -  which consequently cannot 
properly be called ‘proper’”. Through its silent vocation, the death drive is thus 
anarchivic, archiviolithic (anarchic and archive-destroying). It eludes perception 
except if it disguises itself, leaving no monument and bequeathing no document o f its 
own. The archiviolithic drive is thus never present in itself or in its effects. It leaves 
nothing of its own behind, and as a principle of aggression and destruction it not only 
incites amnesia and the annihilation of memory, but also commands the radical 
effacement of that which can never be reduced to the mnemonic, the archive (the 
archive here never signifying memory as a “spontaneous, alive and internal 
experience”).
In The Four Fundamental Concepts o f  Psychoanalysis, Lacan (1998: 31) proposes 
that pleasure “limits the scope of human possibility” because the pleasure principle is
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“a principle of homeostasis”. Instead, the individual is governed by desire with its 
concomitant fundamental insatiability lending an efficacious quality to it. Desire in 
essence “meets its limit somewhere”. It “finds its boundary, its strict relation, its 
limit, and it is in the relation to this limit that it is sustained as such”. There is 
something (as limit) which excludes the possibility for desire’s satiation, and which in 
turn proliferates the process and dynamics of this desire. Desire by its very nature 
signals a movement beyond conscious articulation, for it is barred or repressed from it 
and is thus, in principle, insatiable. Nevertheless, it continually threatens to subvert 
the unity and certainty of conscious demand because it is exclusively concerned with 
its own processes, pleasures and internal logic. Desire, which continually creates and 
exacerbates anxiety around its inherent non-fulfilment, manifests as a productive and 
active state for the subject because, according to Lacan, anxiety is that which does not 
deceive. Lacan subverts the notion of pleasure by introducing the framework o f desire 
which can only be positioned in relation to that which ultimately remains 
insurmountable, to where it meets its limit. Lacan (1998: 49) further comments on 
how Freud’s discovery of repetition, the repetition compulsion in service of the death 
drive, can only be elucidated by foregrounding the relationship between thought and 
the real because “the real is that which always comes back to the same place -  to the
place where the subject in so far as he thinks does not meet it”. The order o f the
real assiduously eludes the subject and as such, repetition can never be reproduction -  
“There is never any ambiguity on this point: Wiederholen is not Reproduzieren”. 
Lacan (1998: 50-51) proposes that nothing has been “more enigmatic than this 
Wiederholen, which is very close, ....to the verb ‘to haul’ {haler) -  hauling as on a 
towpath -  very close to a hauling of the subject, who always drags his thing into a 
certain path that he cannot get out o f ’. In endeavouring to situate its agency, 
repetition generates an unknowingness and therefore institutes a cleavage within the 
subject whereby “any conception o f the unity o f the psyche, o f  the supposed 
totalising, synthesising psyche, ascending towards consciousness” must necessarily 
be abandoned. An encounter with the real (which Lacan terms as ‘tuche') is always 
radically excluded and forever missed. This is because the real is “beyond the 
automaton, the return, the coming- back, the insistence of the signs, by which we see 
ourselves governed by the pleasure principle” (Lacan, 1998: 54-55). The real 
transcends the network of signification and therefore repetition cannot be confused 
with “the return of the signs, or reproduction, or the modulation by the act of a sort of
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acted-out remembering”. Repetition is in essence “always veiled”, a “missed 
encounter”. It demands something novel and exciting and it is turned towards the 
ludic which finds its dimension in this newness and novelty. But whatever in 
repetition is modulated, is merely alienated of its meaning. The individual demands 
something new in his/her activities or games. This in turn creates a ‘sliding away’ 
(glissement) which conceals the true (real) essence, “what is the true secret of the 
ludic, namely, the most radical diversity constituted by the repetition in itself’ 
(Lacan, 1998: 61). Lacan (1998: 62) stresses how the Fort-Da game is “the subject’s 
answer to what the mother’s absence has created on the frontier o f his domain -  the 
edge of his cradle -  namely, a ditch, around which one can only play at jumping”. 
The child’s vigilance is aroused at the very point that the mother left him, the very 
point she moved away from him. This in turn fosters an “ever-open gap”, so that the 
act of repetition is in effect aimed at what is essentially not there as presence. 
Interestingly, Lacan does not view the cotton reel as the “mother reduced to a little 
ball”, but rather he proposes that “it is a small part of the subject that detaches itself
from him while still remaining his, still retained”. It is precisely “in the object the
reel, that we must designate the subject”. This ‘object’ is conceptualised in the 
framework of Lacanian algebra as the petit a. The objet a is an integral part of the 
residues of the real - a remnant of the real, of primal loss, “an excessive, residual 
scrap” (Barnard, 2002: 175). It is always a remainder in excess o f the symbolically 
and sexually differentiated subject, ex-sisting as an uncanny form of life and 
associated with corporeal borderlines and orifices (oral, anal, scopic and so on). 
However, while the objet a may gesture towards the infinity of the real, it ultimately 
fails in this respect in that “it only dissolves, in the final analysis, owing to its failure, 
unable, as it is, to sustain itself in approaching the real”. The objet a is the cause of
desire which is impossible to incorporate [it is a “void a desire that is based on no
being” (Lacan, 1998b: 126)], but also impossible to sever. It can never be formalised 
for it assiduously evades the grasp of symbolisation in that it manifests, for example, 
in a particular tone or timber of the voice, a certain gaze and so on. Moreover, it 
acquires the status of an algebraic sign which signifies the object’s resistance to 
nomination through the uniformity and monolith o f linguistic signification. One can 
at best loosen its association and generate a disseminative quality through the creation 
of a more elusive (abstract, mathematical) formulation.
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Derrida (1987: 261-262) suggests that Beyond the Pleasure Principle, a text which 
inaugurates the death drive in psychoanalytic epistemology, espouses a ‘logic’ of the 
beyond, a non-positional structure which “exempts it from the quest after a final 
judgement, that is of any judgement at all”. Derrida is concerned with the restance of 
the text. Restance, the noun which is derived from the present participle o f rester, to 
remain, signifies that which remains because it cannot be judged, an undecidable 
excess, the essential impossibility of holding onto any thesis within, any posited 
conclusion. As such, the athesis (predicated on the threshold of unleashed 
speculation) of Beyond, before and beyond any judgement, “speaks o f the enigmatic 
death drive which appears disappears, appears to disappear, appears in order to 
disappear”. Derrida describes the death drive as enigmatic because it “appears 
disappears while telling many stories and making many scenes, causing or permitting 
them to be told. It is the “speculative possibility of the totally-other (than the pleasure 
principle)”. He considers the argument of the Fort-Da to be fragmentary and without 
conclusion, “more an argument in the sense of a schema made o f dotted lines, with 
ellipses everywhere” (Derrida, 1987: 298). The content of the Fort-Da narrative is 
presented to the reader as filtered whereby “the most active selection is marked by 
ellipses”, the most “efficacious lacunae” not punctuated (Derrida, 1987: 370). The 
“tissue of lacunae” weave and compose another fable, which is concerned with a 
return to a previous state. Derrida suspects an incompletion when Freud (1991a: 284) 
remarks on the finality of the game -  “This, then, was the complete game -  
disappearance and return”. Derrida (1987: 313) questions whether Freud would have 
to insist upon completion if it was so obvious and certain. Derrida postulates an 
incompletion not only because there is “something like an axiom of incompletion in 
the structure of the scene of writing”, but also because the Fort-Da is “the scene o f an 
interminably repeated supplementation, as if it never finished completing itself’. The 
scene of writing itself does not recount something -  the very something that manifests 
as the no-thing o f the event which may potentially be termed the Fort-Da. The 
real/reel of the Fort-Da “remains unrepresentable” though it produces the scene of 
writing, and it is in the athesis o f this scene of writing that Derrida recognises the 
exemplary movement of paralysis where the step {pas25) beyond the pleasure 
principle remains interdicted (Derrida, 1987: 336).
2 5  As mentioned, ‘step’ in French is pas, which also signifies the ‘no’, negation. The pas is intimately
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Derrida (1987: 341) proposes that what compels a hypothesis is the enigma which 
appears to reproduce no pleasure for any system. Ultimately, it is as if one is “pulling 
this nebulous matrix with chain fusions or fissions, with bottomless permutations and 
commutations, with disseminations without return”. When Freud (1991a: 307) links 
“some ‘daemonic’ force at work” to the manifestation of the compulsion to repeat, 
this demon, Derrida (1987: 341) suggests, is the very thing which comes back 
{revient) without having been summoned. It is the revenance (returning) which 
“repeats its entrance, coming back (revenant) from one knows not
where inherited from one knows not whom, but already persecutory, by means
of the simple form of its return, indefatigably repetitive, independent of every 
apparent desire, automatic”. This automaton “comes back {revient) without coming 
back (revenir a) to anyone, it produces effects of ventriloquism without origin, 
without emission, and without addressee”. It no longer obeys the subject whom it 
plagues and persecutes with its return. The repetition compulsion haunts and 
demonises the pleasure principle, undermining, threatening and persecuting it by 
seeking something unbounded and primal. Moreover, Derrida (1998: 23-24) 
considers the repetition compulsion, “or everything that can be called by that name”, 
to be a “thread of irreducible resistance” which thwarts the possibility of assured 
meaning, meaning that ensures. It defines a resistance that has no meaning, and is 
therefore the resistance ofras non-resistance in that the repetition compulsion cannot 
confer meaning and thus resists analysis in the form of non-resistance (as a refusal to 
signify or as an intention to mean). For Derrida, if this resistance as non-resistance is 
“itself o f  an analytic structure or vocation”, if the repetition compulsion (“in the 
surest form of its ruse: disguised as non-resistance”) is indissolubly and inextricably 
bound up with the analytic process, then it would “permit one to recognise an affinity 
among the analytic, the demonic, and the thanatological”.
Derrida (1987: 381-382) proposes that the athesis o f the text of Beyond transpires 
because its “proper object” cannot be the object of any thesis. Consequently, the 
postulation of a hypothesis (or even any hypothetical provisionally, the possibility of 
a provisional hypothesis) as the most general methodological and epistemological
connected to Freud’s repeated gesture of taking another step forward that goes nowhere, the rhetoric of 
the athesis with which Derrida is seminally concerned.
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category of the text is rendered problematic in that the irreducibility o f the athesis 
remains as such - recondite26. Language foregrounds the difficulty o f properly naming 
the thing-itself which is “a difficulty whose limits can only be indefinitely pushed 
back”. Derrida traces the necessity of this difficulty, this impossibility which begins 
with the necessity of translating an observation into descriptive language which in 
turn requires this translation to be retranslated into a language of theory. 
Subsequently, this theoretical language borrows schemas from scientific precedence, 
and as a result there is once again the necessity of translating or transposing from the 
borrowings of the already constituted sciences. All of these trajectories -  transitional, 
transcriptive, transpositional, transgressive, transferential - open the very field of 
speculation. All of these movements in ‘trans-, the movements that involve 
repetitions, displacements and speculations, are however unable to access or inhabit 
the threshold of the origin. The step (pas) or the trans always already returns, comes 
back, by tending toward the annulling of its own process. The oppositional limit 
between perception and its other cannot be erased. As a result, the “entire stock o f 
metaphors and of metaphors of metaphors” (Derrida, 1987: 384), all o f these 
metaphors clustering around the notions of repetition, of analogy, of correspondence, 
of relay, are ultimately rendered as transcriptions and translations o f something 
inaccessible and hermetic. There is only the possibility o f moving, of playing with 
metaphor, which in turn fuels and fosters the ludic quality, the gameliness o f the 
speculation of the origin. Derrida (1987: 391) astutely perceives how acts and 
performances (discourse or writing, analysis or description and so on) are inextricably 
linked to the objects they designate; they can be cited as examples o f precisely that of 
which they speak or write. Therefore, an “auto-reflective transparency” cannot be 
achieved, a “reckoning is no longer possible”. Ultimately, the death drive and the 
repetition compulsion add a supplement of the abyss so that “after all the exhausting 
crises, indecisions, departures-returns, all the additional steps and no more steps (les 
pas de plus et les plus de pas), doubtless the problem remains ‘■unresolved’” (Derrida, 
1987: 388). The irresolution of the scene of writing signals the impossibility of
2 6  Freud, for example, (1991a: 331) writes how “science has so little to tell us about the origin of 
sexuality that we liken the problem to a darkness into which not so much as a ray of a hypothesis has 
penetrated. In quite a different region, it is true, we do meet with such a hypothesis; but it is of so 
fantastic a kind -  a myth rather than a scientific explanation -  that I should not venture to produce it 
here, were it not that it fulfils precisely the one condition whose fulfilment we desire. For it traces the 
origin of an instinct to a need to restore to an earlier state o f  things”.
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conclusion and solution - “the beyond of pleasure remaining the end of pleasure” 
(Derrida, 1987: 397).
The death drive undoubtedly remains a grand enigma within psychoanalytic 
epistemology and alludes to something irreducible at the core of its supposed 
representation. Even though the self-destructive function plays a corresponding role 
for the death drive (self-destruction manifesting as the basic expression of the death 
drive which aims at the reduction of internal tension), Green (1999: 84) asserts that 
one should not “defend the idea that the self-destructive function expresses itself 
primitively, spontaneously and automatically”. The difficulty remains in attributing to 
the death drive a precise correspondent function. In sado-masochism, for example, the 
death drive may alloy with the sexual drive. However, other forms of destruction 
(serious forms of depression leading to suicide and psychoses revealing ego 
disintegration) may not exhibit this fusion of the two drives. Moreover, in more 
esoteric and archaic forms of anxiety such as catastrophic and unthinkable anxieties, 
fears of annihilation or breakdown, feelings of futility, of devitalisation, or o f psychic 
death, sensations of gaps, bottomless holes and abysses, it is more arduous to 
establish an exact corresponding function since there is the possibility, as Green 
suggests, that these manifestations, in part or in totality, may be connected to primary 
masochism which is “located at an endopsychic level, prior to any form of 
expression” 21. For Green, there is no clinical argument which furnishes proof of the 
death drive because “any clinical picture is open to various interpretations and cannot 
be a direct expression of drive functioning”. Even though the death drive is predicated 
on clinical experience it still ultimately remains a theoretical postulate. The 
ramifications of this statement once again highlight an area of concern which alludes 
to the difficulty of identification and nomination, of offering a name, a definition and 
a structure to describe an energetic phenomenon that continues to foster assiduous 
speculation. However, as Derrida (1996: 10) proposes, the death drive manifests as an 
“invincible necessity” in the development of Freud’s oeuvre even if it remains a 
speculation that never adopts the form of a fixed thesis, or a postulate that is never
27 Winnicott (1974: 103-104), for example, utilises the term ‘breakdown’ rather elusively to allude to 
“the unthinkable state of affairs that underlies the defence organisation”. It is the fear of an original, 
primitive agony that remains shrouded in the unconscious. He utilises the term ‘unconscious’ to refer 
to the process of ego integration in which the still inchoate ego is “not able to encompass something”, 
and gather all phenomena into the arena of personal omnipotence.
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definitively posited - something unrepresentable motioning towards an inorganic state 
of nothingness.
Finally, this stake of the unrepresentability of the death drive is what interests 
Kristeva (1989: 26-27) who is concerned with what level in the psychic apparatus one 
may possibly record “the being of its nonbeing”. She suggests how this drive is 
constituted by “fantasy and fiction -  in short, the level of imagination, the level of 
writing -  which bears witness to the hiatus, blank, or spacing that constitutes death 
for the unconscious”. Freud’s postulation of the death drive not only shifted his 
interest from the theoretical model of the first topography 
(conscious/preconscious/unconscious) toward that of the second topography 
(id/ego/superego), but also crucially, as Kristeva writes, towards the analysis of 
imaginary productions (religion, art, literature) where he locates in them a 
“representation o f death anxiety”. An imaginary rendition of the death drive may 
“locate within its own fabric, such as certain dreams disclose it for us, that 
nonrepresentative spacing of representation that is not the sign but the index o f the 
death drive”. Kristeva suggests how the dreams of borderline patients, schizoid 
personalities or those undergoing psychedelic experiments are often “‘abstract 
paintings’ or cascades of sounds, intricacies of lines and fabrics, in which the analyst 
deciphers the dissociation -  or a nonintegration -  of psychic and somatic unity. Such 
indices could be interpreted as the ultimate imprint of the death drive”. The work of 
death at the zero degree of psychicism is thus weaved into the dissociation o f  form  
itself, “when form is distorted, abstracted, disfigured, hollowed out: ultimate 
thresholds of inscribable dislocation and jouissance. . .”. In this way, the notion of 
representation is confounded by the movement of surreal displacements and 
dislocations, by the movement of disfigurement and fracture. The death drive is 
ultimately regressive and therefore it thwarts the stability of symbolic representations 
by perpetuating a frisson of imaginary dissociation and disintegration -  through the 
lines rather than questing to settle on them........
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Elliptical Transgressions
The exploration in this chapter of various and potentially non-conceptual phenomena 
that psychoanalysis has attempted to grapple with gradually reveals and calls into 
question the adequacy of language and thus the status o f knowledge, of what can be 
known with certitude. A crucial problem or central aporia lies in attempting to capture 
in or through language that which transcends any simple polarity of absence or 
presence. What we are dealing with is in itself other than any simple absence or 
presence. It dislocates and displaces itself, making itself disappear in its appearance 
whilst still paradoxically marking experience. For a start, the attempt to note this ‘it’ 
through language or textually (the non-concept, the nothing, differance, other 
jouissance, the Thing, the abject, the navel and so on) alludes to the way in which the 
text is “marked in its interior by the multiple furrow of its margin”. The ‘it’ intimates 
an “invisibility without return” and it escapes all endeavours at determination, every 
nomination it may receive from the text of metaphysics. The ‘it’ cannot be 
appropriated by some proper name since all attempts at nomenclature merely suggest 
that the ‘it’ remains sheltered, and therefore dissimulated, in any of the possible 
names furnished. All names that the ‘it’ receives in our language, the language o f the 
symbolic, will continue to be determined by the implications of metaphysics or 
logocentrism. Any possible name cannot be the “primary prescription or the prophetic 
annunciation of an imminent and as yet unheard-of nomination”. As Derrida 
(1982: 24; 27) writes: “What we know, or what we would know if it were simply a 
question here of something to know, is that there has never been, never will be, a 
unique word, a master-name”. There is no ultimate name that can capture the ‘it’ or 
the non-concept in its fullness because at least for now, we are faced with what 
Irigaray (1985: 106-107) has identified as a “postponed reckoning” or “historical lag” 
in elaboration whereby certain phenomena continue to resist adequate symbolisation, 
formalisation and nomination thus signifying “the powerlessness of logic to 
incorporate in its writing all the characteristic features”. Frequently, we have resorted 
to reductionism and minimisation in order to keep these phenomena “from jamming 
the works of the theoretical machine”. The purity o f logic is however necessarily 
underwritten by an ensuing aporia, a caesura, a schism. There is always already 
something (as no-thing) that resists transcription and universal quantification so that 
any fantasy of an a priori harmony, a totalising mutuality between signifier and
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signified, is subverted, and the possibility for synchronised correspondence between 
language and what it is supposed to classify or categorise, what it is supposed to hit, 
remains to be accomplished. For Lacan (1998b: 82), the elaborate metaphor o f form 
(as active) inseminating matter (as passive) participates in “the fantasy of an 
inscription of the sexual link” which attempts to “make up for what can in no way be 
said”. As Fink (2002: 31) suggests: “Lacan is generally suspicious o f the whole and is 
ever pointing to the hole in every whole, to the gap in every psychoanalytic theory 
that attempts to account for everything, whether to explain the whole o f the patient’s 
world or to reduce all of psychoanalytic experience to, say, a relationship between 
two bodies (in a ‘two-body psychology’) or to a ‘communication situation’”. Lacan 
(1998b: 42-43) actively works against a view of the world as “perfectly spherical”, as 
constituting a whole, in that he regards the possibility for such encapsulation as “a 
view, gaze, or imaginary hold”. Lacan emphasises the Freudian revolution that 
removed consciousness from the centre of the individual, and his work attempts to 
proliferate this radicality (of decentring) by subverting the centre through the 
movement of the ellipse which disrupts the return and flow of centricity by 
puncturing it with lacunae. The subject “turns in an ellipse” and therefore it turns to 
fall in a state of unknowing, of not-knowing, so that the very idea of a centre of 
ultimate self-possession and reflexivity is obliterated. The ellipse creates a sense of 
dislocation and moments of alterity which opens up experience to a wholly other 
reading (Critchley, 1999). It falls short of being circular and it is this lack of 
circularity which problematises the return of the identical to itself whereby the ellipse 
does not come back full circle to the same. In this way, the endeavour to generate 
questions about experience always already assumes the anteriority of the limits of its 
answers. We are limited by language to address that which ultimately escapes 
language so that in some way we are unable to conceptualise otherness without 
conferring upon it a form of sameness and familiarity through language. Yet in spite 
of these very considerable limitations, we should at least continue through persistence 
to push towards the very limits of knowledge, towards what refutes delimitation 
through a radical discontinuity, dislocation and disjunction without return, towards 
the irreducibility of otherness, towards the impossible ideality o f the mystery o f the 
other, towards that which “would open up a new age o f thought, with a changed 
economy of truth and ethics” (Irigaray, 2000: 110). This new age however cannot 
presume that the “all” of a (discursive) system can prescribe the “not-all” of each
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particular relation established. This “all” cannot project itself onto a given space-map 
(for the purpose of guaranteeing the totality of a system) and thereby colonise the 
between (the “excess factor”) by conferring upon it a value based on “punctual frames 
of reference”, calculation and determination. If the “all” appropriates in advance for 
the “project of exhaustive formalisation” then the remainder is rendered as finite and 
the movement of fluidity is reabsorbed into a solidified form. Ultimately, the “all” 
cannot account for the zone of silence that fails to be circumscribed because “the zone 
of silence (that) lies outside the volume defined by the place from which discourse is 
projected” (Irigaray, 1985: 108-112).
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3. THE THIRD AESTHETIC
Why don’t I choose a theme that one could easily discover? but no: I sidle along the wall, I do sleight-of- 
hand tricks with the melody that is discovered. I walk in the shadow, in that place where so many things
happen.
Clarice Lispector (1989: 66)
In the course of a single second, our senses of sight, of hearing, of smell, register (knowingly or not) a 
swarm of events, and a parade of sensations and ideas passes through our heads. Each instant represents a 
little universe, irrevocably forgotten in the next instant.
Milan Kundera (1990: 25)
Far beneath the level o f storms I slept. I moved within colour and music as inside a sea-diamond. There 
were no currents of thoughts, only the caress of flow and desire mingling, touching, travelling, 
withdrawing, wandering -  the endless bottoms of peace. I felt only the caress o f moving -  moving into 
the body of another -  absorbed and lost within the flesh of another, lulled by the rhythm of water, the 
slow palpitation of the senses, the movement of silk. Loving without knowingness, moving without 
effort, in the soft current of water and desire, breathing in an ecstasy o f dissolution.
Anais Nin (1979: 4-5)
History’s third dimension is always fiction.
Hermann Hesse (2000: 39)
enter between a silence.
Jacques Derrida (1981: 226)
Our dialogues are often mute. This does not prevent them from taking place.
Helene Cixous (1997: 46)
The monument of psychoanalysis must be traversed- not bypassed -  like the fine thoroughfares of a 
very large city, across which we can play, dream etc: a fiction.
Roland Barthes (1975: 58)
Prayers and Tears
In this chapter, I would like to open up possibilities for the exploration o f the space or 
‘structure’1 of what I will term the ‘third aesthetic’, and implicate this spatio-temporal 
potentiality as integral to providing a matrix for facilitating the infant’s future quest
1 I have placed the word ‘structure’ in inverted commas because if  there is the possibility for 
‘structure’, then it is not an easily identifiable or readable framework. It is more astructuraX or 
de(con)structed in ethos, shaking the very foundations of “logocentric assuredness” (Derrida, 1981b: 
24) and resisting any static, synchronic motif. As such it is an “outrage to representation” (Smith, 
1996: 88), passing beyond conventional structures to the “outer boundaries” of experience, to an “other 
scene”, “another horizon”, “an elsewhere”, where identity and presence are disfigured (Kristeva, 1984: 
17; 27; 100). If ‘structure’ can claim to nominate, then it is necessary to transform and displace it, 
reinscribe and modify it, and thereby produce new configurations. ‘Structure’ must “continually, 
interminably be undone” (Derrida, 1981b: 24). It seems to me that ‘space’ is a more appropriate term 
because, according to Derrida (1976: 68-69), it is “always the unperceived, the nonpresent, and the 
nonconscious”, signalling the “very limits of phenomenology” and marking the “dead time within the 
presence of the living present, within the general form of all presence”. It is the “becoming-absent and 
the becoming-unconscious” of experience. It should be noted that space does not exist in a vacuum or 
independently and it is always already, in accordance with differance, mediated by the temporal.
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for meaning-making and negotiation. In an essay entitled “The Dead Mother”, Andre 
Green (1986: 150) notes the catastrophic ramifications o f the mother’s abrupt 
detachment from her infant, the radical transformation in the infant’s psychical life as 
a consequence: “One does not need to give a lengthy description of the narcissistic 
traumatism that this change represents. One must however point out that it constitutes 
a premature disillusionment and that it carries in its wake, besides the loss of love, the 
loss of meaning, for the baby disposes of no explication to account for what has 
happened”. The loss o f meaning thus manifests as a seminal repercussion of the dead 
mother configuration. I was inspired by this quote to grapple with and consider what 
pathways facilitate meaning-making psychoanalytically speaking, given that the 
construct of meaning has been primarily explored and critically noted by the 
existential-phenomenological schools. This chapter however is not interested in 
defining the construct of meaning per se, which is invariably a subjective and 
existential endeavour or idiom, but is rather concerned with what may provide a trace 
for the infant to seek out meaningfulness at a later stage of life following maturation. 
I utilise the notion of meaning in its more traditional existential-phenomenological 
sense. As a broad definition (for it is not possible to describe specifically the 
construct of meaning without resorting to a phenomenological investigation of the 
scene of an individual’s life experience), Viktor Frankl (1970: 8), for example, 
suggests how the “will to meaning” (as opposed to drive or need which would reduce 
meaning to homeostasis, to physiological or biological stasis) functions as a central 
tenet of human existence whereby there is an attempt to seek out potentialities, 
possibilities, and meaning through life, experience, creativity, encounters and so on. 
The creation of meaning is unique and specific to the individual. Yalom (2001: 132) 
regards humans as meaning-seeking creatures and he considers one of life’s major 
tasks as the endeavour to “invent a meaning sturdy enough to support a life”. He 
proposes that this somewhat elusive construct of life meaning is frequently connected 
to questions around values, passion, motivation, vitality, direction creativity, 
significance, engagement, dedication, purpose and self-actualisation. This chapter 
follows on from the psychoanalytic tradition that is primarily concerned with the 
infant’s post-natal experience o f his/her first object, the mother or caregiver, and the 
dynamics that ensue as a consequence (it will make use o f the work of D.W. 
Winnicott and Christopher Bollas, and in the next chapter that o f Wilfred Bion). It 
endeavours to locate an anterior ‘framework’ o f meaning-making potential within the
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context o f the pre-symbolic realm (in its broad sense it refers to the realm prior to the 
order of acculturation, language acquisition and so on), and it will argue that this 
early encounter between the mother and the infant, and more specifically a ‘third’ 
space that exists between them, remains critical in inaugurating the possibility for 
meaningfiilness at a later stage of life. It should be stressed that the epistemological 
angle or orientation of this chapter (and of the thesis in its entirety) places emphasis 
on its explorative aspect. In this sense, it is more an exploration of possibilities as 
opposed to a project of colonisation and omniscient precision. As a useful analogy, I 
cite Derrida (1982: 3) on the notion of the ‘sheaf in attempting to provide an 
explanatory framework for his concept of differance:
On the one hand, I will not be concerned, as I might have been, with describing a 
history and narrating its stages, text by text, context by context, demonstrating the 
economy that each time imposed this graphic disorder; rather, I will be concerned 
with the general system o f  this economy. On the other hand, the word sheaf seems to 
mark more appropriately that the assemblage to be proposed has the complex 
structure of a weaving, an interlacing which permits the different threads and 
different lines of meaning - or o f force -  to go off again in different directions, just as 
it is always ready to tie itself up with others.
In a similar vein, the present project is not interested in tracing some kind o f narrative 
affirming a historical context which would confer legitimacy or verify the existence 
of this space of the third aesthetic. Instead, it will explore the general system of this 
economy, some characteristics, features and aesthetic patterns that inhabit this space, 
without asserting anthropological or historical authorisation, without tracing some 
teleological or linear regression towards its absolute origin or genesis. It is not 
concerned with “how an original and individual repression became possible within 
the horizon of a culture and a historical structure of belonging” (Derrida, 1978: 197), 
with how a hereditary mnemonic trace mediates and impinges on the development of 
subjectivity. The aim of concentrating on the particular dimension o f the chapter’s 
focus is as a result o f the pragmatic restraints of length limit and so as not to 
overwhelm the possibility of strategic or in-depth focus. Through the configuration of 
the sheath, the above citation from Derrida also emphasises the hybridity, fluidity and 
heterogeneity of signification which proliferates difference, deferral, and at times,
transient moments o f meaning. The sheaf comes to signal the infinite possibilities of 
meaning that are able to launch themselves in new directions as they are also able to 
temporarily merge signifier with signified.
The Inaccessibility of Asymbolia
The temporal location of this project is the pre-oedipal, pre-symbolic realm of the 
mother-infant dynamic, the space of what Bollas terms the “unthought known”- that 
which is ‘known’ (not so much as an object representation, but rather as a recurrent 
experience of being -  a more existential as opposed to a representational knowing) 
but not yet thought (as the maturation of the cognitive faculties would permit). It is 
essentially a space that is situated prior to linguistic acculturation and acquisition, 
highlighting the limitations and problematics of representation because the shadow of 
this archaic experience alludes to a period when the possibility for cognitive and 
linguistic representation and processing remains uncertain, and therefore any 
subsequent signification may have to take into account the “wordless element in the 
adult” (Bollas, 1987: 3-4). It is, as Freud suggests, “a prehistoric period of life”, 
almost as if the infant is “not yet in the land of the living”2. The ‘unthought known’ 
is the “place where knowledge unravels from its own self-possession, from its 
pretension as knowledge” (Rose, 2003: 151), functioning as “a force o f dissemination 
that moves us to places beyond thinking” (Bollas, 1992: 17). Rose (2003: 149-150) 
proposes that Bollas’s work vividly captures “the dilemma of psychoanalysis in 
relation to unconscious processes which cannot be known”. Indeed, his project of 
writing endeavors to seize something too evanescent for the conscious mind, the 
“ungraspable unconsciousness of the unconscious, and the endless, unstoppable play 
of its work”, the unconscious as a limit to knowledge, at the limits of knowledge, as a 
break on what is possible for the subject to know. As such, how is one able to think, 
through language, through the subsequent maturation of the cognitive and linguistic 
faculties, that which is primordially known but not yet processed or thought. This 
question-statement foregrounds the complexities and difficulties of representing that 
which remains nebulous and even perhaps in the end signs its own ineluctable
2 For a richer contextualisation o f this notion, especially in its relation to the dreamer/sleeper, the 
reader is referred to Rose’s essay “On not being able to sleep” (2003: 105-124, especially pages 117- 
118).
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implausibility. Kristeva (1980: 272) proposes how the discovery of the Freudian 
unconscious “severs the always possible umbilication of man to the child”. Infantile 
sexuality, for example, entails an examination not necessarily o f the one who does not 
speak, but rather what within the speaker is not yet spoken, or may remain indelibly 
unsaid (unnameable) within the gaps of speech. Infancy is rendered as a place of 
‘error’, mythic, where such an error cannot be rectified by the inextricable alternative 
of cause and effect. Projected into/onto the supposed place o f infancy are 
universalised endeavours which endow the infant with the dictates o f distorted 
symbolic memories and discursive structures. Ultimately, as de Nooy (1998: 7) 
suggests, infants are “unthinkable in the sense that we have no way o f understanding 
what goes on for them without reducing it to what we know”. Kristeva stresses the 
importance of emphasising the heterogeneity between the semiotic disposition (the 
libidinal-signifying organisation in infancy) and the subsequent symbolic functioning 
of the speaker following language acquisition. Moreover, the pre-symbolic 
‘organisation’ thwarts the opportunity for neat representation because, according to 
Kristeva (1980: 276-77), it can only be grasped by the adult as regression -  
jouissance3 or psychosis4. The discourse on infancy involves “a confrontation 
between thought and what it is not, a wandering at the limits of the thinkable”. Any 
attempts at recuperation of the supposed place of infancy are imbued with the specific 
attributes of the speaker’s libido. Kristeva even indicts the radical Lacanian
3 Kristeva views literature and the arts as the arenas within which the tensions, contradictions and 
jouissance of being subjects-in-process find exploration and expression. Her book Revolution in Poetic 
Language addresses precisely this issue and sees the works of writers like Lautreamont, Mallarme and 
Joyce as controlled experiments in the disruption of the symbolic by the semiotic, and the interrogation 
of the social realm and subject by that which threatens their unity and rationality. For Kristeva, 
aesthetic practices prevent the solidification of boundaries, definitions, and identifications, thus 
requiring the subject to acknowledge the reality of difference and otherness (Graybeal, 1994). Art or 
literature, precisely because it relies on the notion of the subject, is the privileged place of 
transformation or change. It is the most conspicuous realisation of the signifying subject’s condition. 
Avant-garde writing, with its semiotic disposition, parallels the logic of the unconscious and therefore 
assumes the privilege of communicating regression and jouissance (Roudiez, 1984). The avant-garde 
text is “a heterogenous process, a structuring and destructuring practice, a passage to the outer 
boundaries of the subject and society” (Kristeva, 1984:17). Literary texts o f the avant-garde disrupt the 
flow of signification, setting up a play o f unconscious drives that undercut the stability of received 
social meaning. This results in a momentary release of libidinal pleasure -  the untranslatable 
jouissance (Leland, 1992).
4 The psychotic forecloses or repudiates maternal castration and hence the representation or registration 
of the Father’s Law. Foreclosure is not only the denial or negation o f observation, but also the failure 
to register an observation. The son fails to represent the Name-of-the-Father (Nom/Non du Pere) and 
therefore is unable to be positioned in the symbolic. The ‘I’ remains unlocated and unstable, 
functioning outside the symbolic (Grosz, 1989; 1990). In psychosis, “symbolic unity is wiped out in 
favour of arbitrariness of an instinctual drive without meaning and communication; panicking at the 
loss of all reference, the subject goes through fantasies of omnipotence” (Kristeva, 1980:139).
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perspective of removing the unnameable in infancy and placing it within the real as 
“nevertheless remain(ing) all-encompassing within the Name-of-the-Father” since it 
is simultaneously impossible yet invariably persistent within the triad of the structure 
of the real-imaginary-symbolic. It seems as if the unnameable, with the subsequent 
‘error’ that is generated through speculation and surmise, still constitutes the ultimate 
limit of meaning where transcendence takes root. Even endeavours to propose spaces, 
spatial representation and variation of which the subject is a phenomenal 
actualisation, must necessarily be subjected to some teleological format because it is 
provided for within the forum of symbolic language.
The space of the ‘unthought known’ or pre-symbolic alludes to an other form of 
knowledge where the jouissance of its acquisition is in effect the jouissance o f its 
experiencing [or as Lacan (1998b: 97) puts it: “ ....the jouissance of its exercise is the 
same as that of its acquisition”]. This other knowledge thus belongs to the order of 
experience which is effected by what Lacan (1998b: 44) terms 'Ilanguage (la 
langue)'5, which presents the symbolic, signifying subject with enigmatic effects that 
remain in excess of what can be spoken through articulated knowledge, indicating 
something (which is no-thing in its ex-sistence) which comes from elsewhere. 
Verhaeghe (2002) suggests how the body ‘knows’ something through experience and 
it is this experience that inscribes another knowledge and jouissance on the body. 
This inscription however is not subject to the exchange o f the signifying order in that 
“the jouissance one experiences and yet knows nothing about put(s) us on the path of 
ex-sistence” (Lacan, 1998b: 77; 98). This other knowledge refers to what is not-whole 
in the Other, which in turn permits it to keep ex-sisting. The locus o f the Other o f the 
signifier knows nothing of it, this not whole part -  “It is the Other that makes the not- 
whole, precisely in that the Other is the part of the not-knowing-at-all in this not- 
whole”. It is not surprising that Lacan is forced to describe this lack (as excess) in the 
Other, and hence in the subject of the signifier, in negative terms given that it can 
never be expressed in signifiers. For Verhaeghe (2002: 127), this negative effect “has 
everything to do with a certain characteristic of this impossible to grasp other
5 Fink points out how Lacan (1998b: 138; 36) creates the term lalangue by placing together the 
feminine article la with the noun langue. This feminine article is no coincidence in that lalangue 
“designate(s) what each of us deals with, our so-called mother tongue (lalangue diet maternelle)”, 
referring to the primary, raw materials o f language “that has nothing to do with the connotation o f the 
signifier, but that elaborates and perfects it”. Language is a function of lalangue whereby the latter 
constitutes the former through enigmatic excess.
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dimension: its infinity”, where infinity “opens up a dimension that cannot be caught 
in the order of the signifier”.
Chora/Khdra.........
The spatio-temporality of the pre-symbolic is a dimension that is maternally connoted 
by what Kristeva terms “chora”. The chora is an “ancient, mobile, unstable 
receptacle, prior to the One, to the Father, and even to the syllable” (Kristeva, 1987b: 
5). It denotes an essentially mobile and extremely provisional articulation constituted 
by movement, and it precedes evidence and verisimilitude. Although the chora can be 
designated and regulated, it can never be definitively posited. One can never give it 
an axiomatic form since it is not a position, model or copy, but rather analogous to 
vocal or kinetic rhythm -  deprived of unity and identity. It precedes the establishment 
of the linguistic sign and manifests as a space where the subject is both generated and 
negated. It is a subversive space where the subject is threatened with annihilation and 
simultaneously produced (Kristeva, 1984). It is not easy to make this concept 
intelligible since it is not, strictly speaking, intelligible. For Moi (1986), Kristeva is 
acutely aware of the contradictions involved in attempting to theorise the 
untheorisable chora. It is problematic to account for this non-concept since it is 
essentially a pre-linguistic construct, and raises the difficulty o f imposing a linguistic 
framework on it. This is perhaps why Kristeva’s position is frequently bewildering 
and opaque since one needs to be acutely aware o f the inherently paradoxical nature 
of attempting to give axiomatic form to something deprived o f unity, identity and 
coherence. Nevertheless, language is paradoxically the only tool one has to describe 
something that effectively eludes signification and definition. The chora is an 
“uncertain and indeterminate articulation” whose rhythm ruptures the very discourse 
of representation that offers its theoretical description and elaboration. It is, in short, a 
primordial matrix of divided subjectivity -  a space of inscription of archaic 
experiences of difference, which are preconditions for signifying representations 
(Crownfield, 1994). In describing the chora, Kristeva acknowledges the need to 
extract it from knowable, empirical, ontologising representations (de Nooy, 1998).
While the maternal body functions as the ordering principle o f the chora, it is not 
identifiable as the body of any individual subject. It is rather a “fantasmatic figure”.
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The chora encompasses and transcends both the masculine and the feminine. As Moi 
(1995:165) notes: “The opposition between feminine and masculine does not exist in 
pre-oedipality”. The maternal is a disruptive and deconstructive force that undermines 
all fixed identities, including those of masculine and feminine. The semiotic chora is 
thus linked to the maternal rather than the feminine, is available to both males and 
females, and always accompanies and threatens the symbolic (Edelstein, 1992). The 
maternal operates as a function that can be performed by both sexes since Kristeva 
desires to transcend the dualistic logic o f opposition that espouses dichotomous 
categories (Oliver, 1993). In this way, Kristeva does not propose the category of 
motherhood as an essential, reified structure or defining metaphor of feminine 
identity (Crownfield, 1992). The maternal functions as a metaphor for the split 
subject and the very notion o f difference within. Kristeva’s concern with the maternal 
is a concern with alterity whereby the maternal functions as a metaphor for a more 
general and diffuse struggle against identity (Grosz, 1989). The maternal is the 
“ambivalent principle” which “stems from an identity catastrophe that causes the 
Name to topple over into the unnameable that one imagines as femininity, non­
language or body” (Kristeva, 1986:162). It is an identity that splits, a process without 
a subject, an unspoken jouissance, the source o f the semiotic and a place of splitting 
that slips away from the discursive hold, from the threshold of the symbolic 
(Kristeva, 1980). It is a precondition of the symbolic, remaining unrepresentable, and 
yet a necessary condition for all representations (Grosz, 1989). Rose (2003: 151) 
poses a very pertinent question when she enquires as to what happens to our 
relationship to knowledge when mothers are around - “What does thinking about 
mothers do to thinking?” [Here Rose (2003: 156) utilises mother as fact, but also the 
“mother, or her space, as the vanishing point o f all identities, where no form of 
knowing could ever reach”]. I would extend this question most critically to the 
process of the maternal because the notion of the maternal facilitates “hermeneutic 
arrest”, a violence committed to consciousness as process.
The aspect of the maternal that I would like to stress for this project, and in 
affirmation of Kristeva’s notion of the maternal, is that the maternal signifies that 
which pushes towards the limits, the boundary, the threshold, o f subjectivity and 
signification. It assumes a transcendental function that resists any assignation or 
specificity. It is neither subject nor object, but between the two. It is, as Kristeva
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(1986: 172) suggests, “neither present nor absent, but real, real inaccessible”. What 
the feminine and the semiotic chora with its ethos of the maternal have in common is 
there dissident status of marginality - the feminine as marginal under patriarchy and 
the maternal as marginal to language and subjectivity (Moi, 1995). The actual mother 
is not ultimately intended to represent the space of the maternal chora. Instead, as 
Smith (1996: 93) suggests, the space encompasses aspects of maternity, the maternal 
process deprived of an identity, that is, the identity of an actual mother who would 
inhibit the negativity of the maternal through her socialising role. The maternal 
alludes to the elusive, rhythmic movements of the semiotic over and against the sense 
of structure and restraint exhibited by the mother. The enigmatic qualities of the 
maternal could never exclusively sustain an autonomous mother subject. The 
maternal is, as Wiseman (1993: 99) suggests, a function  “satisfied by whoever breaks 
through the symbolic screen o f language and culture to reach the semiotic”. It thus 
designates both a space and a series of functions and processes (Grosz, 1989). For 
Edelstein (1992: 42), the maternal reveals the impossibility o f the ‘proper’ (what she 
terms the maternelle propre) and the possibility for transgression. It is always 
elsewhere, other to itself, referring to a process rather than an actual object entity. The 
maternal possesses the quality of an “impossible syllogism”, of the ‘configuration’ of 
“it happens, but I’m not there. I cannot realise it, but it goes on” (Kristeva, 1980: 
237).
While I have stressed a particular reading and interpretation o f the maternal, it should 
be noted, in concurrence with Edelstein (1992), that Kristeva’s use o f the maternal as 
more metaphorical than biological poses similar problems that numerous feminists 
(Grosz, 1990, for example) find in separating Lacan’s notion o f the phallus from the 
actual penis. Indeed, Oliver (1993) suggests that Kristeva’s notion o f the maternal 
chora is extremely polemical, particularly amongst feminist critics. She attributes this 
reason to the fact that it is not homogenous and univocal but rather fluid and 
polysemic. As a consequence, its meaning and function assiduously shift and remain 
in flux, and this is evident in the numerous contradictory ways that critics have 
responded to the maternal. As an example, the maternal has certain analogous 
features or resonances with Kristeva’s ideas on the pregnant body. Pregnancy and 
‘art’ (in its avant-garde form, and especially poetic language) are two privileged sites
94
of the maternal6. On the process of pregnancy, Kristeva (1980: 238) writes: “Through 
a body, destined to insure reproduction of the species, the woman-subject, although 
under the sway of the paternal function (as symbolising, speaking subject and like all 
others) more of a filter than anyone else -  a thoroughfare, a threshold where ‘nature’ 
confronts ‘culture’”. Elsewhere, Kristeva (1986: 182) suggests how the
“heterogeneity that cannot be subsumed in the signifier nevertheless explodes 
violently with pregnancy (the threshold of culture and nature)....”. It is precisely 
these types of quotes that have lead Butler (1993: 175) to conclude that Kristeva 
“reifies maternity and then promotes this reification as the disruptive potential o f the 
semiotic”. As a result, she continues, the univocal signification of the paternal law is 
displaced by an equally univocal maternal corporeal signifier “which remains self­
identical in its teleology regardless o f its multiplicitous manifestations”. Here Butler 
presents a very critical point because perhaps we cannot escape the inevitability o f the 
inflation of a discursive structure (even if it is not intended) owing to the fact that we 
are creatures of the symbolic and language. Perhaps ultimately even the 
conceptualisation of that which exceeds the discursive cannot escape its symbolic, 
discursive construction, its positioning within the binary, within a teleology that in the 
end encompasses something monolithic. The expression o f semiotic irruption is after 
all still dependent on symbolic mediation which buffers against madness. There is 
always the danger, as Gallop (1982: 123) indicates, that “any position can become 
assimilated into the symbolic order as a codified, fixed representation. No 
‘experience’ or ‘identity’ can guarantee one’s dissidence”. This notion alludes to the 
bind or impasse that Derrida (1981: 26) refers to when he suggests how in 
psychoanalysis, the lack, the void, the break and so on, “have been given the value of
6 For Kristeva (1984), poetic language is one of the most lucid examples of the semiotic-maternal 
gaining the upper hand and exposing the infinite possibilities in language. Poetic language is language 
that is other to itself. In Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva establishes a necessary relation 
between the heterogeneity of the drives and the plurivocal possibilities of poetic language. Poetic 
language is the linguistic occasion on which drives shatter the univocal terms o f language and reveal 
an irrepressible heterogeneity of multiple sounds and meanings. The semiotic represents the 
multiplicity of drives in language which disrupt its signifying function. The semiotic, through rhythm, 
assonance, intonations, sound play, and repetition, represents or recovers the maternal body in poetic 
speech. (Butler, 1993). Poetic language is thus considered transgressive o f discursive modes or 
operations of language, and disruptive of meaning and signification. It is explicitly involved in the 
destructuring and structuring of language at the periphery of the symbolic. For Kristeva, this is the 
nature of all signifiance. The revolution in poetic language is also a revolution in the subject because 
any theory of language is also a theory of the subject. Indeed, poetic language puts the subject on trial 
and shatters the unity of the subject-position by revealing a subversive semiotic disposition that calls 
into question subjectivity and the entire domain of textual practice (Kristeva, 1980).
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a signified or, which amounts to the same, of a transcendental signifier: the self­
presentation o f truth (veiled/unveiled) as Logos”. The radicality and otherness of 
(non-)concepts like ‘the void’ have the potential to be recuperated back into symbolic 
sameness, into an ineluctable symbolic presentation. It seems as if a non-concept 
cannot escape its discursive inevitability once there is an attempt to identify and 
describe it. Moreover, it seems as if the establishment of a pre-symbolic space always 
falls prey to the structuring order o f the binary whereby it functions or is set up in the 
system as an antithetical component in relation to the hegemony of its symbolic 
opposite. Language as a descriptive and ultimately symbolic tool does not offer a neat 
resolution for this irreconcilable bind. Perhaps resolution may only be found with the 
inauguration of what Derrida terms (1995: 90) a “third genus o f discourse”, an other 
discourse, a discourse that transcends the logos -  assuming that this could be 
possible, though Derrida draws attention to the impossibility o f such a possibility, 
especially if one considers our overwhelming dependence on the system of language 
in service of description.
The notion of a maternal is inherently complex and ambiguous (alluding to the 
difficulty of defining functional and set parameters), and while I have stressed a 
particular reading -  the maternal as a process signifying something unmasterable and 
heterogeneous, the maternal as calling into question, evoking questions without lucid 
answers -  I do concur with Gallop that sometimes and perhaps invariably the 
maternal is necessarily conflated with actual mother, and it is difficult to dissociate 
the one from the other. As Gallop (1982: 116) writes: “Certainly it is a stultifying 
reduction to subsume femininity into the category of maternity. But it is an opposite 
and perhaps equally defensive reduction to believe in some simple separation o f the 
two categories”. Gallop suggests that the relation to the maternal only approaches its 
full complexity with some recognition that the actual mother both is and is not the 
maternal. This statement highlights the notion that the actual mother is linked to, but 
not necessarily equated with, the maternal. In true Kristevan fashion, all is not exactly 
as it seems so that even if there is the possibility to conflate the experience of 
mothering with the process of the maternal, there is still something in the latter that 
remains impervious. In addition, as Edelstein (1992) notes, if as Kristeva has argued 
that the maternal is as much the site o f the avant-garde artist as it is o f the mother, 
then the maternal must operate primarily functionally or metaphorically, especially
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considering Kristeva’s (1984) proposition that the avant-garde transgressor is always 
male since only men can occupy a secure position as a speaking subject within the 
symbolic, and it is only from a position within the symbolic that it can be ruptured or 
transgressed. In this way, Kristeva’s emphasis on marginality (from the symbolic) can 
be viewed in terms of positionality rather than o f essences (Moi, 1995). In attempting 
to address Gallop’s statement, I would suggest that the maternal might incorporate 
features or aspects of the experience of mothering, though this experience can never 
assert some kind of control over the maternal. As an example, I cite once again 
Kristeva’s (1986: 178) musings on the pre and post-natal experience of the mother:
A mother is a continuous separation, a division o f the very flesh. And 
consequently a division of language -  and it has always been so. Then there is this 
other abyss that opens up between the body and what had been its inside: there is the 
abyss between the mother and the child. What connection is there between myself, or 
even more unassumingly between my body and this internal graft and fold, which, 
once the umbilical cord has been severed, is an inaccessible other? My body
and...him. No connection. Nothing to do with it Trying to think through that
abyss: staggering vertigo. No identity holds up.
In this passage, as Gallop suggests, the mother’s dilemma is represented -  the 
experience of an intra and interpersonal heterogeneity that she cannot master. There is 
thus something beyond her capacity to assert or dominate. The mother does not 
possess omniscient control over this enigmatic process nor does she author it and 
command “the authority to signify the experience, to intend its meaning or represent 
it” (Gallop, 1982: 117). Furthermore, as Weir (1993) suggests, the mother’s position 
in the symbolic (as a speaking being) remains coextensive with her semiotic relation 
to the child. This serves to establish her divided subjectivity whereby positioned both 
within the symbolic and semiotic dimensions (and the subsequent tension that such a 
position creates), the mother functions as the subject-in-process/on-trial par 
excellence. Indeed, as Rose (2003) suggests, motherhood owes its most fundamental 
allegiance to the “disunity of being” so that what passes through the mother, 
“gnaws....at the symbolic’s almightiness” (Kristeva, 1986: 185). Elsewhere, Kristeva 
(1980: 237) designates the mother/maternal (the mother subsumed by the ‘ethos’ of 
the maternal) scene as a place where “cells fuse, split and proliferate fluids change
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rhythm within the body, growing as a graft, indomitable, there is an other. And no
one is present, within that simultaneously dual and alien space, to signify what is 
going on”. Maternity is the “splitting, fusing, merging, fragmenting” (Grosz, 1989) of 
a series of corporeal processes exterior to the control of the subject so that the actual 
mother does not find her identity affirmed by the maternal but rather her corporeality, 
her position, on the threshold between nature and culture. Motherhood is 
characterised as an uncanny experience, a space both double and foreign where no 
one is present to signify it.
Kristeva reconfigures and revises the notion of the chora from Plato’s Timaeus- a text 
which narrates the story of the creation of the universe, of a self-contained, complete 
and harmonious cosmos where the chora functions as the medium within which 
Platonic intelligible forms and paradigms are phenomenalised in relation to the order 
of the world. The chora, according to Plato, is not matter but rather space. It is a field 
or medium, “some kind of dialectical glue”, as Kintz (1994: 148) suggests, which 
fuels the interaction between Being (that which always is and never becomes) and 
Becoming (that which is always becoming and never is). As Timaeus (1929: 49a) 
proposes:
We began, in fact, by a distinction between two terms (Being and Becoming), but 
have now to call attention to a third.......In our original distinction we introduced no
further third term, as we supposed that these two would suffice us; now, it seems, our 
discourse compels us to attempt the exposition of a perplexed and obscure concept. 
What quality and nature, then, must we ascribe to it? Something o f this kind: that it is 
the receptacle, the foster mother as I might say, of all becoming.
He continues further:
Now the same thing must be said also o f that which receives all bodies. It must be 
called ever self-same, for it never departs from its own quality. For it is always 
receiving all things and has never anywhere a shape in any way like any o f the things 
that enter it. For it is there as a natural matrix for all things, moved and variously 
figured by the things that enter it, but through their agency takes on diverse 
appearances at diverse times” (50b-c).
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Plato conceives o f the chora as a matrix or receptacle whereby “anything that is to 
receive in itself every kind of character must be devoid of all characteristics” (70). It 
is thus an eternal, receptive, unchanging, amorphous, unreadable, constant space, 
which necessarily provides the function, an imprinting surface, for all reading, 
interpretation and experience to proliferate, though in its capacity to hold the 
imprinting, it ostensibly never alters or exerts any influence on it. What remains 
crucial for this particular project is Plato’s conceptualisation o f the chora as 
inaugurating ‘thirdness’, a critical ‘third’ element, which is instrumental in the 
generation and transpiration of relational experience.
A conspicuous distinction between Kristeva’s and Plato’s delineation o f the chora is 
that Kristeva (1984: 25) incorporates the “‘energy’ charges, as well as ‘psychical’ 
marks” of the drives into her conceptualisation of the chora. It is “a nonexpressive 
totality formed by the drives and their stases in a motility that is as full of movement 
as it is regulated”. The chora is assiduously in motion, intimately connected to the 
facilitation and structuring disposition of the drives, as well as primary processes 
which displace and condense both energies and their inscription. In contrast, Plato’s 
notion of the chora is not imbued with same quality of flux, fluidity and motion. It 
does not proliferate relativity. For Kristeva, the chora functions as a site o f spacing 
inflected with the process of performance o f embodied beings. It is a moving dialectic 
wavering and vacillating between and through the corporeality of the subject and 
creating infinite interpretation. While Plato conceives of the chora as a disembodied, 
neutral medium whose function is that o f an imprinting surface, Kristeva intimates 
that the inscriptions of such a medium need to be read and that its traces and imprints 
are inextricably connected to the maternal body7. Such a reading though would need 
to incorporate a radical shift in thinking about language and subjectivity because the 
chora is not yet organised into symbolic language, and must be deciphered through 
the aesthetic of other languages such as rhythm, gesture, sound, ellipsis, tactility and
7 The maternal body designates a relation of primary continuity between, rather than a discrete object 
entity. Poetic language, as an example, suggests a dissolution of a coherent, signifying subject into the 
primary continuity of the maternal body. As Kristeva (1980: 136) suggests: “Language as symbolic 
function constitutes itself at the cost o f repressing instinctual drive and continuous relation to the 
mother. On the contrary, the unsettled and questionable subject of poetic language (for whom the word 
is never uniquely sign) maintains itself at the cost of reactivating this repressed, instinctual, maternal 
element”.
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so on. As such, the ‘notion’ of the chora can only be illuminated within a theory of 
the subject that does not reduce the subject to a category of understanding, but rather 
facilitates “within the subject this other scene of pre-symbolic functions” (Kristeva, 
1984: 27).
The chora functions as the basis for Kristeva’s concept o f negativity which signals 
that which is heterogeneous to language - the materiality of the corporeal structure, 
the unconscious and the process o f drives. In negativity, the signifier is strongly allied 
to the drives and corporeality whereby “the full force of their activity cannot be 
grasped or measured by consciousness, but instead their constant division and 
multiplication reflects the repeated division of matter that engenders signiflance, the 
production o f meaning in excess o f consciousness” (Smith, 1996: 110). “The concept 
of negativity, distinct from that o f nothingness (.Nichts) and negation {Negation), 
figures as the indissoluble relation between an ‘ineffable’ mobility and its ‘particular 
‘determination’” (Kristeva: 1984: 109). Negativity therefore alludes to that which is 
other than stasis because it reformulates that which is static as a process that 
perpetuates motility. Moreover, “negativity is the liquefying and dissolving agent that 
does not destroy but rather reactivates new organisations and, in a sense, affirms”. 
This statement by implication intimates that the ethos o f negativity, through its 
mobility and heterogeneity, fuels the potential and possibility for other configurations 
by refiguring and reforming various dynamical patterns and connections (it 
“concatenates, reactivates, and generates” Kristeva, 1984: 141). As a consequence, 
negativity promotes the pattern and logic o f alterity, and therefore transforms the 
subject into a subject in process/on trial (le sujet en proces) so that the subject (and as 
such all relational dynamics) is inexorably infused with the irruptions o f negativity as 
persistently reorganising, reconfiguring, reshaping. For Kristeva (1984: 118), the 
subject is always produced as “a process, an intersection -  an impossible unity” 
because negativity registers a “conflictual state” which stresses the movement of 
heterogeneous inscriptions, the continuous deferral o f consciousness from itself and 
the inevitable otherness within/of self. Negativity “brings us up against a limit: the 
limit of what a society, of what a subject, can recognise o f itself’ (Rose, 1993: 143).
The space o f the chora undoubtedly poses a considerable challenge to the notion or 
notation o f representation because, as Derrida (1995) reflects, Khora immediately
100
signifies more than its name5. It signals “the other of the name and quite simply the 
other, whose irruption the name announces”. Khora seems to defy the “logic of 
noncontradiction o f the philosophers” o f which Vemant (cited in Derrida, 1995: 89) 
speaks, the logic “o f binarity, o f the yes or no”. It derives from that “logic other than 
the logic of the logos”, and espouses a logic of ambiguity, equivocation, a para-logic 
or meta-logic, which alternates between the logic of exclusion (it is neither this nor 
that) and that o f participation (simultaneously both this and that). This alternation 
stems from some incapacity (impossibility) for naming. It is alien to the order of the 
paradigm, the intelligible and the immutable model. It comes as in a dream. As a 
result, it is arduous to gain access to khora because, as Derrida (1995: 90) intimates, it 
might not be possible to place one’s trust in an alternative logos/mythos when 
considering khora. Perhaps a third genus of discourse is required in order to explicate. 
However, this third genre may only be a “moment o f a detour in order to signal 
toward a genre beyond genre. Beyond categories, and above all beyond categorial 
oppositions, which in the first place allowed it to be approached or said”. A potential 
rendition of khora highlights the impossibility of language in being able capture and 
define its ‘essence’. While Derrida pushes the (impossible) possibility of khora to the 
extreme, playing precariously on the borders of nonconceptuality, he simultaneously 
alerts the reader to an irreducible inscrutability, to the very limits of what can be 
comprehended even if it were possible to generate a novel genre of discourse. 
However one cannot assume that spaces do not exist (or more accurately ex-sist) 
because they cannot be conceptualised based on the tools that are available. Even 
though Derrida (1995: 126; 103) concedes to the difficulty o f speaking or writing 
about khora, he does regard it as “a necessity”. It is “an apparently empty space -  
even though it is no doubt not emptiness”. Irigaray (2000: 1) attunes herself (through 
writing-recognition) to the rhythms o f this space of necessity when she suggests that 
“no space is yet fully occupied, but the spaces are not empty: they are inhabited by an 
invisible growth. Where it seems that nothing exists, there remains one presence, or a 
thousand”. While this necessary space may allude to something as a certain
8 Derrida suggests the word ‘khora’ as opposed to ‘the khora’ for the definite article presupposes the 
existence of a thing with a concomitant easy reference. Khora does not designate any received type of 
philosophical discourse or ontological logos because it is neither sensible nor intelligible. Derrida 
however does concede that even if  one says khora and not the khora, one is still making a name of it. 
Interestingly, the French pronoun elle, referring to khora, includes both “her” (the mother or nurse- 
receptacle) and “it”. Moreover, as the reader will have noticed, Derrida resists translating the word 
khora. The reasons for this will be explored further on.
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irreducible alterity, it is always already undercut by the necessity or inevitability of its 
description through the medium or channel of the discursive. As Lacan (1998b: 32) 
writes: “How is one to return, if not on the basis of a peculiar {special) discourse, to a 
prediscursive reality? That is the dream -  the dream behind every conception {idee) 
of knowledge. But it is also what must be considered mythical. There’s no such thing 
as a prediscursive reality. Every reality is founded and defined by a discourse”. 
Reflecting on the process o f attempting to provide a space for the inconceivable, 
Smith (1996: 89) proposes:
Yet clearly our language-bound condition is such that any place which apparently 
cannot be thought or imagined is still subject to our need to name and describe. The 
moment a new conceptual vocabulary enters discourse, the subject of language sets 
about making it a comfortable home through naturalising its strangeness. Even 
writing that plays over vast spaces o f emptiness is vulnerable to the reader’s 
domesticating imagination which attempts to house it in a topography that can be 
represented. Conceptualising such a place is a laborious uncertain task, but not 
impossible.
I think that it is important to gesture (however precariously or tenuously) towards 
these spaces of irreducible necessity, these spatio-temporal possibilities that (always) 
already facilitate all possibilities o f inscription yet cannot be inscribed or prescribed, 
because these spaces offer a richer, though not necessarily more transparent, appraisal 
of a multi-dimensional reality. One however needs to be continuously reflexive and 
foreground the complexities, the intricacies, the ambiguities, that inevitably 
encompass the scope o f such an endeavour. One should not attempt to colonise, 
naturalise or domesticate the foreign or uncanny quality of the space of the non- 
conceptual for the sake o f “any philosophy directly issuing from the Cog/Yo” (Lacan, 
1977: 1), though of course there is always the risk o f reductionism and 
homogenisation in the very act o f linguistic-conceptual description. Instead I think 
that it is paramount to present the elisions and gaps as a result o f the unknowingness, 
the flawed endeavour that necessarily confounds and accompanies such an exiled 
journey into the estranged and defamiliar. For Frosh (2002), the non-discursive does 
not imply that it cannot be spoken about but rather one needs to take into cognisance 
that there will always be something excessive or other to what is spoken. In
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considering the possibilities of representing ecriture feminine (writing said to be 
feminine), I think that Helene Cixous (1986b: 92) usefully sums up the impasse of 
conceptualising and writing about that which defies such codification:
At the present time, defining a feminine practice o f writing is impossible with an 
impossibility that will continue; for this practice will never be able to be theorised, 
enclosed, coded, which does not mean it does not exist. But it will always exceed the 
discourse governing the phallocentric system; it takes place and will take place 
somewhere other than in the territories subordinated to philosophical-theoretical 
domination. It will not let itself think except through subjects that break automatic 
functions, border runners never subjugated by any authority. But one can begin to 
speak. Begin to point out some effects, some elements of unconscious drives, some 
relations of the feminine Imaginary to the Real, to writing.
For Derrida (1978: 98-103), very often problems presented to a particular discipline 
(in his instance, philosophy) are problems that it cannot resolve owing to what it has 
“held in store”. This is certainly not aided by the fact that the questions that need to 
be developed in addressing the problematics of otherness may fail in seeking out a 
language, a concept given to the other, because the phenomenon of the other is a 
certain non-phenomenon, its presence a certain absence -  certain as opposed to pure 
and simple absence where a binary logic could make its claim. There is always the 
possibility of a “fragile moment when the question is not yet determined enough for 
the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated itself beneath the mask o f the 
question”. Nevertheless, it remains crucial for a discipline to speculate, to reflect and 
“to question about itself within itself’, “within a recourse to experience itself’, as 
opposed to merely receiving what it gives itself which in turn neutralises the other. 
Any discipline can only let itself be questioned. In considering otherness or alterity, 
one may have to move toward what is no longer a source or site, towards “a space or 
a hollow within naked experience”, a space that carries one to the outer or inner 
reaches of experience. This hollow space is not an opening among others but rather 
“the opening of opening, that which can be enclosed within no category or totality, 
that is, everything within experience which can no longer be described by traditional 
concepts”. If the other is to remain as other than there needs to be a refutation of 
logos as absolute knowledge. Any rupture of logos however does not signal a descent
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into irrationalism, but rather an affirmative “wound or inspiration” which facilitates 
the opening of possibilities so that the logos can “let itself be proffered toward the 
other beyond its own totality” (Derrida, 1978: 121-22). This otherness may reveal the 
discipline’s surface to be “severely cracked” whereby what was taken for its solidity 
is actually its rigidity. Otherness remains resistant to all categories and concepts 
which (pre)suppose “an anticipation, a horizon within which alterity is amortized”. It 
cannot be bound rigidly by a concept or thought on the basis of a horizon that 
assumes sameness. In approaching otherness, we are obliged to think in opposition to 
the truisms which we believe and still cannot not believe “to be the very ether o f our 
thought and language” (Derrida, 1978: 118). In short, engaging with otherness leads 
to a difficult impasse. On the one hand, there is language with its possibility for a 
violent rapprochement o f otherness in terms of sameness, “the necessity that the other
 not be respected except in, for and by the same”. On the other hand, there is the
exclusion, the non-relation to this otherness which ignores and ultimately suppresses 
the other. It is this second option which Derrida (1978: 146) regards as “the worst 
violence, the violence o f the night which precedes or represses discourse” because
“pure non-violence, the non-relation of the same to the other is pure violence”,
whereas “the irreducible violence o f the relation to the other, is at the same time non­
violence, since it opens the relation to the other” (Derrida, 1978: 183; 160). 
Gesturing, without suffocating, towards otherness or remaining silent? As de Nooy
(1998: 7) suggests: “If  the claim to comprehend the other is akin to seizing the
other for oneself and squeezing its otherness out, then ignoring the other is no less 
crushing. We still need to put out a hand, but not a grasping hand, to make a gesture 
towards the unnameable, but not a gesture o f dismissal. Violence cannot be totally 
eliminated but can be minimised. To save the threshold from becoming a thrash-hold, 
the appropriate gesture still needs to be found”. This apposite gesture towards the 
intricacies of otherness will continue to remain between silence and language.
The problem of rhetoric, in particular the possibility o f naming, is a critical issue 
when considering khora because it cannot be easily situated or “assigned to a 
residence” (Derrida, 1995: 92-95) as it is more situating than situated. It transcends 
the horizon of sense or meaning as it refers to meaning of being - ontology. As a 
result o f these precautions and negative hypotheses that khora alerts one to, Derrida 
resists translating the name khora because “if it must be attempted, such an
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experience or experiment (experience) is not only but of concern for a word or an 
atom of meaning but also for a whole tropological texture”. Whether one is concerned 
with the word khora itself (‘place’, ‘location’, ‘region’, ‘country’) or what is termed 
the figures or tropes - comparisons, images, metaphors -  proposed by Timaeus 
(‘mother’, ‘nurse’, ‘receptacle’, ‘imprint-bearer’), the translation “remain(s) caught in 
networks of interpretation”; the translation is “lead astray by retrospective 
projections, which can always be suspected of being anachronistic”. One can never 
propose the exact name or word, the mot juste, for khdra because its name is not an 
exact word. Ultimately, one cannot approach it, itself, without resorting to some point 
of view or anachronistic perspective. Khora can only promise itself through a 
removal of determination, marks, impressions, forms. It never lets itself “be reached 
or touched, much less broached” and it resists inexhaustible interpretations which 
unsuccessfully endeavour to leave on it “the schematic mark of their imprint”. Khora 
does not furnish these interpretations “with the support of a stable substratum or 
substance”; it is not a or the subject. The hermeneutics of interpretation cannot 
inform, give form, to it except to the extent that khora, as an amorphous space, seems 
to receive these types/interpretations and give place to them. For Derrida, even if 
Timaeus names khora as a receptacle or place, these names to not designate an 
essence, a stable being. All acts o f  language, designations or sign postings which aim 
at khora or its meaning invariably fail because these acts appeal to genus, species, 
individual, type, schema and so on.
Derrida’s theoretical musings on khora are extremely useful to cite because he 
exposes the notoriously difficult, if not impossible, challenge of engaging with that 
which teeters on the brink o f the inconceivable. Khora is deprived o f a real referent. It 
is an X which possesses nothing as its own property because it remains unformed and 
amorphous. Derrida (1995: 97-99) suggests that “this very singular impropriety, 
which precisely is nothing, is just what khora must, if you like, keep”. One glimpses 
at the khora in an aporetical way and as if in a dream. Any interpretation o f it would 
have to possess a “teleological programming which annuls it while constituting it”. It 
is a “sur-name” for differance, a kind of “allegory” o f differance (Caputo, 1997b). 
Derrida’s ‘aesthetic’ o f conceptualisation and presentation functions as a type of 
critical index, agency or template against which one is able to assess (rather 
ironically) the viability of propositions and conceptions of the almost inconceivable.
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It is as if his writings function as a critical oracle (or perhaps more accurately a 
critical maelstrom) where one presents any endeavours of excavating the unknown 
(of course such a hegemonic assertion, such a reification and canonisation of his work 
risks functioning as completely antithetical to the Derridean ethos of play and 
deconstruction). While there is the acknowledgement o f the rigour o f Derrida’s 
exposition of the impossible, this chapter, like Kristeva’s reading of the psychical 
energy charges o f the chora, will gesture towards providing some ideas about what 
may inspire the movements of this non-conceptual, potential space. It should be 
reiterated that the emphasis on such a project is not to claim absolutely, but rather to 
explore through the archaic encounter o f the mother and the infant, the complexities 
and multi-faceted quality of the potential energetic features and traces of this spatio- 
temporal possibility (which at times even escapes adumbration). While this chapter 
explores the specific mother-infant interaction, it simultaneously espouses an ethos 
which takes into consideration that the multi-layered dimensions and texture of any 
experience may not be completely captured by an attempt to describe it through 
linguistic-discursive narratives. It is within the realm of the otherness of space and 
time that what I have termed the “third aesthetic” is generated - a particular idiom of 
co-creation constituted by what Bollas (1987: 13) refers to as the “mother-infant 
culture”, where the encounter between the mother and her infant facilitates a third 
space (the third aesthetic) that encompasses the dynamical interplay of two individual 
energies or corporeal entities.
Transitional Spaces
The notion of the third aesthetic attempts to extend the scope o f consideration o f the 
mother-infant relationship by focusing on a third space that exists between them. The 
concept of a third space, which alludes to a meeting point of two subjectivities which 
in turn proliferates a third arena o f negotiation, was initially foregrounded by 
Winnicott’s (1991) notion o f an ‘intermediate area’ or ‘potential space’ which, as 
Green (2000: 47) points out, remained seminal in transforming the “two-body 
psychology” that was attributed to the psychoanalytic scene o f the 1950s. In effect, 
the notion o f a third space considers other spatial possibilities that exist in relation to 
the interaction between two subjectivities. It is “as if the expression o f the inner world 
could be transposed into the limited field of interaction between subject and object
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and could reflect characteristics other than those usually deduced from a relationship 
between two parties standing in the external world. As if something poured from the 
internal to the external and would give birth to another form of existence before it 
would become entirely defined by its exteriority”. Something in the generation of this 
co-created third space gestures towards a dimension that is able to incorporate 
features from the domain o f each individual’s intrapsychic world in addition to their 
inter-engagement. There seems to be some type o f movement from the intra to the 
inter, from interiority to exteriority, that engenders new possibilities and qualities, the 
formation o f a new type (culture) o f energy or ‘existence’. Winnicott (1991: 3) 
proposes that a “third part of the life of a human being,, a part which we cannot 
ignore, is an intermediate area o f experiencing, to which inner reality and external life 
both contribute”. He suggests that this potential area functions as a “resting place” for 
the individual who must assiduously negotiate the demands of internal and external 
reality. Therefore this intermediate area of experience, which is never challenged 
(and, as Winnicott suggests, at a later stage expressed through art, religion, 
philosophy and other forms of creativity), provides relief from the burden or tension 
of this dialectical strain between internal and external reality. It is a “hypothetical area 
that exists (but cannot exist) between the baby and the object” - “a paradox” that 
Winnicott (1991: 107-108) “accepts and do(es) not attempt to resolve”. Phillips 
(1988: 2) intimates how Winnicott wanted to find a way to examine the gaps as 
opposed to close in on them because they could be potential spaces for the 
imagination. He was preoccupied “by the idea o f gaps, those ‘spaces between’ where 
there was room for the play o f speculation”.
For Winnicott, trust and play are two critical elements that generate this potential 
space. Trust is a sacred element in individual creative living and the potential space 
happens as a result o f a feeling o f confidence on the part of the infant during a time 
when s/he is captivated by a process of discovery. Indeed, this third arena is 
qualitatively variable in accordance with experiences o f trust that the infant 
encounters. The capacity for play between mother and infant creates an intermediate 
playground, transforming the potential space into a creative playground. For Pizer 
(1996: 690) it is “the interweaving of tonalities and lyrics, o f resonances and 
dissonances, (which) establishes the potential space with modes o f playing”. 
Winnicott (1991: 51) emphasises how “this area of playing is not inner psychic
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reality. It is outside the individual, but it is not the external world”. As such, in and 
through playing, “the child manipulates external phenomena in service of the dream 
and invests chosen external phenomena with dream meaning and feeling”. It is these 
ludic symbols of early childhood that, according to Winnicott, persist in adult life 
primarily in the shape o f dreams. It is not an easy task to conceptualise or write about 
the potential space because it gestures towards an other scene, situated in the nuances 
and interstices of intra and interpsychic processes. It is a dreamlike space that disrupts 
the binarity between self and other, a “possible existence” of a place “that is not 
properly described by either o f the terms ‘inner’ or ‘outer’” (Winnicott, 1991: 106). 
Moreover, the potential space is capable o f infinite variation, where experience is 
woven into the fabric of the imagination. Ogden (1985) proposes that the concept of 
potential space remains enigmatic and elusive because it is arduous to extricate the 
meaning of the concept from the elegant system of images and metaphors in which it 
is embedded. It is, as Davis and Wallbridge (1981) suggest, neither inside the world 
of dream and fantasy nor outside in the world of shared reality, but rather 
paradoxically in a third space that incorporates both of these places simultaneously. It 
is something that may transpire should there be sufficient room to grow and develop. 
This speculative or hypothetical area pertains more to living as opposed to mere 
functioning. The notion of living is imbued with a quality o f richness and it is 
enhanced by the intensity o f experience which resonates with the life experiences that 
transpire in the early stages of development. As a result, it is “not founded on the 
pattern o f body functioning but is founded on body experiences. These experiences 
belong to object-relating of a non-orgiastic kind, or to what can be called ego- 
relatedness, at the place where it can be said that continuity is giving place to 
contiguity” (Winnicott, 1991: 101). This statement suggests that the potential space 
encompasses more than the exclusive domain of the tension of drive states motioning 
towards reduction and satiation. It incorporates the infant’s capacity for relatedness 
and connectedness, often articulated through corporeal experiences -  the sensation of 
being held, played with, tactility, audio-visual engagement and interaction, and so 
forth. In this way, there is a tendency to consider the body in metonymical extension, 
a body that is “moved, stirred, depressed, or exalted”, and thus work against a 
“reduced conception o f the body”, o f the body locked into the traditional either-or 
binary with the soul (Barthes, 1977: 60; 80).
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The Alterity of the Third
My utilisation of the notion o f thirdness for the non-concept of the third aesthetic is 
more for the purpose of convenience because in my opinion, the notion of an ‘other 
space’ (to which I have attributed the term ‘third’), is infinitely and inherently more 
complex than a mere logical deduction or neat derivation (through synthesis) of a 
dialectic between two finite subjectivities or psychological entities. The third 
aesthetic is not a finite and uni-dimensional space that may be contained by a discrete 
third framework, but is rather infinitely between and infused with the trace and ethos 
of otherness and differance. This other or third space could never be incorporated into 
a neat synthesis without leaving a remainder, without leaving in excess. It cannot be 
“closed, mastered, encircled” (Derrida, 1981: 26). It forms part o f a liminal space, a 
threshold which is opened up by “the incommensurability between the signifier and 
the signified” (Derrida, 1981: 18). The third is the effect of a position which alludes 
to what is generated by, but ultimately transcendent and exterior to the mother-infant 
engagement. In this way, thinking o f the third does not include or presuppose a 
successful, harmonious dialectical mediation -  a lifting up (sublation) into “the self­
presence of an onto-theological or onto-teleological synthesis” (Derrida, 1981b: 44). 
The third emphasises an alterity, an outside as excess, that problematises the very 
possibility of recuperation or subordination within the symbolic, signifying system. I 
think that it is important to stress this reading o f the third as insisting on the 
exteriority of otherness and fluidity, especially in light o f Levinas’s (1969: 42) 
considerations o f how the mediation o f a third term (as category, concept, sensation 
or transcendental signifier) may potentially neutralise alterity by encompassing it 
within the totality o f a conceptual system so that the “shock of the encounter o f the 
same with the other is deadened”. Once again though, I am not entirely sure whether 
one can avoid the pitfalls of a third term or concept even if one foregrounds or inserts 
within the (non-)concept an irrevocable heterogeneity and exteriority (though of 
course one must at least try). This notion resonates with the above cited contentions 
of Butler (1993) who draws attention to how even non-concepts risk functioning as 
univocal signifiers which ultimately land up espousing an identical teleology to 
monolithic concepts. One needs to take cognisance of this critique or qualification 
whenever one is dealing with concepts that are purported to no longer be assimilated 
into the typography o f a discursive system. This statement exposes the complexity,
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the potential bind that one may face, owing to the fact that we are dependent on 
discursive, symbolic, language for describing extra-discursive, pre-symbolic spaces. 
It is, as Stanton (1986: 164) suggests, “endemic to any practice that tries to name the 
unnamed” whereby we remain embedded in the bind that the affirmation of the pre- 
symbolic creates. For either we nominate otherness and become entrapped within the 
structures of the already named; or else we do not name and remain trapped within 
the perpetuation of the same. Any inscription o f difference needs to take into 
consideration its inescapable debt (oppression) to the corpus of the symbolic given 
that the symbolic functions as the realm where meaning possibilities may be 
linguistically rendered. As Derrida (1978: 354) writes: “There is no sense in doing 
without the concepts o f metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no 
language -  no syntax and no lexicon -  which is foreign to this history; we can 
pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into 
the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest”. 
Elsewhere, he suggests that even when there is an attempt to break with discourse, 
logic and grammar and seek out an “a-grammaticality”, one still has to follow  
grammar because there is “no pure a-grammaticality; or rather, there is pure a- 
grammaticality but as soon as it appears as such, or as it enters a text or a situation, it 
starts to become grammatical” (Derrida, 2003: 13).
Metaphor and Metonymy
Before I continue with the discussion o f my choice of the term ‘aesthetic’, I would 
like to consider how the space o f the third aesthetic might be developed through the 
tropological forum o f metonymy. I think that the emphasis on the excess of the third 
aesthetic problematises its containment within a metaphoric paradigm. However, 
before I am able to expand on this notion, it is important to offer an explication o f the 
Lacanian terms o f metaphor and metonymy. One o f Lacan’s most highly innovative 
interventions into Freudian psychoanalysis was his use o f linguistics developed by 
Saussure to explain the functioning of the unconscious. He regards the contents o f the 
unconscious as signifiers9. The topography of the unconscious is defined by the
9 Lacan’s (1998: 20) fundamental premise suggests that “the unconscious is structured like a language” 
and that it consists of signifiers which have fallen below the barrier, that is, submitted to repression and 
prevented from traversing the bar (the division between the unconscious and consciousness) and
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algorithm ‘S/s’. This delineation reverses Saussure’s formula, signified/signifier, by 
giving primacy to the signifier (‘S’) over the signified10. The signifier is granted 
priority because, in Lacan’s understanding, the signified is in fact simply another 
signifier occupying a different position, a position below the bar within signification 
(bar = f) so that signifiers function in relation to other signifiers without ever arriving 
at a signified. Metaphor and metonymy are two central terms in the analysis of 
unconscious production. Lacan (1977) identifies metaphor, the substitution of one 
term for another, with the Freudian process of condensation11. The metaphoric 
process, the submersion o f one term underneath the other, provides the general model 
for the unconscious symptom (it is also implicated in . the poetic and creative 
endeavour). The term having fallen below the bar is repressed, and the signifier which 
replaces it becomes its symptom. It is during the transient moment of the symptom 
that the indefinite sliding of meaning constitutive of signification can be viewed as 
stuck so that the signifier is not free to form other connections and meanings, but is 
rather tied to particular significance. It is the “precise point at which sense emerges 
from non-sense” (Lacan, 1977: 158). The bar takes on a temporal dimension so that
gaining access into consciousness. This seminal notion requires further clarification because, as 
Lemaire (1979: 100-101) suggests: “when we hear of people rejecting Lacanian formulae such as ‘the 
unconscious is structured like a language’, or ‘the unconscious is a discourse’ in the name of a purist 
adherence to the principles of linguistic science, we can consider them as dismissing, with too hasty a 
stroke of the pen, the richness of such analogical recourses”. Therefore in the statement, ‘the 
unconscious is structured like a language’, the word Tike’ is essential in highlighting that the process 
of the unconscious is analogous to the process of operationalisation of linguistic functioning because 
language at the level of the unconscious cannot be assimilated into language as a body of conscious 
communication. In Seminar XX, Lacan (1998b: 48) stresses his usage of the phrase Hike a language’ 
as opposed to ‘by a language’ which would render the connotation differently. As Lemaire continues 
further: “We are also obliged to admit to a certain inability to specify the relations between these two 
languages, as thinking and unfolding the unconscious in analytic discourse means denaturing its 
essence”. The language of the unconscious can never neatly and absolutely translate into the language 
of conscious communication, and as a result the unconscious will always expose the peculiarities, 
idiosyncrasies and slippages of linguistic discourse. The primary process o f the unconscious signals an 
indelible flight from meaning which remains extremely arduous to grasp. It is for this reason that 
during one of the interviews that Lacan granted Lemaire, he proposed the following statement, which 
Lemaire (1979: 130) cites as: “the unconscious is a discourse, a language which is different from 
conscious language”.
10 The signifier is a form which signifies, whether it be visual, auditory, tactile and so on. The signifier 
is concerned with the process by which meaning is produced. The signified is the idea or concept that 
is signified by this process.
11 Condensation creates a compression of two or more ideas so that a composite figure, image or name, 
drawing on and leaving out features o f both, is formed. In this way, a single image in a dream, for 
example, is able to represent many different wishes or thoughts through the compression of common 
features and the elimination of relevant differences. Freud (1991c) regarded the process of 
condensation as overdetermined since one unrecognisable idea or memory can stand for a number of 
previously unrecognisable and far more important ideas or memories. It aids in disguising forbidden 
wishes by representing several unconscious contents through a single image, effecting great 
compression using an economy of omission (Grosz, 1990).
I l l
the signifier is not lost but rather delayed or deferred, and finds articulation in the 
transient moment of the symptom. Benvenuto and Kennedy (1986) describe the 
symptom as an anchoring point between signifier and signified. Lacan also proposes 
that metaphor undoes all previous connections between signifier and signified. It rips 
the signifier from its lexical connections. In this way, Lacan appeals to metaphor’s 
ability to divest the material it uses of any previous connections so that it becomes 
relevant to the subject’s unconscious dynamics. Metaphor is an element that has been 
emptied of its meanings and reintegrated into a different, signifying system12.
Metonymy, which Lacan (1977) identifies with the Freudian notion of 
• 1displacement , ensures that the repressed term always remains in a linear, 
syntagmatic, associative relation or connection to the rest of the subject’s language. It 
signals the relation between two contiguous signifiers where the original signifier 
(what was originally or primally repressed) never traverses the barrier between 
consciousness and the unconscious. Unlike metaphor, which privileges repressed 
signifiers, metonymy bars the hierarchical repressive structure of metaphor so that 
relevant connections are primarily based on the connection between a term and what 
substitutes it. Therefore the original repressed constellation that fuels or motivates 
this movement of displacement and substitution is barred from conscious access. In 
this movement o f one term to its substitute, Lacan will recognise the movement o f 
desire. Desire too is based on a chain o f substitution whereby the first (lost) object of 
desire (the need for union with the mother) generates a potentially infinite chain of
12 Metaphor is delineated in the following formula which offers an algorithmic representation of its 
process:
F (S'/S) = S(+)s
On the left-hand side, the original signifier (S) is vertically suspended under the substitute signifier (S’) 
which has taken its place in representation. It does not abolish the original but covers over it. On the 
right-hand side, the plus sign between the brackets represents the crossing of the bar and the 
constitutive value o f this crossing for the emergence o f signification. The movement barring a signifier 
from consciousness and placing it in the unconscious position of signified (s) is therefore subverted. 
Metaphor opens up a host o f new meanings which Lacan (1977) indicates by the plus sign in his 
formula.
13 During the process of displacement, a significant unconscious wish is able to transfer its intensity or 
meaning to an indifferent term, allowing the latter to act as its delegate and thus disguise it. The 
insignificant idea is able to represent the more significant one without the repressed features of the 
significant idea breaching the barriers of censorship. Displacement ensures that apparently trivial, 
indifferent and insignificant material can represent highly significant unconscious elements. It 
disguises unconscious wishes by transferring their intensity and meaning to relatively innocuous ideas 
which function as their distorted representatives (Freud, 1991 c).
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(only partially satisfactory) substitutes (Grosz, 1990). Metonymy describes a 
movement from signifier to signifier, a movement which opposes any tendency 
towards mastery and the fixing o f meaning. For Chaitin (1988), metonymy separates 
the subject from its attributes and produces a certain lack (<manque), loss, or gap 
(.beance) in and o f being14.
In assuming the name o f the third aesthetic as a movement of a (temporal) space that 
problematises conceptualisation, I have necessarily endeavoured to open up or 
proliferate the fluidity and multiplicity of this space, rather than suggest a neat 
closure, a unified and harmonious derivation of the mother-infant dialectic which 
would render it into a synchronous harmony. As such, I have attempted to resist 
triangulation whereby a third element in the equation, the third aesthetic, creates 
confluence or unification (in/through a trinity, triplicity) and closes off into a 
hermetically sealed system, a triadic schema. The question therefore arises as to how 
useful metaphor (the Lacanian rendition with its possibility for congealed, 
symptomatic meaning, however transient) is in subverting the purity of a potential, 
neat triadic system? Does metaphor not function as an example of the mediation of a 
third that neutralises the very alterity that accompanies this space o f the third 
aesthetic and thus renders it within the ambit or body o f a system? Assuming it is not 
possible to enclose the third aesthetic within a metaphoric system without risking 
neutralisation, what other forum or framework would be available so as not to 
metabolise or incorporate the radical alterity of this space? Or posed in a different 
way, is it possible to develop another (tropological) ‘configuration’ that would not 
function as an all-encompassing, oppressive meta-model or frame for the third 
aesthetic? It seems to me that there needs to be a radical reconstitution of the third 
aesthetic as metaphor (even if it is a metaphor for marginality, heterogeneity, 
estrangement and so on) because, as Kristeva (1987a: 30) suggests, metaphor should
14 The algorithmic representation of the metonymic process is as follows:
F (S ...S ’) = S(-)s
The left-hand side of Lacan’s (1977) formula can be read as the functional representation of the 
relation between two contiguous signifiers ‘(S ...S )’, two signifiers on the same level. The right hand 
side can be interpreted as a relation between a signifier (S) and a signified (s), which does not traverse 
the barrier of censorship, as indicated by the minus sign. The metonymic effect is caused by the 
linearity of a signifying structure — the juxtaposition of signifiers in a chain.
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be understood as a “movement toward the discemable, a journey toward the visible”, 
a “sundered unity” which is “in the process of being set up”. However the attempt to 
reconsider something other than the metaphoric remains complicated from the very 
outstart especially if one considers Derrida’s (1982) proposition in “White 
Mythology” o f how metaphor is the very condition of language, metaphysics, 
conceptualisation, nomination, description and so on. Indeed, what is proper to the 
movement of the third aesthetic is effaced or erased, wiped over by its metaphorical 
construction and conceptualisation (when attempting to describe it through language). 
One cannot escape the terrain o f metaphor because it is inextricably bound to the 
condition of language, and it does not necessarily offer relief, exculpation, the 
possibility to “lift the weight o f things and acts” (Derrida, 1978: 114). As a result, 
even if one suggests that the third aesthetic is a quasi or pseudo-metaphor, a metaphor 
about the impossibility o f metaphor, one still incorporates such a delineation within 
the overriding frame of metaphor as a variation that still holds to the metaphoric 
system or oeuvre. An alternative solution, the displacement of metaphor with 
metonymy, is not necessarily a resolution because metonymy still partakes of a binary 
epistemology (the imposition o f a metaphor/metonymy dichotomy), and even the 
very subversion of such a binary reveals that metonymy is not an impoverished 
metaphor, but rather “metonymy exists from the beginning and makes metaphor 
possible” (Lacan 1993: 227) and vice versa15.
Despite or in spite o f the limitations that metonymy presents, its inextricable link with 
metaphor, its ultimate incapacity to transcend the figure of metaphor, I would like to
15 For Grosz (1990), there is an inextricable link between metaphor and metonymy, since the 
metaphoric process generates the signified from the chain of signifiers, and the metonymic process 
ensures that each signifier has multiple connections and associations which relate to other signifiers, 
and therefore give it meaning. Every condensation (metaphor) is also a displacement from the 
substitute to the original signifier, and every displacement relies on terms generated by condensation. 
The (metonymic) displacement is derived from the condensation, the original signifier o f the 
metaphoric process. Another useful way of understanding this intimate connection is in terms of 
horizontality and verticality. Gallop (1985) suggests that in the metonymy formula, a horizontal 
configuration of S and S’ is paired with a horizontal line (the bar, the minus sign). In the algorithm for 
metaphor, a vertical disposition of S and S’ is not paired with a vertical line, but rather with a cross 
composed of a vertical and horizontal line (+). The structure of the metaphoric algorithm encourages 
the reader to only see the vertical line which “crosses the bar” (Lacan, 1977: 164). However, one is 
presented not with a vertical crossing line, but with the cross itself, two dimensional, nonlinear. The 
complete metaphoric process is a “double twist” or a “double triggered mechanism” (Lacan, 
1977:166), because it involves both the emptying of sense (-) made possible by metonymy, and the 
formation of new meanings made possible by the ‘+’sign. It is therefore virtually impossible to read 
metaphor without taking into account its metonymic substructure. The recognition of the two 
dimensions of the plus sign suggests that metonymy is necessary for metaphor.
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propose that the trope o f metonymy is more apt (though ultimately flawed because it 
is a metaphor of metonymy or metonymic metaphor) in creating dissemination which 
subverts or disrupts luminous unification. Such a proposition requires qualification 
and as such, in accordance with Derrida, if I propose metonymy then it must 
necessarily be written “under erasure” (sous rature). As mentioned, this linguistic 
orientation highlights the necessity of both utilising and erasing language 
simultaneously. The word is inaccurate and therefore it is crossed out. However, since 
it is necessary (in an endeavour to foreground some concept or notion through a 
linguistically flawed system), it remains legible. There is thus a simultaneous 
acknowledgement that metonymy may potentially gesture towards the radical alterity 
of the third aesthetic, yet it also remains inherently flawed owing to its location 
within logocentric discourse. One is thus rendered in an uncomfortable position 
whereby there is an attempt to “account for an error by means of tools derived from 
that very error” (Johnson, 1981: x). A critical reason why I have suggested a qualified 
metonymy is because its operations are more closely aligned with dissemination, 
which operates at the limits of intelligibility. Moreover, as Johnson (1981: xxxii) 
highlights, dissemination “attempts to work a violent but imperceptible displacement 
of the ‘triangular’ -  Dialectical, Trinitarian, Oedipal -  foundations o f Western 
thought”. The dissemination o f metonymy is therefore juxtaposed with the polysemy 
of metaphor, and in this very statement I am guilty of perpetuating a type of binarity 
or perhaps proliferating a certain oedipal configuration (maternal dissemination, 
paternal polysemination?), which falls into the very trap o f triangulation16. However, 
as Johnson (1981: x) astutely perceives, “to show that the binary oppositions of 
metaphysics are illusions is also, and perhaps most importantly, to show that such 
illusions cannot simply in turn be opposed without repeating the very same illusion”.
My proposition that metonymy (as opposed to metaphor) is more apt as a tropological 
gesture for the radical alterity of the third aesthetic is as a result o f its disseminative 
(rather than polysemic) capacity to subvert all recuperative gestures of mastery, foil 
attempts at dialectical closure and break the circuit o f intentions or expectations 
through its ungovernable excess. It prevents the possibility of summing up and
16 Derrida (1981b) suggests how dissemination figures that which cannot be the father’s (as symbolic 
agent), though of course this does not necessarily and invariably intern it within the domain o f the 
maternal as this would confer upon it an essence (in/as opposition perhaps?).
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closing in on gaps at any possible point. In my opinion, metonymical dissemination 
or displacement is more useful in disrupting the sense of a neat, triangulated closure 
which would neutralise the infinitely between o f the third aesthetic by imposing on it 
“discursive effects o f an intention-to-mean” (Derrida, 1981:7). Before I offer an 
explication of dissemination, the reader should bear in mind (a bind once again!) that 
the very success of ‘presenting’ dissemination in a disseminative way would be a sign 
of failure because “to perfectly disseminate the exposition of dissemination would 
require a kind of textual mastery that would belong among the recuperative gestures 
that dissemination undercuts” (Johnson, 1981: xxxiii). If dissemination “cannot be 
summarised into an exact tenor, it is because the force and form of its disruption 
explode the semantic horizon” (Derrida, 1981b: 45). Dissemination refers to the 
impossibility of, the resistance (restance) against, delimitation, reinscription and 
reducibility. It always leaves an irremediable remainder, an after-effect which cannot 
be reincorporated into a teleological anticipation. It signals towards the impossibility 
of saturation so that to master is to miss. Dissemination is predicated on the 
disappearance of the mastery of meaning, even if it comprehends difference and 
plurality. As such it diverges from polysemy, “comprising both more and less than 
the latter”, and it “interrupts the circulation that transforms into an origin what is 
actually an after-effect o f meaning” (Derrida, 1981: 21). In the symptom of metaphor 
or metaphor as symptom, as Kristeva (1987a: 23) suggests: “now, and thanks to 
Lacan, one analyses the symptom as a screen through which one detects the workings 
o f signifiance (the process o f formation and de-formation o f meaning and the 
subject)”. In this way, metaphor creates the capacity for the construction o f meaning 
in its plural, polysemic form and by implication this meaning may (even in its flux 
and heterogeneity) potentially be recuperated back into static classifications o f dyadic 
or triadic configurations. One can detect or decipher within metaphor “an indefinite 
jamming of semantic features one into the other, a meaning being acted out” 
(Kristeva, 1987a: 37). While Derrida (1981b: 45) acknowledges that polysemia 
“represents progress in relationship to the linearity of the monothematic” that anchors 
itself to a principle signified, he nevertheless suggests that it is still organised “within 
the implicit horizon of a unitary resumption of meaning” -  within the horizon o f a 
teleological and totalising dialectic that annuls expansive and productive 
displacement. The dissemination of metonymy, on the other hand, “cannot be pinned 
down at any one point by the concept or the tenor o f a signified” because it does not
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traverse into (cognitively comprehensible) meaning, it does not cross the bar. It 
remains inherently and infinitely elliptical. The more or less which disjoins 
dissemination from polysemy is, according to Derrida (1981: 25-26), associated with 
castration, but with a certain exteriority of castration which signals “a fall with no 
return and with no restricted economy” so that it can “no longer be taken up and 
comprehended within the logocentric, sublimating field o f talking truth, law, 
signification, full speech, the symbolic order, the intersubjective dialectic, or even the 
intersubjective triad”. Dissemination cannot simply be equated with castration 
(though it ‘possesses’ a castrating effect, a cutting off of meaning even in the 
celebration of its plurality) because the concept of castration has been metaphysically 
interpreted and arrested. If dissemination is associated with castration then it cannot 
be a castration as transcendental signifier, “the ultimate recourse of all textuality, the 
central truth, or truth in the last analysis, the semantically full and non-substitutable 
definition of the generating (disseminating) void in which the text is launched” 
(Derrida, 1981b: 86). Instead, it ‘is’ an angle o f the play o f castration which refuses to 
signify, and it opens up a snag that can no longer be mended or rectified, a spot where 
neither meaning (however polysemic) nor any form of presence can be pinned down. 
It effaces any metaphoric movement that would attempt to tie down, coagulate, 
condense, hypostatise, and compress the play of differance. It cannot be led back to a 
simple origin or presence, and it marks an irreducible and generative multiplicity.
Dissemination marks the essential limits signalling “the impossible return to the 
rejoined, readjusted unity of meaning” so that it affirms “the always already divided 
generation of meaning”, spilling it in advance (Derrida, 1981: 268). It can never 
manifest as an originary, central or ultimate signified, the place proper to truth. The 
interminable motion of dissemination therefore is insufficiently announced by 
polysemy, which according to Derrida (1981: 350), “always puts out its multiplicities 
and variations within the horizon, at least, o f some integral reading which contains no 
absolute rift, no senseless deviation” so that in the end “meaning (is) at last 
deciphered, revealed, made present in the rich collection of its determinations”. All 
moments of polysemy are potential moments of meaning installed through plurality, 
“temporary detours o f some passion, some signifying martyrdom that testifies to a 
truth past or a truth to come, to a meaning whose presence is announced by enigma”. 
As a result, the concept o f polysemy is located within the confines of explanation,
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within the enumeration and explication of meaning, so that meaning presents itself 
and gathers itself together. A nonmasterable dissemination is polysemia with a 
perpetual remainder, an irreducible polysemia (Derrida, 1982). While I have 
endeavoured to create some type o f division between metaphor and metonymy and 
their active properties or functions of polysemy and dissemination respectively, such 
a division can only ultimately be utilised in the service of explanation because 
metaphor and metonymy (and by implication polysemia and dissemination) are 
inextricably linked in a dialectic of negation, creation, accentuation and definition. 
The efficacy of the displacement o f metonymy, for example, is dependent on the 
establishment of an originary signifier of the metaphoric process, and similarly, 
dissemination is a type o f polysemia that cannot be saturated, reduced, deciphered; it 
is both more and less. Metonymy therefore cannot evade its metaphoric origins or the 
way in which the metaphoric position constructs and informs its process. Given the 
limitations, it seems to me that metonymy is however more appropriate, though of 
course not ideal, in thwarting and subverting the ‘‘trinitarian horizon” (Derrida, 1981: 
25) through its disseminative features. The algorithmic delineation of metonymy 
reveals it to function as a figure of the ellipse whereby its tropological nature is not 
easily homogenised or rendered as synchronous. It fails to cross the bar to truth, 
meaning and signification, creating an (in) excess, an alterity and residue which 
disturbs the potential for hermetic, static, finite, triadic closure.
The Aesthetic (Of the ‘Third’)
Ideally, I would like the term “aesthetic” to signify a particular idiom, form, gesture, 
culture, feature and way of ‘being’. However, as I shall describe, this may not be 
possible unless each of these positions are placed under erasure or in inverted 
commas because the third aesthetic defies and eludes the possibility for absolute 
structural (formal) definition. If anything, the aesthetic, as Barthes (1977: 84) 
suggests, must be brought closer “to the drift” — to a space of variation and floating. 
Bollas (1993: 40-41) is one writer who highlights some useful features o f what the 
aesthetic may come to signify. He is concerned with the experience o f the aesthetic 
(the enchantment, the allure o f art in a sense), which occurs as a moment where time 
manifests momentarily or transiently as a space for the subject. Moreover, the
118
aesthetic reactivates the archaic, existential experience, the symbiotic reverie between 
mother and infant:
A spell that holds self and other in symmetry and solitude, time crystallises into 
space, providing a rendezvous o f self and other (text, composition, painting) that 
actualises deep rapport between subject and object and provides the person with a 
generative illusion o f fitting with an object, evoking an existential memory. 
Existential, as opposed to cognitive, memory is conveyed not through visual or 
abstract thinking, but through the effects of being. Such moments feel familiar, 
uncanny, sacred, reverential, and outside cognitive coherence. They are registered 
through an experience o f being, rather than mind, because the epistemology o f the 
aesthetic moment is prior to representational cognition and speaks that part o f us 
where the experience of rapport with the other was the essence of being. Indeed, the 
aesthetic induces an existential recollection of the time when communicating took 
place solely through the illusion o f deep rapport o f subject and object. Being-with, as 
dialogue, is the communicating o f the infant with the mother, where the mother’s task 
is to provide the infant with an experience of continuity of being. Her handling and 
the infant’s state of being are prior to the infant’s processing his existence through 
mentation.
The notion of the aesthetic resonates with the archaic experience o f the mother-infant 
encounter where the infant experiences distress and its dissolution through the 
“appar itional-like presence of the mother”. The mother’s form or manner o f care, her 
“aesthetic of handling” (Bollas, 1993: 41-42), is internalised by the infant whereby 
her style of being with the infant through inactive presence, the satiation o f need, 
soothing, playing, feeding and so on, precipitates transformations of the infant’s 
internal and external realities. Bollas acknowledges in an endnote that while the 
maternal aesthetic originates from the mother, it becomes a mutual experience as the 
infant and mother discover new modes of connection. It is this mutuality which 
fosters the generation of the third aesthetic -  intersubjective residues generated 
between the mother-infant engagement17. The experience which contributes to the
17 In The Bonds o f  Love, Benjamin (1988: 14) emphasises this notion of mutuality whereby she 
suggests that despite the infant’s dependence on the mother, the mother is still grateful for the infant’s 
cooperation and activity — his/her willingness to be soothed, acceptance of frustration, devotion to the
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generation of the third aesthetic often exudes the quality o f the momentary, of 
irreducibility, of an “indivisible unicity of the instant” (Derrida, 2000: 30) -  as if it 
were a space that transcends linear temporality, a pre-temporal or atemporal archaic 
existence that indicates the infant’s state of being as prior to processing through 
mentation18. Of course, it is important to stress the as i f  o f the above statement for the 
spatial is always already mediated by the movement o f differance and thus by 
temporality. The archaic scenario between mother and infant is further complicated 
by the proposition that “the mother is less significant and identifiable as an object 
than as a process that is identified with cumulative internal and external
transformations where the first object is ‘known’ not so much by putting it into an
object representation, but as a recurrent experience of being -  a more existential as 
opposed to representational knowing. As the mother helps to integrate the infant’s 
being (instinctual, cognitive, affective, environmental), the rhythms of this process -  
from unintegration(s) to integration(s) -  inform the nature o f this ‘object’ relation 
rather than the qualities of the object as object” (Bollas, 1987: 14). In effect, Bollas 
suggests that the infant internalises not simply an object (the mother, for example), 
but also a process (the aesthetic of her transformations). I would qualify and add to 
this notion by suggesting that the infant ‘internalises’19 not only the process o f the 
mother’s aesthetic of transformation, but more so the process and energies of the third 
aesthetic -  a co-created intersubjectiveness which takes into consideration not only 
the way in which the infant responds and contributes to this space, but also the 
fluidity of boundaries o f object-entities -  a relational continuity between rather than a 
discrete object or subject20. If the infant experiences the mother less as an ideational
breast, and focus on her face. Indeed, the mother feels comforted by this “glimmer of recognition” as a 
sign of mutuality that persists in spite of the infant’s tremendous dependence on the mother.
18 I make use of Bollas’s (1993: 48) definition of mentation as “thought processing, whether organised 
or disorganised, conscious or unconscious”. In its breadth, it seems to me more accurate precisely 
because one cannot know with empirical certainty what transpires in the infant’s psyche. It is 
ultimately a speculative endeavour.
19 The use of the world ‘internalise’ should not be equated with an outcome of an internal object or 
intrapsychic object representation in phantasy as the Kleinians would propose. It refers more to the 
‘absorption’ (though not in any masterable sense) of the energetics of intersubjective residues of a non­
simple present. For Benjamin (1988), the idea of internalisation implies that the other is consumed, 
incorporated and digested by the self, whereas that which cannot be consumed seems to elude the 
concept of internalisation or is at best only obliquely apprehended by it. For the purposes of this thesis, 
if internalisation is to be offered as a proposition, then it must be done so under erasure or with critical 
qualifications.
20 As mentioned, Benjamin (2002) proposes that the infant’s response to the mother is of importance 
even though it has been less emphasised in the literature on development. She suggests that the infant’s 
devotion to the mother’s milk or acceptance of her soothing ministrations functions as a form of
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object-representation and more as an existential experience of being, then it seems to 
me that one has to take into consideration that the infant will absorb certain rhythms 
or energies that are not necessarily attached to the mother as a discrete object-entity 
but instead are a metonymic extension of his/her relationship with the mother. The 
affirmation of an ex-sistential knowingness diffuses the sense of a specificity of a 
discrete object and pushes towards the very threshold o f boundaried relationality in 
that the infant internalises the “mobility of relations between” (Irigaray, 1992: 90), 
which are not attached to a specific object but rather to an excessive co-creation 
between, where energy circulates and a third space remains incessant yet furtive in 
relation to categories o f apprehension. This type of description of the mother-infant 
dynamic seems to come closer to Kristeva’s ideas on a maternally connoted space -  a 
maternal space which is fluid and heterogeneous, a maternal which designates a 
relational continuity between rather than a sense of something finite; a maternal 
which alludes to an other jouissance which precedes desire (of the symbolic) and the 
subject/object dichotomy that this desire presupposes.
In developing the notion of the third aesthetic, I have encountered the difficulty of 
attempting to write about a residual third spatio-temporal impossible possibility, that 
obliquely ‘mediates’ (placed in inverted commas for it is not something that is 
authoritative) the interaction between the mother and the infant. At this juncture, one 
may possibly be entering into the domain of psychoanalysis’s most radical 
propositions where it is forced into the extremity of consequence because, as 
Jacqueline Rose (2003: 156) suggests, it may intimate that “subjects pass through 
each other like spirits in the night, more intimate, closer than any other form of 
contact could hope to be”. This citation from Rose seems to be substantiated by 
psychoanalytic concepts such as reverie which involves a “psychological source of 
supply of the infant’s needs for love and understanding” (Bion, 1962: 36) whereby
mutuality and an affirmation of the mother’s agency. The infant’s responsiveness, however, cannot 
always necessarily be equated with reciprocity and one should take into consideration the asymmetry 
of the mother-infant relationship at times. Indeed, Frosh and Baraitser (2003: 786), in an article 
exploring recognition, responsibility and reciprocity inter alia, suggest that “reciprocity may ensue 
from the recognition given to the infant, but that is neither predictable nor necessary (and it seems 
likely that love of the child for the parent will be much more ambivalent than the other way around). 
Winnicott, for one, realises this, with his emphasis on how the infant uses the mother, the importance, 
for example, of her willingness to submit herself to the infant’s aggression, and her capacity to 
survive”.
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the mother acts as a “container” for the infant’s experiences through modification of 
the infant’s sensations. Here we come close to a type of telepathic bonding where, as 
Freud (2001: 39) proposes, “processes in one person -  ideas, emotional states, 
conative impulses -  can be transferred to another person through empty space without 
employing the familiar methods o f communication by means o f words and signs”21. 
The dialogue between the mother and the infant thus takes place not only in and 
through language as we understand it as symbolic beings, but also through psyche- 
soma rhythms where the mother responds with a sense of otherness in self, offering 
herself up as a “mobile receptacle” which fashions itself on the infant’s invocation 
and “follows its winding course” (Kristeva, 1980: 282).
I am alluding to liminal energetic spaces and dynamics which mediate intra and inter­
subjectivity by transforming discreteness into the proliferation o f relationality and the 
infinitely between. I think that Rose (2003: 154-155) is particularly sensitive to the 
ramifications of this liminal relationality, a space which “dissolves all identity, wrests 
from us any certainty of being, turns us into shadows, spirits, ghosts”. In a sharp 
critique of object-relations theory, its staid or reactionary recuperation of a 
potentially radical stance, she suggests:
If object-relations theory, in its Winnicottian form, has taken upon itself to enter the 
space where Freud did not dare to tread, this particular form o f danger -  that there 
might be a world without boundaries where all founding distinctions are lost -  seems, 
for the most part, to have been ignored (rerepressed one might say). Indeed, you 
could argue that the emphasis on the adequacy and inadequacy o f the mother -  what 
she can and should do -  has served to make safe or occlude this space: not the space 
of a necessary lack-in-being in Lacanian terms, but the opposite, a space too full, a 
space that will become our dream of the mother, but which is in fact a space with no 
single origin, and for which no one is accountable, where the divisions inside my own 
mind, and between me and the other, are unclear.
21 For a very playful and astute analysis of the aporias of telepathy and psychoanalysis’s attempt to 
keep it at bay in attempting to promote itself as a scientific discipline, the reader is referred to Derrida’s 
(1988b) essay entitled “Telepathy”.
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While the third aesthetic may at times allude to this too full space, a fullness which 
“derives from an indwelling of otherness” (Sprengnether, 1990: 238) given the unique 
set-up or properties of the mother-infant engagement (the possibility for ‘magical’ 
connection, for something, as cited above from Rose, “closer than any other form of 
contact could hope to be”), the generation of the third aesthetic should not be 
confused or equaled with the “terrifying consolation” of what Derrida (1988b: 36) 
terms “complete presence {la toute presence)” or “fusional immediacy”. Instead, it 
may gesture towards transient moments of approximated presence, qualified presence 
(given the limitations o f symbolic subjugation, and the movements of differance), 
where the infant and the mother remain ensorcelled within the throes, the rhythms, of 
the pre-symbolic -  as if suspended momentarily from the oppressive structures o f the 
symbolic22. The third aesthetic is not not present, its just that it is rather not simply 
present (or absent, which would present itself in the ontology o f a binary with the 
possibility for metaphysical revelation). Where the third aesthetic is concerned, 
presence presents itself as a chimera so that, irreducibly, “something promises itself 
as it escapes, gives itself as it moves away, and strictly speaking it cannot even be 
called presence”. The third aesthetic is almost inconceivable (Derrida, 1976: 154). 
The notion of absolute plenitude or presence in-itself, an all-encompassing “presence 
of the present” (Derrida, 1976: 309), an originary, essential, living present of 
presence, remains a logocentric myth that belies the sense o f a divisive symbolic 
reality and the heterogeneity of experience that cannot be captured absolutely. In O f 
Grammatology, Derrida (1976: 166) suggests how the phenomena of the myth of 
consciousness, the suppression of differance and the reduction of the opacity o f the 
signifier, all lie at the origin of what is called presence. “That which is not subjected 
to the process of differance is present”. The present deludes one into believing that
22 As one possible example of how the mother-infant relationship evokes echoes of the mother’s own 
pre-symbolic language constellations, Kristeva (1980: 278; 136) suggests how infantality may be 
mobilised in the mother in response to her child: “...the adult, through her still infantile sexuality, is 
able to perceive in the discourse o f the child (boy or girl) while it refers her to that level where her 
‘own’ language is never totally rationalised or normated according to Cartesian linguistics, but where it 
always remains an ‘infantile language’”. This infantile language refers to the what remains from 
infancy in the language of the adult -  the rhythm and musicality of language, the physical pleasure of 
producing vowels and consonants, rhyme and repetition, “syntactic liberties or lexical variations”, a 
“wondering or frizziness” of language. What the mother identifies in her infant’s babbling is a sense of 
otherness within her — where her language can never be totally rationalised: “The child therefore
becomes the real from which we begin our analysis o f our language’s infantile attributes”. As de
Nooy (1998: 13) writes: “The alterity o f the infant remains unapproachable but can provoke an echo in 
the mother, causing a vibration in that tenuous thread that links the subject to the unknowable regions 
of her being -  regression”. In short, the mother-infant engagement has the capacity to render a sense of 
otherness that has never ceased to haunt the mother’s language.
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one is able to think time or space without differance. The present, however, is 
indelibly fissured by differance. As a consequence, there is always already infinite 
deferral and remains from the possibility of a pure, whole or utopian essence and 
simplicity of present ideality -  an unceasing, full synthesis, a pure actuality of the 
now23. From another perspective, Milan Kundera (1995: 128-129) considers how “the 
present -  the copcreteness o f the present -  as a phenomenon to consider, as a 
structure, is for us an unknown planet; so we can neither hold on to it in our memory 
nor reconstruct it through imagination. We die without knowing what we have lived”. 
He further suggests how the “acousticovisual concreteness” o f a present situation in 
all its continuity is transformed by the abstractions of our mind, our memory, so that 
reality can only be known in the past tense and not as it is -  “The present moment is 
unlike the memory of it. Remembering is not the negative of forgetting. 
Remembering is a form o f forgetting”. It is important to emphasise that the third 
aesthetic should not be viewed as a derivative o f what Frosh (2002: 121) has 
identified as a “pasture o f oneness” -  the creation of a “transpersonal space without 
separations, a relational space o f communication and contact, in which the boundaries 
o f each self fade and a wholeness o f contact with others is made possible”. This type 
of oceanic synthesis would neutralise the dissemination and differance that invariably 
accompanies the movement of the generation of the third aesthetic which requires the 
interplay of two individuals and the transpiration of infinite possibilities as opposed to 
a unified non-heterogeneous whole which would render between-ness redundant24. 
The infinitely between does not “lead to a fusion in which one or the other disappears, 
but to a mutual crossing o f boundaries which is creative, and yet where identity is not 
swallowed up” (Whitford, 1991: 167).
23 Rather shrewdly, Derrida (2003: 8-9) confesses elsewhere (exploring the nexus of writing and 
desire) that the very presence that he opposes in his texts is “exactly what I’m after in life”. This 
however does not signify that he does not believe in what he writes. Instead, he tries to understand a 
certain “Necessity” (which he writes with a capital N) which compels him to deconstruct and write that 
there is an interruption and so forth. It is precisely because there is this Necessity that there is a desire 
for pure presence. Derrida attempts to articulate this Necessity which compels and urges him to write, 
and “this articulation means that it’s because there is no pure presence that I desire it”.
24 In considering the ethics o f intersubjectivity, Irigaray (2000) insists on the necessity “to be two” 
because is only the non-possessiveness of two-ness that leads to a respect for alterity and difference. 
This notion will be explicated further in Chapter 5.
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The Turn of Between-ness
While I have suggested that the third aesthetic is generated or co-created in-between 
the mother-infant engagement, this sense of co-creation and in-between-ness is 
differentiated from one particular entity through spacing, “the becoming-space of 
time” which in tu^m leads to deferral through temporisation, “the becoming-time of 
space” (Derrida, 1982: 8). While the mother and infant are responsible for generating 
the space of the third aesthetic [which however does not belong to either as it is 
“located elsewhere, distant, permissive, always already past” (Kristeva, 1980: 286)], 
there is simultaneously an irreducible mystery which encompasses this space in that 
the essence o f kinesis, rhythm, motion, sound, gesture, vocality, tactility and so on, 
frequently elude the mastery of symbolic understanding. It is as if there is an 
empirical setting of the mother and the infant, as well as the phantasm of a fictional 
third space between them -  an actuality and a spectral virtuality o f a scene. The third 
aesthetic remains exterior to knowledge, cognition, construction and possession, and 
it resists “conformity, resemblance, or adequation between a presence and a 
representation”. As a result, the presence o f the third aesthetic “is no longer a mother- 
form around which are gathered and differentiated the future (present) and the past 
(present)” (Derrida, 1981: 210). The entire possibility of the third aesthetic as a 
cognitively knowable, conspicuously present experience that can excavated, 
uncovered or recuperated (through the psychoanalytic endeavour perhaps), and which 
determines subsequent significant past and future positions, is rendered problematical 
because the way in which it inscribes the possibility for future meaning-making 
endeavours prevents the establishment of causality -  a casual link between the third 
aesthetic and a subsequent meaning-content configuration. I am suggesting that the 
nature of the presentation o f the third aesthetic, its frequent passage through pre­
verbal patterns of being, complexifies the establishment o f aetiological or originary 
causation — a lost experience/origin, a single, simple founding moment that can be 
excavated for the purposes o f casual connections. It is important to stress that the 
third aesthetic (in the form of what I have termed the ‘O-Function’, which will be 
explored in the next chapter) provides a frame, a matrix (as an oblique anteriority), 
but not content, for meaning-making possibilities. The third aesthetic cannot be 
conceptualised as a central present/presence of which the past and future would be 
but modifications. It cannot be wholly translated, modified or recuperated as a
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conscious narrative (that was once unconscious) or as a subsequent determinant of 
future ontological meaning-content.
What is crucial to the fabric of the third aesthetic, the “inside of its proper interiority” 
(Derrida, 1981b: 94), is inscribed within one without memory that is susceptible to 
linguistic representation and codification. It is as if a certain element is lost from the 
archaic mother-infant relationship, yet some nebulous, esoteric trace remains (in the 
form of the O-Function). The idea o f a reference would be misleading in that the third 
aesthetic refutes the idea of space-becoming-place whereby there is some subsequent 
point available for easy reference as object or referent. The lost element of the 
mother-infant bond is the thing out of which flows the undecidable, the virtual, for it 
is as if it can only be rendered in the pre-symbolic realm (as a mobile, rhythmic, 
energetic process, and as such it is not an object if by object one refers to a 
prescriptive enclosure, a closed, knowable, definable entity25). The third aesthetic 
partakes of the in-between-ness, the spacing between, where the between 
encompasses the scope o f its movement. With all the undecidability o f its meaning, 
the third aesthetic, like Derrida’s hymen, “only takes place when it doesn’t take place, 
when nothing really happens”. Nothing can really happen in the sense of cognitive- 
linguistic processing as a result of the in-between-ness, the no-thingness, the 
irreducibility and mystery of its function. And it is precisely this irreducibility, as 
Irigaray (2000: 69) suggests, that ensures the alchemy of between-ness, and “opens an 
abyss in consciousness, in knowledge, in truth”. The third aesthetic never presents 
itself in a codified, symbolic form. “It never is -  in the present - ; it has no proper, 
literal meaning; it no longer originates in meaning as such, that is, as the meaning of 
being” (Derrida, 1981: 229), yet it inaugurates some possibility for potentially 
creating meaning. While it does not partake o f meaning (resisting any possibility of 
ontologisation), it ‘facilitates’ the possibility of being able to create meaning at a later 
stage of life. It is indeed “a mark without a mark (margin)”, re-marking itself 
indelibly as disappearance, erasure and non-sense (Derrida, 1981: 212-213). It is a 
memory that does not evoke remembrance, a dismembered memory, an act that does 
not take place, a threshold that can never be surmounted. It is always “at the edge of
25 If there is an element of transcendence, of the beyond, between two individuals, then the gap should 
be sufficient to sustain the dynamic. “Why should an object between us be necessary?”, enquires 
Irigaray (2000:16).
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being” infinitesimally inconsistent, undecidable -  next-to-nothing (Derrida, 1981: 
215).
Rhythm
One of the major difficulties in capturing or codifying the ethos o f the third aesthetic 
is as a result o f its rhythmic properties. Indeed, the third aesthetic is a function of 
rhythm, marked by a rhythmic differance. For Lacoue-Labarthe (1998: 139-140), the 
question of rhythm marks the frontier o f “that properly placeless and undefined 
domain of all one ‘knows’” -  furtive presentiments, imprecise formulations, vague 
intuitions and so on. He cites two declarations on rhythm. The first is from Hdlderlin: 
“All is rhythm (rhythmus); the entire destiny o f man is one celestial rhythm”. The 
second comes from Mallarme’s La musique et les lettres where he states, in the turn
of a phrase; “ because every soul is a rhythmic knot”. Such statements are in a way
an emblematic formula of the enigmatic horizon o f the problematic. Indeed, the 
question of rhythm alludes to what is ‘infra-theoretical’ which in turn goes back from 
Narcissus/reflection to echo, from the optical/verbal/specular to reverberation or 
resonance . Rhythm evades any deciphering or decoding and does not fall under the 
jurisdiction of any metaphysical binary. It speaks a foreign, esoteric language -  a 
language of inarticulated sounds, eyes and gestures. It remains prior to the figure or 
visible schema. It “throws off (scopic) perception, and estranges, defamiliarises, 
disturbs the familiar, the visible, the phenomenal” (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 194). It 
remains an “unspoken, connivance of the inexpressible, o f a wink, a tone o f voice, a 
gesture, a tinge, a scent”, and takes “refuge in tones to recover an underwater, trans­
verbal communication between bodies” (Kristeva, 1986: 182). What is missing in 
rhythm is categorisation, schematisation, what is missing is the possibility to institute 
a cleavage between the recognisable and non-recognisable, the familiar and the 
uncanny, the real and the fantastic, the mimetic and non-mimetic, the visible and the 
audible, the temporal and the spatial -  life and fiction. Benveniste (1971: 285-286) 
suggests how rhythm defies any fixed or stable form that may posit itself as an object, 
an imago, a figure or Gestalt. Instead, rhythm designates a form that is 
instantaneously assumed and constituted by mobility and fluidity. It is a form without
26 As Valery (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 139) states: “It must be confessed that the self is nothing 
but an echo”.
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any organic consistency, “improvised, momentary, changeable”. The phenomenon of 
rhythm is ultimately untheorisable. At the very frontier of the theoretical domain, it 
eludes any grasp because the very question of rhythm alludes to what the composer 
Gustav Mahler (cited in Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 196) once stated: “I don’t compose; 
I am composed”. As a consequence, one is “rhythmed” (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 202) 
so that rhythm nq longer comes to one as a predicate. Rhythm is the pulsation or 
repetition marked by a caesura or gap which does not possess the “dialectical 
cadence” (Derrida, 1998b: 42) of a relation between rhythm and non-rhythm, the 
continuous and discontinuous and so on. It thus interrupts alternation, “the constraint 
of opposition in general” (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 212), any binarity or neat 
dichotomy. Rhythm alludes to the empty moment, the absence o f a single, defining, 
pivotal moment in time. The maternal-infant encounter contains a number of 
cumulative experiences of gestures of sameness or repetitive sequences. These 
repetitive sequences or features are however marked or contained by the differance of 
rhythm, and as such, sameness emerges as otherness. The otherness of rhythm always 
already implies that which is “at the very edge of what o f the subject can appear, 
manifest, or figure itself -  the type and the stamp or impression, the pre-inscription 
which, conforming us in advance, determines us by disappropriating us and makes us 
inaccessible to ourselves” (Lacoue-Labarthe, 1998: 202).
To be constituted by the signature o f rhythm is, as Derrida (1998b: 31) suggests, to be 
\de)constituted by the marks o f this ‘caesuraed’ stamp”. Rhythm functions as the 
very condition of possibility for the subject, existing “before” -  before any specular 
reflexivity, before any image. The motif of rhythm opens up a new problematic o f the 
subject (of what prescribes or preinscribes it, o f what divides it) whereby the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, that is to say the subject as determined by notions of 
consciousness, representation and optical or discursive subjectivity, is qualified by a 
psychoanalytic dimension with its emphasis on the workings and process o f the 
unconscious. But simultaneously, the motif of rhythm renders it plausible to 
deconstruct, in a certain philosophy of psychoanalysis prevalent in the theories of
27Freud and Lacan, the hegemony o f the visual, o f the image and of the specular .
27 It is perhaps Freud’s emphasis on castration anxiety [As Derrida (1998b: 35) writes: “Freud orders 
all interpretation around the articulation o f discourse and figuration {Darstellbarkeit, figurability), a 
semiotics of verbal signifiers and visual forms”]; and Lacan’s mirror stage (which is concerned with
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Rhythm belongs neither to the audible nor the visible [it is “silent movement” in time- 
space (Derrida, 2000: 37)], neither to specular figuration nor to verbal representation, 
though it structures them insensibly. The very structuration o f what Derrida (1998: 
33) has termed “rhythmo-typy, rhythmotypical or typorhythmic”, which remains 
outside the order o f the sensible, opens up the very possibility o f  an intelligible sense 
or meaning even though it ironically does not belong to this possibility of meaning. 
As Bowie (1991: 194) rather usefully puts it: “— that which is excluded from sense- 
making is that which makes sense hang together”. Rhythm is ultimately an experience 
that cannot be theorised. It is a theoretical failure that undergoes repression, but it 
exerts a pressure in the form o f a compression, a compulsion marked or scanned by 
traces which signal “that rhythmotypical compulsion constitutes (we should translate: 
de-constitutes), desists the ‘subject’ in the knot that lies at its core, in its ‘soul’, in its 
ineluctable destiny -  any name you wish for the dis-location of this destinal site”.
Meditation on Athetic Retreats
Any attempts at the elaboration (or perhaps more realistically adumbration) of a 
potential space, in this instance the third aesthetic, an other spatio-temporal 
possibility, may fall prey to what Kristeva has addressed in her critique of differance 
(cited in the previous chapter). Kristeva (1984b) is primarily concerned with 
dynamising structure through an exploration o f the speaking subject and his/her 
unconscious experience in relation to the pressures of social structures. This issue 
takes precedence over the deconstruction of phenomenological experience through an 
exposure and unravelling o f its metaphysical attributes and an assertion of its infinite 
alterity28. Kristeva deals with the revolutionary potential of the negativity or 
heterogeneity of the drives which disrupts and ruptures subjective, linguistic and 
social experience. This semiosis however must be mediated by the symbolic in order 
to prevent madness or annihilation through jouissance29. Kristeva is interested in how
the theory of fictional figurality whereby there is an inscription in the ontology of the figure, a figural 
and fictional ontology, that emphasises the gaze and the specular) that best exemplify this notion.
28 The politics of this type o f positionality refer directly to the divisions in the French intellectual 
movement of Tel Quel (and subsequently where Kristeva begins to dissociate her work from 
Derrida’s). For further reading on this issue, the reader is referred to de Nooy (1998), Kristeva (1984b), 
and Derrida (1981 b).
29 As a meta-critique, for we might as well proliferate the differance of critique, the infinite possibility 
for the manifestation and deferral of potential critical-interpretive possibilities, the reader is referred to 
critics like Butler (1993) who takes Kristeva to task precisely on this issue. Briefly, Butler argues that
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semiosis invades as opposed to evades the symbolic. It is for this reason that she 
regards Winnicott’s potential space (and a critique that applies equally well to the 
third aesthetic) as a “libido without drive, therefore without object, goal, or time -  all 
of which remain specific attributes of the adult speaker’s libido; the desiring 
machines of schizophrenics without signifiers” (Kristeva, 1980: 277). Here Kristeva 
notes (as mentioned earlier in this chapter) the projection of mythic error onto the 
supposed place o f the pre-symbolic (something that remains inevitable in addressing 
the pre-symbolic through language/discourse), a fantastical projection of the adult 
speaker’s libido yearning for a quixotic regression into asymbolia. For Kristeva 
(1980: 281), “meaning’s closure can never be challenged by another space, but only 
by a different way o f speaking: another enunciation, another ‘literature’”. This quote 
highlights Kristeva’s orientation which refers to the practice of shattering the limits 
of the speaking subject. She attempts to “delineate the history of spaces (we practice 
epistemology)” through the exploration of what is not yet spoken within the speaker, 
or what may remain indelibly unsaid and unnameable within the gaps of speech, as 
opposed to attempting to investigate the ‘origins’ of human forming. She postulates 
an “infantile language” which “seems to be located at the ambiguous point where 
psychoanalysis opens up the limits o f phenomenological meaning by indicating its 
conditions of production”. Kristeva’s materialist perspective ensures that the 
engagement with gaps, spaces, absences and so on, will function as an explosive 
challenge to the symbolic order, where challenge not only functions as the operative 
position but also ensures the disruption of any hermetic meaning. In the end, 
however, this is Kristeva’s version (or as Butler would argue pere-version) or 
approach and that does not necessarily preclude other possible epistemological 
approaches to spatiality and its permutations, even if they do not directly contest 
symbolic hegemony. Kristeva’s theory offers up another interpretive alternative to be
in the course of postulating that the semiotic contests universality, Kristeva makes theoretical moves 
which end up consolidating the power of the symbolic and paternal authority. Her theory depends on 
the stability and reproduction o f the paternal law she seeks to displace. Even if  the semiotic promotes 
the possibility for subversion, displacement or disruption, the symbolic always reasserts its hegemony. 
For Butler, Kristeva offers a strategy o f subversion that can never be a sustained political practice. The 
notion that a sustained presence of the libidinal source o f subversion is impossible (since it leads to 
psychosis) is viewed as problematic because it alternately posits and denies the semiotic as an 
emancipatory ideal or a language that can be consistently maintained. As Rose (1993b: 43) succinctly 
claims: “....if  Kristeva concentrates on the signs of that fragility (troubles of phonological , syntactic 
and enunciating laws), she can only do so in terms of the order of language against which they break. 
The semiotic can never wholly displace the symbolic since it relies on that very order to give it its 
albeit resistant, shape”. See also Felski (1989)
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considered and incorporated in the exchange and dialogue of ideas, though I think, as 
Kristeva (1984b) identifies in “My Memories Hyperbole”, it seems to function as a 
prioritisation of interest and theoretical/ideological commitment (the dynamical 
structure of the subject or the more esoteric investigation into human forming) which 
in turn possesses implications for the epistemological bent, though the two 
possibilities are certainly not mutually exclusive. An exploration of the third aesthetic 
does not preclude, exclude or nullify Kristeva’s ideas on corporeal rupture. Instead, 
the third aesthetic focuses on another sphere or avenue, an other possibility. It should 
be stressed that the third aesthetic is not a commentary on the subject’s social 
practice. It cannot be recuperated as the symbolic’s revolutionary 
nemesis/potential/underside, and as such it is not directly concerned with how the 
pre-symbolic can create ruptures in the symbolic, its intrusions into and implosions of 
symbolic subjectivity. It indeed retreats before the thetic function, refuting anchorage 
or definition within symbolic enclosures. As a result, Kristeva’s exploration of the 
subversive and transgressive immediacy o f corporeal pulsions gives way to other 
considerations more in line with Winnicott’s (1991: 101) “body experiences” (as 
referred to above and in extension o f mere reductive body functioning) - experiences 
that proliferate an alchemy o f between-ness. When considering the drives and the 
third aesthetic, the former remain important mainly insofar as they facilitate scenarios 
of holding, soothing and so forth, which in turn creates the ex-sistence of liminal 
intersubjective residues, residues o f “the motility of anaclitic facilitations” (Kristeva, 
1980: 284), which fuel the energetic movement of the third aesthetic. This notion 
takes into account the differance o f the drives whereby another dimension is explored 
in the inter/intraplay o f psyche-soma, and as such the third aesthetic focuses on other 
(virtual) possibilities that may be archived, though of course this does not exclude 
Kristeva’s theorisations on corporeal revolt, it just shifts the focus to an other scene 
or an other of an other scene......
Circumfessions
In writing about the third aesthetic, I am confronted by a similar desire (or possibly 
the dictates o f thetic insistence, the edict of the academy) that Derrida (1993b) 
experiences during the writing up of his autobiographical essay “Circumfession” — 
the desire to confess something in excess of the symbolic system, to confess what
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cannot be confessed, and hence the ensuing and invariable failure. As Derrida (1993b: 
3-7) rather playfully conveys:
 the other one, the one that has always been running after me, turning in circles
around me, a circumference licking me with a flame and that I try in turn to
circumvent, having never loved anything but the impossible from this dream in
me, since always, of another language, an entirely crude language, of a half-fluid 
name too, there, like blood, and I hear them snigger, poor old man, doesn’t look 
likely, not going to happen tomorrow 30
Derrida responds to “scarcely a sentence” that emerges from “further away than (he) 
could ever say” -  “fin d  the vein” -  the point where a syringe establishes “an invisible 
passage, always invisible, for the continuous flowing of blood, absolute, absolved in 
the sense that nothing seemed to come between the source and the mouth, the quite 
complicated apparatus o f the syringe being introduced in that place only to allow the 
passage and to disappear as instrument”. Derrida (1993:10-12) dreams of a “pen that 
would be a syringe”, a suction point that would filter the inscribable and bypass all 
toil and violence to the “invisible inside (that) gives itself up, and you can do as you 
like with it”. However what one is confronted with is a certain castration which marks 
the economy of the proper, the limit as circumcision, which screens off access to a 
“region that is no longer that of an example”, and thwarts and cuts off “a supposedly
30 This particular citation from Derrida may strike the reader as being whimsical, romantic, sentimental, 
hyperbolically coy or tantalisingly playful. However, I have made use of it as I think that it highlights 
the imaginary or poetic overflow within philosophy-theory, the need at times to resort to the 
metaphoric, to the imaginary in philosophy, in order to adumbrate in some way a bind or impasse 
within the theoretico-conceptual system that remains to be conveyed. I also think that it is important to 
interrogate the discourses that would render this type of citation as sentimental naivete. Reflecting on 
the historical significance o f the publication of Roland Barthes’s text, A Lover’s Discourse, Kristeva 
(2002: 116), for example, suggests how it attempted a “soft rehabilitation of an amorous sensibility” to 
counteract the “robotic banalisation” of society, and in doing so it challenged a “pervasive puritanism” 
within the media and academia. As Barthes (2002: 177) writes: “Historical reversal: it is no longer the 
sexual which is indecent, it is the sentimental - censured in the name of what is in feet only another 
morality”. Kristeva (2002: 116-117) explains this quote from Barthes by proposing that sexuality, 
which was once condemned as radical and taboo, is now viewed as being very much in vogue -  
“sexuality is modem; it does not scandalise, it is not obscene, it has its journals, its sects, its workers”. 
Indeed, sexuality (at least in its more dogmatic version where everything forms part of a polysexuality 
or is but a sublimation of the sexual impulse) may form part of a “new clergy” which “constitutes a 
fecet of a binary code, binary thus reductive and policelike, that contrasts an obvious self-righteousness 
with a no less obvious morality, because it is repressive-prescriptive-cocoonlike, and so forth”. In this 
way, the discourse on sexuality may thus morph into the very function o f the discourses that once 
marginalised it, and in doing so it judges, relegates and ultimately disavows all that may fall under the 
umbrella term of the ‘sentimental’ or the ‘esoteric’ or the ‘romantic’.
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idiomatic, unbroachable, unreadable, uncircumcised piece o f writing” (Derrida, 
1993b: 71; 194). Ultimately, as Oliver (1997) suggests, the text functions as a mark of 
circumcision, the skin cut from the body, the skin-tissue without blood. Any text 
remains circumscribed by the inevitability o f circumcision. This notion resonates with 
the eloquent plea o f one of J.M. Coetzee’s (1990: 125) protagonists in The Age o f  
Iron, where she considers her narrative as “grow(ing) more abstract, more abstracted, 
the kind of letter one writes from the stars, from the farther void, disembodied, 
crystalline, bloodless”. Nevertheless, we continue to yearn for the recuperation o f the 
blood shed in symbolic ritual, the warm blood of the living body that exceeds any 
writing -  “what mixes prayers and tears with blood” (Derrida 1993b: 20) 31. As 
Kristeva (1986: 162) writes: “Words that are always too distant, too abstract for this 
underground swarming of seconds, folding in unimaginable spaces. Writing them
down is an ordeal of discourse, like love Flash on the unnameable, weavings of
abstractions to be torn. Let a body venture at last out of its shelter, take chance with 
meaning under a veil o f words. WORD FLESH”. The lost body {corps perdu) is the 
very passion of writing; it is what fuels the very process of writing which 
simultaneously loses the body. When writing touches the body, it simultaneously 
loses the sense of touching. When writing traces the body, it effaces it. This body 
however is not lost to some simple or concrete exteriority but instead it is “lost for all 
manners of metaphysical presence”. The body inscribes its presence beyond 
metaphysical presence. Its ‘presence’ is the “presence of the unavoidable withdrawal 
of writing, where it can be nothing but its own ellipsis, here or there, out of there” 
(Nancy, 2002: 32-33).
31 Prayers and tears, as Caputo (1997: 73) writes, are a “passion for the beyond, au-dela, the tout autre, 
the impossible, the unimaginable, un-foreseeable, un-believable ab-solute surprise, which is ab-solved 
from the same”.
4. THE O-FUNCTION
Touched by lights, by sounds, by forms and colours, I try to preserve this gift, without appropriating it. I 
receive it as a guide for my becoming, an aid for advancing along my journey.
Luce Irigaray (2000: 61)
 previous to everything that happened afterward. This is what I mean when I say I would like to swim
against the stream of time: 1 would like to erase the consequences of certain events and restore an initial 
condition. But every moment of my life brings with it an accumulation of new facts, and each of these 
new facts brings with it its consequences; so the more I seek to return to the zero moment from which I
set out, the further I move away from it.
Italo Calvino (1998: 15)
It is the very idea o f a first time which becomes enigmatic.
Jacques Derrida (1978: 202)
....but it is a book remote in time, which barely surfaces from my memories. There is a story that for me 
comes before all other stories and of which all the stories I read seem to carry an echo, immediately lost.
In my readings I do nothing but seek that book read in my childhood, but what I remember of it is too
little to enable me to find it again.
Italo Calvino (1998: 256)
To tell the truth he will never have had any relationship with it, even though, in secret, in an immemorial 
time, a past which was never present, he will, presumptively, have engendered that family.
Jacques Derrida (1987c: 188)
Essentially Otherwise or Recapitulation as Glissement
The previous chapter explored the way in which the mother-infant dynamic has the 
capacity to generate a pattern or aesthetic of a ‘third’ (time-)space which exists 
infinitely between two subjectivities (in the interval), positioned in a kinetic, rhythmic 
flow of energies and dissociated from any one specific, distinct entity. This spatio- 
temporal otherness, which I have termed the “third aesthetic”, signals an alterity, an 
excess, which problematises its containment within representation. Indeed, the third 
aesthetic, with its disseminative energies, subverts the possibility for neat triadic 
closure through the mediation of a third term that would subordinate alterity to a 
symbolised, monolithic system. It is this dissemination o f mediation that proliferates 
an excess of otherness with respect to any totality or absolute knowingness and 
closure. The third aesthetic preserves otherness by escaping symbolic, ontological and 
linguistic closure. Such alterity however should not be conceived as constituting “a 
pre-linguistic, self-evident identity that should be recovered through a more faithful 
representation” (Ziarek, 1993: 65-66). Instead, it signals itself within the totality of
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experience only as a trace. It is through the space of the third aesthetic that what I 
have termed the “O-Function” is inaugurated in the infant’s unconscious. The O- 
Function is a trace of the movement of the third aesthetic, which inaugurates the 
possibility or potentiality for future meaning-making endeavours. Through the notion 
of the O-Function, and particularly its feature or process as trace, this chapter will 
explore what remains - the residues or remnants (restance) that the third aesthetic 
leaves because it does not lend itself to any recuperative gesture, but rather scripts 
itself as an imprint, an etching -  “a lithography before words” (Derrida, 1978: 207).
The Algebraics of O
The concept of the O-Function was inspired by Bion's musings on O, the ultimate yet 
ultimately inaccessible reality, a reality that is unknown, an originally, essentially 
unknowable reality. Bion (1970: 26) defines O as the following; “I shall use the sign 
O to denote that which is the ultimate reality represented by terms such as ultimate 
reality, absolute truth, the godhead, the infinite, the thing-in-itself’ (Bion, 1970: 26). 
There is an ultimate reality which cannot be known but can only be ‘become’, that is, 
it is possible to be at one with it. We cannot know O itself but only emanations from 
it. What we know of O are transformations o f it. O can only be known about 
(Symington and Symington, 1996). To contextualise O within the psychoanalytic 
clinical domain, as an example, O would signify the function of an ultimate reality of 
which everything else is but a factor or derivative. The analytic experience cannot be 
known in its essence (O), but only in what manifests or transpires as a derivative of 
this essence. Similarly, mathematical transformations -  graphs, formulae, geometrical 
drawings -  are not ‘things-in-themseIves’, but rather transformations of the O of 
mathematics. Grotstein (2000:1) proposes that O “designates an ineffable, inscrutable, 
and constantly evolving domain that intimates an aesthetic completeness and 
coherence”. It is attainable only through the relinquishment o f memory, desire, and 
cognition, fostering primordial chaos and fragmentation, yet paradoxically exquisite, 
primal harmony and serenity depending on the capacity to be ‘at-one’ with it. It is an 
ineffable matrix, “the container beyond the container of our existence” (Grotstein, 
2000:2). O cannot be known, loved or hated; it is not “a relationship or an 
identification or an atonement or a reunion” (Bion, 1965: 140). In O, the thinker is not 
necessary. It shatters all totalities and transcends any essential act of knowing through
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thinking. Moreover, it promotes what Keats (cited in Bion, 1970: 125) regards as 
“negative capability” - that which emerges as the capacity to hold and contain the 
process o f uncertainty, mystery and doubt without any “irritable reaching after fact 
and reason”. Bion (1965: 151) cites a verse from Milton’s Paradise Lost, which 
conveys the ethos of O:
“The rising world o f waters dark and deep 
Won from the void and formless infinite”
What I would like to emphasise for this project, is the notion of O signifying an 
alternate reality, an unthought known. Its divergence from Bion is predicated on the 
idea that one is able to be ‘at-one’ with O, or in this instance, the third aesthetic. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the notion of being ‘at-one’ with a particular 
phenomenon would intimate the fullness of presence, which this thesis problematises. 
Instead, one is able to gesture towards presence, but not merge completely with the 
absoluteness of a moment because this latter configuration would negate the reality of 
presence as infused with traces of differance. This notion will be further explicated in 
this chapter. The concept (as non-concept) of the “O-Function” is employed, following 
the Bionian (1962: 2-3) tradition, whereby there is an attempt to utilise concepts 
“intentionally devoid o f meaning” so that they may not be restricted by a “penumbra of 
associations”. Bion frequently conceptualizes in terms of mathematical variables, such 
as the “alpha-function”, “beta-elements” and so on [which Symington and Symington 
(1996) consider to be hypothetical entities or abstractions], so that he is able to work 
towards the elaboration o f concepts “without being restricted” by the utilisation of a 
“more meaningful term”. For Bion, there is an “implicit freedom” in the usage of 
mathematical forms because they confer a flexibility whereby the concept is able to 
accrue value during the process of exploration, as opposed to any type of premature 
assignation of meaning. The use of mathematisation is also an attempt to mitigate the 
assignation of position, the “violent apposition(s)” (Cixous, 1997: 75) of naming which 
congeals the suppleness and fluidity o f the phenomenon-in-description-through- 
conceptualisation. Algebraic/mathematical figures are names-without-naming, “names 
that are not quite ‘for real’” (Calle-Gruber, 1997: 76), which signal a spectrum of
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possibilities, scenarios and movements1. In addition, there is a resistance in Bion’s 
work towards the rendering of concepts as concrete because the concepts function as 
imperfect representations of an essentially unknowable reality. At the heart of all such 
concepts that psychoanalysis has the tendency to concretise (ego, unconscious, instinct 
and so forth) lies “a central abstraction unknown” (Bion, 1963: 51), which according to 
Symington and Symington (1996), fosters a mystery of which all conceptualisations are 
but inadequate representations. For Lacan (1977: 313-314), the use o f mathematical 
letters or mathemes refutes the idea o f psychoanalysis as a static body of knowledge. 
These mathemes are not “transcendent signifiers”, but rather “indices o f an absolute 
signification” designed to “allow a hundred and one different readings, a multiplicity 
that is admissible as long as the spoken remains caught in its algebra”. Moreover, as 
Verhaeghe (2002) suggests, the letter does not designate an assemblage but instead 
constitutes one whereby the formalisation o f mathematical letters may allude to what 
“invisibly holds (retient) bodies” (Lacan, 1998b: 93; 131). In short, Lacan proposes that
“mathematisation alone reaches the real................a real that has nothing to do with
what traditional knowledge has served as a basis for”.
The Trace
The O-Function may perhaps, under-erasure, be considered as a receptacle, container, 
repository or matrix which inaugurates the possibility or potential for future meaning- 
making endeavours2. I will however focus on its significance as a trace. Spivak 
(1976) suggests how the trace is the mark of an absence or non-presence (not not 
present) o f presence, where its ‘structure’ is always already inhabited by the track o f 
something other. At the moment that stimulus is received, it goes either into the 
perceptual system or into the unconscious and in turn produces traces. These traces, 
however, may only be energised into consciousness long afterward -  nachtraglich, 
apres coup - or they may never infiltrate consciousness as knowing entities. Derrida
1 Interestingly, Cixous (1997: 77) suggests that there is “ a mathematics” in the scenes of our existence, 
and more specifically the scenes of intersubjectivity (The scenario, for example, of “I see you, I see 
you seeing me, I see myself see you seeing me, etc”). Cixous dreams of finding an instrument to 
“mathematise” this spectacular shuttle of intersubjectivity, and collect this exchange that multiplies 
itself, this exteriority that encircles us.
2 ‘Matrix’ is defined by the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1978) as a “womb; place in which thing is 
developed”. ‘Receptacle’ is defined as a “containing vessel, place, or space”; while ‘repository’ is 
described as a “receptacle; recipient of secrets”.
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(1976) argues how the trace itself is primary and that there is no ‘thing’ in the 
unconscious. Instead there is the possibility for a particular path to be energised 
without necessarily knowing the source of this re-animation. Even when the track is 
opened up and the deferred perception of the trace is presented, the impulse in the 
unconscious is not exhausted. In his writings on the trace, Derrida takes into account 
that any experience is poly-dimensional and constituted by a multiplicity of elements. 
As a result, he is suggesting that one cannot absorb every element in an experience. 
One cannot experience something in its complete and immanent presence as an 
expression of immediacy and direct transmission. Accompanying any experience are 
fragments or traces that may not have been perceived by consciousness. Derrida is 
proposing that what we experience is not the absolute fullness of an experience (a 
saturation of what can be experienced and known), but rather derivatives or fragments 
of this experience filtered through certain of its traces which in turn create lacunae. 
This is why Derrida suggests that the trace itself is primary because one cannot 
experience something in its completeness or absolute immediacy, but rather one can 
only experience aspects or elements of an experience and it is this latter type of 
experience that constitutes the ‘essence’ of any experience as a result. In addition, the 
play of differences in experience prevents the possibility that “a simple element be 
present in and of itself, referring only to itself’. All elements of an experience 
function in relation to other elements which are not simply present. This interweaving 
results in each element “being constituted on the basis of the trace within it o f the 
other elements of the chain or system” so that every element bears the trace o f other 
elements which are made o f bundles of other traces. The notion of the trace takes into 
account that there cannot be a pure unmediated instance of oneness between self and 
experience. Instead, experience is mediated through traces of discontinuity which 
signal differentiation (a spacing interval between signifier and signified), as well as 
repetition through the temporization o f delay and deferral, which in turn thwarts the 
possibility for immediacy, an immediate and unmediated transfusion of presence. The 
interval as spacing is an “index of an irreducible exterior, and at the same time of a 
movement, a displacement that indicates an irreducible alterity”. The operation of 
spacing is articulated otherwise and it refers not only to the space constituted 
between, but also, as an operation, to the “movement of setting aside”. It marks what 
is set aside from itself and what interrupts self-identity, homogeneity, and “every 
punctual assemblage of the self’ (Derrida, 1981b: 106-107). For example, as de Nooy
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(1998) proposes, an infant’s crying indicates a mark of a relation of difference and 
imbalance (a discontinuous continuum) between self and environment so that the cry 
constitutes a response to the infant’s situation and is thus deferred in relation to it. An 
interval appears so that the sound of crying is not an unpunctuated pure flow of 
sound, a live transmission o f a bodily state (owing to the need to breathe and start 
again, at a very fundamental level), but rather a response to environmental 
discontinuity which in turn creates a gap, an interval o f deferment, between the pure 
expression o f hunger and a response (through crying) to a feeling o f hunger. This 
interval divides the present in and of itself, yet it has no tangible existence since it 
functions as a “barely existing limit, exceeded as soon as it is posited” (Derrida, 1986: 
220). If the interval transpires, then “what takes place is only the between (entre), the 
place, the spacing, which is nothing” (Derrida, 1981: 214). In short, the infant’s cries 
are not an absolute and unmediated expression of sensation but are rather from the 
beginning structured by the marks o f the trace. Between the expression or response of 
crying and its initiate, something eludes the infant, and it is here (or perhaps there) 
where differance intervenes. There is only an effect, an illusion of presence. There is 
no direct, immediate or uncomplicated access to experience. Experience is 
approached through its traces, through the (always already) becoming-trace of 
experience which signals that all experience is marked or divided from itself as a 
discrepancy.
The movement of the trace, where the relationship with otherness is marked, takes 
into account the multi-faceted quality of reality. As a result, the precise constitution 
(an absolute, simple origin or point of departure) of the trace o f the O-Function in the 
infant’s unconscious (a marking or etching by the movement o f the third aesthetic), 
which was derived from the infinitely between of intersubjective residues, other 
liminal spatio-temporal possibilities that ex-sist between, remains complex. The O- 
Function is primarily an effect o f the traces of the non-verbal intimacy [soothing, 
holding, playing, gazing, silent movement, touching and so on — “the subtle gamut of 
sound, touch and visual traces, older than language” (Kristeva, 1986: 177)] weaved 
by the mother-infant idiom. The trace partakes of the dual logic of necessity and 
erasure in that it “must make its necessity felt before letting itself be erased”, and 
therefore in its necessity, in its necessary variability and proliferation, it must produce 
some efficacious impact in spite o f its possibility for repeated otherness. The trace is
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indeed “contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity”, marking the 
disappearance of origin, although one cannot even claim that the origin disappeared 
(that is, make claims to an originary nontrace) since origin is never constituted in the 
first instance “except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the 
origin of the origin” (Derrida, 1976: 61). Hence, any possibility of ‘origin’ is 
problematised; there is an impossibility of re-animating absolutely the manifest, 
empirical evidence o f an originary presence -  “an originary and unceasing synthesis -  
a synthesis constantly directed back on itself, gathered in on itself and gathering -  of 
retentional traces and protentional openings” (Derrida, 1982: 2 1)3.
The generation of the third aesthetic necessarily leaves an imprint (an infra-print), a 
trace (in the ‘form’ o f the O-Function) as an indication of a future meditation. The 
fabric of the trace is constituted by differance and therefore it cannot be neatly 
captured in the ideality of a unifying synthesis. Indeed, the trace may be understood 
as the transformation in which the horizon o f presence gives way to the ‘horizon’ of 
differance (Wood, 1989). It remains an “absolute past” (Derrida, 1976: 66) that 
cannot be comprehended in the form of a modified presence, though, strictly 
speaking, the trace does not even merit the name of ‘past’ since the past has always 
retained an element of the present (the past colouring the present, the present 
colouring the past) in the metaphysical concept of temporality in general. “The 
radical past is rendered as the “never-to-be, never having been present (to 
consciousness as such)” (Harvey, 1986: 172). The idea of the trace remains 
incompatible with the concept o f retention, “of the becoming-past of what has been 
present” (Derrida, 1982: 21). The trace marks a time that is evasive and unsignifiable 
within the presence of the living present, within the form of all metaphysics of 
presence and the phenomenology of consciousness. It cannot be neatly summed up in 
the simplicity o f a present. It is indelibly inscribed by “the becoming-absent and the 
becoming-unconscious of the subject”, and registers the enigmatic relationship to the 
other, of an interiority to an exteriority, of an interiority always already inhabited by 
the possibility of an outside, an other (Derrida, 1976: 69).
3 Here I emphasise that one cannot inaugurate an absolute and single point of departure, and in this 
way, the notion of ‘origin’ is complexified, though of course, in accordance with Rose’s (1993) 
suggestion, it is almost implausible not to assign at least the status of a pseudo or quasi-origin to 
something once it is defined as beyond language, the symbolic, discourse and so forth.
140
To nominate something as a trace is not to confer upon it a name but rather a pro­
name (Llewelyn, 1988). Levinas (1986: 355) suggests that if the trace possesses a 
signifyingness, then its signifyingness remains “an irremissible disturbance, an utterly 
bygone past”, where transcendence refuses immanence, where the trace cannot be 
transformed into something explicit that would mark the revelation of a signified 
absent and bring it into immanence. Moreover, the signifyingness of the trace answers 
to an irreversible past where no conscious memory could follow the traces of this 
past. It is thus an immemorial past, a past more remote than any past. The trace 
remains anterior to all polarities and can never be presented -  made to appear or 
manifest in its phenomenon. It “erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in 
resonating” (Derrida, 1982: 23). For Derrida, the trace teaches one that it remains 
impossible to justify a point of departure absolutely. Strictly speaking, the trace 
should not be considered as a concept but rather as an impression, an association of 
impressions, an open imprecision, a relative indetermination that resists closure, the 
hermetics of an enclosure. It is “an insistent impression through the unstable feeling 
of a shifting figure, of a schema, or of an in-fmite or indefinite process”. The process 
of the trace always remains inadequate relative to what it ought to be, to what it ought 
to signify. There is a disjunction in its signification and its description. It contains 
within itself tensions, contradictions and aporias -  “an unknowable weight” (Derrida, 
1996: 29). The trace is archived, imprinted (in the ‘form’ of the O-Function) in the 
infant’s unconscious, though this process o f archivisation fosters something 
intractable. Its ‘structure’ is spectral and elliptical whereby its irreducible excess 
signals “not in the direction o f another presence, or another form o f presence, but in 
the direction o f an entirely other text” (Derrida, 1982: 65). The spectral motif 
proliferates a “disseminating fission” (Derrida, 1996: 84) which fosters a non­
contemporaneity o f  the living present with itself. It unhinges the possibility of 
confluence between a living present and its full representation, and subverts the 
possibility of any presence as present to itself. There is thus a “disjointing, 
disjunction, or disproportion” (Derrida, 1994: xix) of the living present with the 
possibility of unqualified, pure, non-transcendent presence. Derrida argues that the 
value of presence itself is not essentially fundamental, but rather constituted by the 
very differences it seeks to appropriate or amalgamate (Wood, 1989). Effectively, the 
place of inscription, the archive comprised of something (which is no-thing) o f the 
primordial maternal-infant engagement, cannot be reduced to memory as a conscious
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reserve or memory as an act of recalling. It is instead a “memory without memory of 
a mark” (Derrida, 1996: 42), a memory without the memory of a symbolic track or 
tag that would render it colonisable. The trace of the O-Function shelters in itself a 
‘third’ or other spatio-temporality of the maternal-infant idiom which remains 
radically incompatible with the principle and operation of what Derrida (1996) has 
cited as consignation. Consignation aims to coordinate elements into a system or 
synchrony that posits the unity o f an ideal configuration.
Derrida (1994: xviii) suggests that “what happens between two, and between all the
‘two’s’ one likes can only maintain itself with some ghost”4. The spectral
spatiality between, the there-ness o f spectrality, does not correspond to an essence and 
it cannot be ascertained if it is. There is, “over there, an unnameable or almost 
unnameable thing” that refutes any semantic, ontological, psychoanalytic or 
philosophical classification (all these categories remain treacherous in the search for 
perhaps an-other ‘structure’ of presentation). This “thing” is not a thing, it is “nothing 
visible” (Derrida, 1994: 6), and it remains furtive and ungraspable in its creation of a 
spectral asymmetry that disrupts all specularity and speculation. The O-Function does 
not fall under “the ontological provenance of thing-ness”, rejecting “thingification 
and substantialisation” (Derrida, 1989: 16). It does not allow itself to be ‘thingified’ 
or ontologically clarified. The trace o f the O-Function, like an elusive spectre (it is the 
remains o f what may be called the “virtual space o f spectrality”), “engineers 
(s’ingenie) a habitation without proper inhabiting” (Derrida, 1994: 11; 18). It haunts 
the process o f the meaning-making quest without ever confining itself to the content 
which could never contain or delimit this spectral trace. The O-Function is the trace 
of what is altogether other, a haunting that remains irreducible to what it makes 
possible -  the (ontological) meaning-making quest. A haunting permits “neither 
analysis nor decomposition nor dissolution” (Derrida, 1989: 62), and marks the scene 
with its absent presence or non-simple presence, as a secret that is neither present nor 
absent.
4 Later in Spectres o f Marx, Derrida (1994: 107) reiterates this notion by proposing that “if there is 
some ghost, it is to be found precisely where, between the two, reference hesitates, undecidably....”
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Cinders
Derrida relates the trace, something that radically erases itself while presenting itself, 
to the trope-metaphor of cinders (cendre). It should be cautioned however that the 
notion of ‘cinder’ is simultaneously a nomination for the absence of a truly proper 
name that is also just another name that ultimately cannot account for the still 
withheld essence of absolute presence. ‘Cinder’ therefore cannot function as the 
metaphor for the truth of being, as a metaphor for the ontologisation or essence of a 
certain irreducibility, the “metaphysical determination of the essence of 
unhiddenness”. Instead, as Lukacher (1991: 5; 1) suggests; “cinders name another 
relation, not to the truth as such, but to its possibility”. Cinder or trace, trace or 
cinder, proliferates a space for the in-vention, the in-venire, the in-coming of 
otherness. A cinder signifies an extreme fragility that falls to ash, that crumbles and 
disperses. But cinders also allude to the resilience and intractability of that which is 
most delicate and fragile. The luminous glow of its emanation is rendered as less of a 
“question of seeing the light than of feeling the heat” (Lukacher, 1991: 2). The fire 
withdraws, effaces itself, whilst continuing to burn in a cinder. The cinder is scorched 
by a ghostly secret that bums within its essence; it burns in lieu of the promise of a 
secret which withdraws into it. The cinder remains, persists in an attenuated clinging, 
though it cannot be incorporated or consumed. It is a dispersion without return, a 
pyromaniac dissemination, always ‘over there’, in the distant past, a lost memory of 
what is no longer here. As Derrida (1991: 33) suggests: “The cinder is not here, but 
Cinder there is”. The cinder clings as part of a something beyond - “There are 
cinders, perhaps, but a cinder is not. This remainder seems to remain of what was, and 
what was just now; it seems to feed or drink from the source of being-present, but it 
comes out of being, it uses up in advance the being on which it seems to draw. The 
remnant of the remainder -  the cinder, almost nothing -  is not a being that remains, if 
at least one understands here a being that subsists” (Derrida cited in Lukacher, 1991: 
13).
The entire notion o f ‘what remains’ is subverted from the very possibility of any 
accessible materiality or tangibility because what remains, what will have remained, 
is “that which preserves in order no longer to preserve, dooming the remnant to 
dissolution” (Derrida, 1991: 35). The remainder or the rest [reste(s)], as Derrida
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(1987: 211) suggests, remains (rester) without example of the rest/remainder (du 
reste), which cannot be reduced. In general, what remains is frequently conceived of 
as something permanent, substantial and subsistent. Here however what remains does 
not remain in such a way. It does not correspond to the remains of a traditional 
semantics because it is rigorously undecidable. It cannot be thought of as a “residue 
of an operation (subtraction or division), a cast-off, a scrap that falls (entombed) or 
stays”. The trace-cinder o f the O-Function cannot be removed from itself, from the 
preservation o f its absolute secret, so that it belongs (without belonging) to the 
meaning-making quest as an “excluded necessary”. Making use o f the non-concept 
(as concept) o f the cinder alludes to an immediate incineration (though Derrida 
dislikes this word for it does not exude the tenderness and patience of the cinder, but 
rather an activeness, incisiveness and acuteness) where what remains is consumed by 
the art o f the secret that cannot be flattered with commentary. What remains -  the 
trace (of cinders) - is almost a silent monument, a remnant that must no longer 
remain, because the trace is a movement of that which is barred from empirical 
veracity and ontological closure. The trace “just barely remains” (Derrida, 1991: 43) 
and it preserves itself in losing itself through dispersion and dissemination. It ceases 
to be what it is in order to remain what it is - cryptically compelled. The trace as 
remains does not “accentuate itself here now” (Derrida, 1986: 1; 23; 42), but rather 
envelops or marks the scene of meaning-making without being contained therein. It 
does not result because if it could result it would relieve its remnance (restance), what 
is in excess. Derrida (1986: 44) concedes that from the viewpoint of the concept, this 
notion of a remains without remains is not easily comprehensible, even perhaps 
“foreseeably impossible”. As a consequence, it is a matter of the relation or 
nonrelation between castration and the concept, between castration and truth, because 
what can be known cognitively, symbolically, is cut off from such a ‘non-concept’ 
concept. It is indeed a “desert (concept) that must be left time to wander thirsty”.
The trace of the O-Function is “not yet what it is already” or “already what it is not 
yet” (Derrida, 1986: 218) because in order to be what it already is, there would have 
to be some revelation o f that which would incorporate the full excess of its process. If 
one had to relate the O-Function with essence (hypothetically speaking), then what 
becomes essential to its essence cannot be extricated from the already-there of the 
not-yet, or the already-no-more of the yet. The essential ‘predicate’ of the O-Function
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is of what presents or announces itself there as opposed to the here-now. It cannot 
find an identity or proximity to itself because it cannot be “submitted to the onto- 
phenomenological question o f essence” (Gasche, 1986: 190). It cannot reconcile itself 
with itself in that its appeasement remains burdened with a beyond -  something 
transcendental, distant, infinite. The O-Function preserves itself through losing itself. 
It ceases to be in an ontological sense (it is ontologically irreducible) in order to 
remain what it is - that is a strange anteriority, an enigmatic passage or aporetic that 
inaugurates the possibility o f future meaning-making endeavours.
The Gift
The trace of the O-Function may also be considered in terms of a gift. This gifi 
however defies the enclosure o f traditional semantics through its disruption of 
circularity, reciprocity and symmetry, which all allude to the notions of exchange, of 
distribution, of circulation, of return5. The gift “escapes the closed circle of checks 
and balances, the calculus which accounts for everything, in which every equation is 
balanced” (Caputo, 1997: 160). If there is gift, then it must not circulate or be 
exchanged, be exhausted by the process o f exchange [Derrida (1995: 41) speaks of 
the “dissymmetry o f the gift”, o f how the impossible happens]. The gift remains 
foreign to all circularity or return and it finds its possibility only as an effraction in 
the circle of return. The gift ‘gives’ itself by erasing itself. It is not a present bound up 
in temporal synthesis. Instead it remains in certain excess over essence itself, always 
something more, something beyond, which signals that it does not give everything. 
Derrida (1992: 13) suggests how the very conditions of possibility of the gift (that 
some ‘one’ gives some ‘thing’ to some ‘one other’) designate simultaneously the very 
conditions of the impossibility o f the gift because the conditions o f possibility define 
or produce the annulment and destruction o f the gift. The gift cannot be a gift except 
by not being present as a gift. Its annulment comes in perception, recognition and 
reception. It “interrupts the system as well as the symbol, in a partition without 
return”. Through restitution, reproduction, anticipatory expectation or apprehension 
that grasps or comprehends in advance, the process o f the gift is destroyed. The gift
5 Traditionally, the notion of gift refers to some ‘one’ giving some ‘thing’ to someone other, without 
which ‘giving’ would be rendered meaningless. Indeed, the tautology of a gift cannot be satisfied 
without giving something (other) to someone (other).
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remains irreducible because it cannot be received or perceived as a gift through 
consciousness, memory, recognition, through the law and order of the symbolic, 
through the economy of symbolic transcription. The gift is deconstructed by an 
inherent troubling of its own premises, by a logic which ‘contaminates’ the logic of 
gift-giving, by an other logic which has nothing to do with gift-giving or ‘giftness’ 
(Wolfreys, 1998). The O-Function is a gift o f otherness, and as such it is accompanied 
by a radical forgetting [which is the “affirmative condition of the gift” (Derrida, 1992: 
35)] that even exceeds the psychoanalytic category o f forgetting, that is, forgetting in 
terms of a repression that may ultimately be recovered or verified by its effects or 
symptoms. The O-Function as trace or gift cannot give rise to something that can be 
reconstituted, remembered or recuperated. However, it is ironically on the basis of 
what transpires in the name gift that one could hope to consider forgetting because the 
‘establishment’ of the gift would also be the condition o f its forgetting. In this 
instance, condition signifies not merely ‘condition of possibility’, a system of 
premises or even causes, but more importantly “a set of traits defining a given 
situation in which something, or ‘that’ (‘ca’) is established (as in the expressions ‘the 
human condition’, the ‘social condition’, and so forth)” (Derrida, 1992: 17). For this 
particular thesis, it is the condition of the capacity to seek out meaningftilness that is 
established by the process (of the radical forgetting) o f the gift of third aesthetic and 
its remains in the O-Function. The notion o f condition should not be considered as a 
set of stipulations or prerequisites posed, but rather “in the sense in which forgetting 
would be in the condition o f  the gift and the gift in the condition o f  forgetting” 
(Derrida, 1992: 18). The gift as remaining (restance) without memory is what is at 
stake in this forgetting.
The gift of the O-Function alludes to something that does not belong to the economy 
of linear time and therefore it is not something that can be determined or 
circumscribed, rendered sensible or absolute. The gift cannot appear as gift - in its 
phenomenon, its sense and its essence -  otherwise it would be engaged in a symbolic 
structure that would annul the gift in a ritual of circularity, in the “economic odyssey 
of the circle”. If anything, the gift is inscribed or infused with(in) a “circulatory 
differance” (Derrida, 1992: 40; 47) which makes it turn without end. It subverts any 
hermetic circularity o f “exchangist rationality” and proliferates a dissemination 
without return. What is proper to the gift, what is properly its own, the very question
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of the gift, alludes to what has been established in excess of two subjects (in this 
instance, the third aesthetic that the mother and infant generate). The gift of the O- 
Function is received from an otherness which “sees me without my seeing, holds me 
in his hands while remaining inaccessible” (Derrida, 1995: 40). The gift of the O- 
Function falls within the realm o f the aporetic in that if the gift appears or if it is 
presently as gift, as what it is, then it is not, it annuls itself. The gift cannot appear as 
a present, as “an intentional signification or the meaning-to-say”, without annulling 
itself. If it were destined for recognition then it would instantaneously annul itself. 
“Secrecy is the last word o f the gift which is the last word o f the secret”. The secret 
entails a certain invisibility (that which is other than the visible, an encrypted non- 
visible) that alludes to the sonorous, the musical, the vocal, tactility and so forth. The 
secret of the gift is dissymmetrical and it remains incommensurable with absolute 
definition and knowledge. It ultimately exceeds “my seeing and knowing (mon voir et 
mon savoir) although it concerns the innermost parts of me, right down to my soul, 
down to the bone, as we say” (Derrida, 1995: 30; 54). The gift o f the O-Function, in 
short, belongs to knowledge beyond (traditional) thought, to the un-phenomenalisable 
and impossible possible, to something (as no-thing) whose possibility is sustained by 
its impossibility.
Desistance: Of the Future-to-Come
The O-Function marks the constitutive desistance o f future meaning-making 
potential. According to Derrida (1998b), desistance as a (non-)concept foregrounds 
the problematics o f translation and indeed may be untranslatable. Moreover, 
desistance redoubles or disinstalls everything which secures stabilisation, 
identification, determination and positionality. One possible intimation as to what 
desistance may come to signify is proposed by Lacoue-Labarthe (1998) who 
considers the subject o f Lacan’s mirror phase as primarily a subject in desistance6.
6 The mirror stage precipitates the “I” in “primordial form” and “situates the agency of the ego in a
fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual”(Lacan, 1977: 2). The 
mirror stage is viewed by Lacan as a formative event in the development of the subject whereby the 
infant begins to recognise in the mirror the image of his/her body as a totality, a total form or Gestalt. 
The mirror stage marks the child’s first recognition of a distinction between him/herself and the 
(m)other/mirror image (self-as-other). According to Bowie (1979), this moment of self-identification is 
crucial since the individual develops a permanent tendency to seek out and foster this imaginary, 
specular wholeness which creates a spurious unity or mirage and obscures the notion of human
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Derrida (1998b: 1-2) proposes that desistance belongs to the ineluctable of which 
there are two typical experiences:
The first type: this has to happen -  il faut que cela arrive (How are they going to 
translate il fau t? Has to, is to, ought to, must, should?) — this cannot and must not be 
eluded. This has to begin sometime, someday, in accordance with the necessity of 
what will have been announced in the future tense. I, the one who says it, precede and 
anticipate in this way the advent o f what happens to me, which comes upon me or to 
which I come. I am then like the (free) subject or the (aleatory) accident of the 
ineluctable. The latter does not constitute me. I am constituted without it.
Second type: what announces itself as ineluctable seems in some way to have 
already happened, to have happened before happening, to be always in a past, in 
advance of the event. Something began before me, the one who undergoes the 
experience. I’m late. If I insist upon remaining the subject o f this experience, it would 
have to be as a prescribed, pre-inscribed subject, marked in advance by the imprint of 
the ineluctable that constitutes this subject without belonging to it, and that this 
subject cannot appropriate even if the imprint appears to be properly its own.
These two propositions of the ineluctable, of desistance, gesture towards the process 
of the O-Function. The infant with the aid of the mother generates the energetics of 
the third aesthetic which subsequently, through the ‘inauguration’ (though not as 
some absolute, original/originary point) of the O-Function in the infant’s 
unconscious, heralds the future possibility to seek out and create meaning. The non­
simple past experience [it is like “sleepwalking in the vicinity o f the impossible” 
(Derrida, 1992: 35)] of the third aesthetic, which cannot be recuperated through some 
kind of teleological regression from present to past (or even apres coup), necessarily 
contains within it future possibility and potentiality. It is precisely because the third
existence as inextricably linked to lack, absence and incompleteness. The infant becomes enmeshed in 
a system of confused recognition/misrecognition because s/he sees an image of him/herself that is both 
accurate and delusory (the image prefigures a unity and mastery that the infant still lacks). The infant is 
thus “caught up in the lure of spatial identification”. As a result, the ego possesses an illusion of 
autonomy which permits the infant to move from fragmentation and “insufficiency” to “anticipation” 
and illusory unity (Lacan, 1977: 4). The individual will continue throughout life in search of imaginary 
unity, synthesis, integration and wholeness but to no avail. Lacan successfully displaces the notion of 
the ego as the most secure and unifying component of the individual. He manages to unsettle the 
assumption of a fixed, core identity and the subject’s capacity to know him/herself and his/her world.
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aesthetic of the archaic encounter is absolutely past that the O-Function, as the 
remains of the third aesthetic, opens out to the future as an irreducible experience of 
the future, as something that can no longer be accessed as a past memory in the 
present but only potentially in a future-to-come. The O-Function is always a future 
anterior in that it is a ‘pre-structure’ (that could only announce itself in the future-to- 
come) of the possibility o f meaning-making endeavours. Its very ‘essence’ remains 
indelibly elusive and undefinable, and it highlights the aporetic movement of 
desistance in that it is essentially constitutive and imperative yet “it puts off (from 
itself) any constitution and any essence” (Derrida, 1998b: 2). The imprint, the pre­
inscription of the O-Function, remains ineluctably constitutive (inaugural) of future 
meaning construction while always already escaping any possibility of 
phenomenolisation or actualisation. It constitutes whilst deconstituting itself, it 
configurates whilst disturbing the very possibility o f something configurable, 
something consistent, stable or identifiable in its collectiveness.
Like the Mystic Writing-Pad, the O-Function operates palimpsestically, erasing itself 
whilst leaving a trace in the infant’s unconscious and making way for the possibility 
of the future scene o f meaning7. The O-Function however should not be 
conceptualised as an ecstasis named present, as a present that is “modifiable or 
modalisable in such a way that the past and the future are still presents-past and 
presents-to-come” (Derrida, 1992: 28). The O-Function always exceeds any presence 
as completely present to itself so that the past and future cannot be conceptualised in 
terms of simple derivations o f the third aesthetic and its subsequent etching in the 
infant’s unconscious. The experience o f the third aesthetic was never present as such, 
in a cognitively thinkable manner. What happened will have “opened another time”, 
an “anachrony of a time out o f joint” (Derrida, 2000: 61). This time out of joint is a 
time that does not close in upon itself, a time that is “structurally ex-posed to an out­
side that prevents closure”, a time that is an effect of differance (Caputo, 1997: 123). 
Consequently, the O-Function is “turned toward the future, going toward it, it also 
comes from it, it proceeds from  (provient de) the future” (Derrida, 1994: xix). This 
statement alludes to the notion that the O-Function is a spectral trace that no longer 
belongs to the linking o f modalised presents (past-present, actual-present: ‘now’,
7 The palimpsest is a piece of parchment or other writing material from which the writing has been 
erased to make way for a new text (Sheridan, 1977).
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future-present). Its very spectral and trace-like movement positions it towards the 
future from which it comes. It turns towards the future from which it comes or 
proceeds because it could only potentially be determined from within the frame o f a 
particular future that is a future-to-come ( / tf-venir), a future not teleologically or 
linearly informed by a past that was once (conspicuously) present. The notion of the 
future-to-come (Va-venir) is an affirmation of an irreducible experience. Derrida 
prefers using the ‘to-come’ o f the avenir rather than the French word futur so as to 
distinguish what proceeds from the future as a non-simple past (the future-to-come) 
from the teleology o f a past-present-future scenario — a past that once present and that 
now causally constructs, moulds and shapes the future. It should be noted that the 
proposition o f affirmation (o f the avenir) is not a positive thesis but rather the 
condition of all promises and hope, of all awaiting and performativity, “of all opening 
toward the future” (Derrida, 1996: 68). In my understanding o f the future-to-come, 
Derrida is suggesting that if any (impossible) experience or phenomenon could 
manifest or arrive (come), could be recuperated or reconstituted, then, in the first 
instance, the framework of temporal linearity or teleological chronology would 
remain wholly inadequate. Like Derrida’s intimation that the elaboration o f khora 
may require a third or other genre of discourse, so to would the possibility o f a 
manifestation o f a phenomenon that resists conceptualisation require an alternate 
model of the future -  as mentioned, a future that would not be teleologically informed 
by a past that was once present thus creating a type o f temporal synthesis. 
Furthermore, the representation o f this future-to-come would render itself as 
problematic (aporetic) because it would not announce itself as some kind of 
declarative theorem or unified synthesis. It is not a necessarily knowable arrival and 
its determination does not fall under the realm and horizon of knowledge because the
future-to-come remains heterogeneous “to all taking note to all stabilisable
theorems as such” (Derrida, 1996: 72). The future-to-come cannot be a re­
presentation because “it is not my anticipation of a present which is already waiting 
for me, all ready, and like the imperturbable order of being, ‘as if it had already 
arrived’, as if temporality were a synchrony” (Levinas, 1998: 115).
The O-Function is the non-simple past as a future-to-come that “precedes us, but so 
as to be as much in fron t o f  us as before us” (Derrida, 1994: 17). The O-Function is a 
future anterior, a future that announces itself from the archaic past encounter between
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mother and infant, and in this way it remains to come (in front o f us) from a past 
(before us) that was never present as such. If the future-to-come is the provenance of 
the O-Function, then what would come in a future-to-come is what is beyond any 
recollection of a past that was once simply present. The O-Function is a trace of the 
remains of the unthought experience o f the third aesthetic, that is to say, it is a trace 
of the remains of an unthought experience that is non-simply past in that it cannot be 
recuperated in the present as a past memory available for recollection. Therefore this 
non-simple past quality of the experience of the third aesthetic (and its remains in the 
O-Function) ensures that it (this non-concept) could only come in a future that could 
negotiate this past that was never simply present. The O-Function, as the remains of 
the third aesthetic, alludes to this non-simple (impossible) past that could only come 
in the future-to-come, the avenir and not the futur. The O-Function can only be 
thought of in a radical disjunction without any conjunction that may be restored or 
repaired. It alludes to a present in deferral, a “disjointure in the very presence of the 
present”, a non-contemporeity o f the present with itself. The present is assiduously 
ruptured so that it cannot fold back into immediacy or a reappropriable identity as 
“plenitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a presence effectively identical to 
itself’(Derrida, 1994: 99). The O-Function preserves an irreducible heterogeneity that 
cannot be saturated by traditional knowledge means. It comes from the future, 
announcing itself in the future o f what comes, in a future that is linked to a non­
simple past. The O-Function is thus spectral in that it is always still to come, as that 
which would come from a future-to-come of the non-simple past experience of the 
third aesthetic. In its spectral effect, it would undo the polarity between the actual 
(empirical) or present reality of the present and everything that can be opposed to it -  
non-presence, inactuality, virtuality — because, as the remains o f the third aesthetic, it 
alludes to a non-empiricised liminal space at the heart o f the actuality of the 
encounter between the mother and the infant which inscribes the possibility o f radical 
alterity and heterogeneity, of differance, in the very event o f the present, in the very 
presence of the present.
The notion of the presence of the present, an essential ‘now’ {main-tenance) alludes 
to the promise of something graspable and tangible. Moreover, it privileges the 
present in relation to the past and future, representing the past and future as 
alterations of the present so that otherness is rendered as teleological sameness, and
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alterity is gathered into the unity o f presence and the synchrony of representation. The 
very possibility o f gathering diversity or heterogeneity into presence or presentation 
permits for the unravelling, nomination and signification of a “presence of what is 
already past or o f what has not yet come about”. The O-Function, on the other hand, 
alludes to an “immemorial or an an-archic past” (Levinas, 1987: 100; 102), an 
irreducible past of the ‘experience’ of the third aesthetic that has not been simply 
present. It remains relentlessly other to that which allows itself to be assembled into a 
present/presence that is knowable, concrete and synchronous in synthesis. The O- 
Function is without reference to the assurance o f a present because it is a past 
“outside of all reminiscence, re-tention, re-presentation, or reference to a remembered 
present” (Levinas, 1987: 112). It signals the diachrony o f a past that attaches itself to 
an alterity that no longer falls within the province of (re-)presentation, a past without 
recourse to memory, an immemorial past that signified without ever having been 
simply present. Consequently, the O-Function’s relation to the future contrasts 
acutely with the sychronizable possibility of re-presentation. One cannot trace the O- 
Function back to a fullness of presence, to a presence that was not ruptured by 
differance, and therefore to a future predicated on a causative, discoverable past- 
present. The promise of a future-to-come, avenir as opposed to fu tur , is an alternative 
way of referring to what is other, to what opens onto what is other (Wood, 1989). It is 
a future without proper nomination. It is, as Derrida (1976: 5) suggests, a future that 
“can only be anticipated in the form o f an absolute danger”, that is, a future that could 
only manifest in a radical discontinuity that deconstructs the value o f sign, word and 
writing. It cannot be conceptualised as a future as telos, as end, as fulfilment or 
achievement -  an exhibition of a harmonious and continuous succession or unity 
between past and future. Instead, it is a future that subverts teleology, and it remains 
ateleological in its displacement of the notion that the future is a projected dimension 
of the present, that is, a future-present. Hamacher (2001: 146) suggests that “the 
future ‘is’, if it is at all, what shows itself insofar as it effaces the signs it permits. It 
presents itself only in the retraction o f its signs”. The speciality o f the O-Function 
may only be conjured up by the promise o f another, an other future-to-come. 
However, any promise may only be given in consideration of its possible breach, 
under the premise and promise of a possible retraction, because the O-Function’s 
“structural unrealisability” necessarily incorporates the possibility of the future’s 
possible non-advent insofar as the promise “must be open to something that denies
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itself knowledge, evidence, consciousness, and the calculability of a programme”. A 
promise would not be a promise if it were a prognosis for a causal chain of 
development because it remains without any “egologically anchored certainty that 
should belong to epistemic calculability” (Hamacher, 2001: 169). This reservation or 
limitation, the possibly impossible luture-to-come, is inscribed within the promise 
into the very opening of the future, into the very futurity of the future.
The O-Function constitutes a past that has not been simply present, and therefore does 
not fall under the realm or province o f reconstitution, recollection or reminiscence. 
The O-Function (as the remains o f the third aesthetic) cannot re-emerge or manifest 
absolutely except perhaps in a messianic promise [“the structure of the promessianic” 
(Hamacher, 2001:166)] o f another future that would be able to hold and contain all 
heterogeneity, negativity, non-conceptuality, traces, differance and so on (though this 
is more than likely speculatively implausible)8. I have utilised the notion of the 
messianic, following Derrida, not in its theological sense (it is atheological), but 
rather as that which promises an unanticipatable, unprefigurable other, an other that 
does not exist. The messianic is “nothing other than a relation to the future so 
despoiled and indeterminate that it leaves being ‘to come’ (a venir), i.e, 
undetermined” (Derrida, 2001: 20-21). As such, it is precisely because this other is 
not prefigurable or determinable, that the messianic must of necessity refuse its 
promise to retain its promissability. It is a messianic that is potentially ammessianic, 
what Derrida (1994: 59) has termed the “messianic without messianism”, where there 
is no prestablished telos that may be recognised, anticipated, striven for or achieved 
in the symbolic. It is without a horizon of expectation, something indeterminate, a 
horizon without determinate expectation. The “messianic without messianism” is the 
impossible coming o f the other. It is always and structurally “to come”, where the
8 As Milan Kundera (2002: 122-123) writes: “Memory cannot be understood, either, without a 
mathematical approach. The fundamental given is the ratio between the amount of time in the lived life 
and the amount of time from that life that is stored in memory. No one has ever tried to calculate this 
ratio, and in fact there exists no technique for doing so; yet without much risk o f error I could assume 
that the memory retains no more than a millionth, a hundred-millionth, in short an utterly infinitesimal 
bit of the lived life. That fact too is part of the essence of man. If someone could retain in his memory 
everything he had experienced, if  he could at any time call up any fragment of his past, he would be 
nothing like human beings: neither his loves nor his friendships nor his angers nor his capacity to 
forgive or avenge would resemble ours”. I think that it is important to stress that it remains implausible 
to predict the ‘form’ that the future-to-come will take because, as Derrida (2001: 84) suggests, “for 
there to be a future as such -  which means surprise, alterity -  one must no longer voir venir (wait and 
see), there must not even be a horizon o f anticipation, a horizon o f waiting”. The future-to-come means 
that “the other is there before me, that it comes before (previent), precedes and anticipates me”.
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coming of the other must be left to the other since determination or predetermination 
would represent a coming o f the same (Caputo, 2000). The notion of a venir 
presupposes a messianic time, so that “nothing coming {venue) could ever actually 
occur or come about, or have occurred or have come about, in ordinary time”. In this 
way, the delicacy and lightness o f the “to come” is not absorbed by the grossness of 
the order of presence. The always already “to come” does not belong to the order of 
the present, it “does not maintain the maintenant of temps ordinaire”. It is always 
beyond (au-dela) the same and the possible (Caputo, 1997: 79-80). Lacan (1977: 306) 
proposes that if the subject “announces himself -  he will have been -  only in the 
future perfect”, thus highlighting how any epiphanic moment of complete self- 
illumination must necessarily be deferred to a future perfect that remains barred from 
the meconnaissance of the present. Similar to Derrida’s suggestion of desistance, the 
subject is marked in advance by the imprint o f the O-Function (that which 
‘inaugurates’ the possibility to seek out meaningfulness) which does not belong to the 
subject, even if the imprint appears to be properly his/her own. The O-Function 
leaves its mark on the individual without there being the possibility that s/he will ever 
be able to think or reflect on how s/he has been effected by it. This notion has certain 
resonances with Lacan’s (1977: 86) rather gnomic assertion of the subject’s 
constitution and experience:
I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object. What is 
realised in my history is not the past definite o f what was, since it is no more, or even 
the present perfect o f what has been in what I am, but the future anterior o f what I 
shall have been for what I am in the process o f becoming.
I have offered this citation in order to suggest that the endeavour to establish linkages 
between one occurrence, phenomenon or experience and another, remains convoluted 
in its obliqueness because there is some unthinkable process that contributes, without 
one’s cognisance or realisation, to the process of becoming. In this way, the subject 
“comes into being at the point o f intersection between an irrecoverable past and an 
unattainable future; its structure is that o f a ceaseless cross-stitching, in language, 
between what-is-no-longer-the-case and what-is-not-yet-the-case” (Bowie, 1991: 
184). At best one may be able to speculate on some kind o f metonymical association 
between an event and one o f its possible displacements, though ultimately any
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metaphorical symmetry, the confluence and unification of signifier and signified, 
remains for now still to be accomplished. The O-Function cannot return, even in a 
distorted or transformed state. It remains inaccessible in its ‘originary’ patterning of a 
third spatio-temporal potentiality, and it remains without the possibility for 
rearrangement, repetition or reconstruction. It is, in short, a trace of ineffable (of 
ineluctable) otherness that signals an elsewhere that is “further-than-myself in 
myself’ (Cixous, 1997: 56), a movement from certain traces of archaic gestures of 
silence.
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5. PERMUTATIONS OF LOVE: TOWARDS AN ETHICS OF RECOGNITION
And yet I still love you too well in my silence to remember the movement o f my own becoming.
Perpetually am I troubled, stirred, frozen, or smothered by the noise of your death That was the
most painful hour. For you had so deeply implanted these things into me that almost nothing was left to 
recall me to the innocence o f my life. Almost nothing to let me rediscover my own becoming beyond 
your sufferings. All that was left -  barely -  was a breath, a hint of air and blood that said: I want to 
live. And why should living always be misfortune? And why should I always be security for your 
misery? The test of your bad luck? If you care nothing for living, then death will be for you a surer
place of eternal peace.
Luce Irigaray (1991a: 3-4)
As if I were dead but I do not even think of killing myself, nor do I desire to do so, it is as if it had
already been done I stayed in the house as if I were there in her stead, I preserved her fragrance, I
imagined her presence, I kept her with me.
Julia Kristeva (1989: 72; 83)
Delivering myself to her -  life. Enveloped in her so thoroughly, the fear of offending her still lingers. 
Yet I remain in her arms, knowing that a day limits itself to a period of light, after which suddenly
arrives the night.
Luce Irigaray (2000: 5)
Love remains a relation with the Other that turns into need, and this need still presupposes the total, 
transcendent exteriority o f the other, of the beloved. But love goes beyond the beloved. This is why 
through the face filters the obscure light coming from beyond the face, from what is not yet, from a 
future never future enough, more remote than the possible. Love....designates a movement by which a 
being seeks that to which it was bound before even having taken the initiative of the search and despite
the exteriority in which it finds it.
Emmanuel Levinas (1969: 254-255)
For this journey, I have listened, I have opened in myself a space to accommodate you, a clearing of 
silence. I have welcomed this part o f you, this flower of your body, born from your breath and heart, 
nourished by your sun, which has sprung from you and has inclined towards me. I have wanted to 
savour and protect this, before wanting more. I have wanted to stop a bit. To love. Not to suffocate the 
breath. To allow the breath to go and to return, hotter or colder, more animated or more serene: moving 
air or shining cloud. I have wanted to feel you in me, not as an object, a newborn, or even as an
emotion, but as life. As a living soul?
Luce Irigaray (2000: 60)
The Poetics of Thirdness: On Spatial Rhythmicity
The notion of a ‘third’ (time-space, aesthetic) alludes to archaic preverbal patterning 
that is often experienced through silence, sound, breath, kinesis, posture, energy and 
so on. It is a rhythm, an echo, a “creation of a dance” as Benjamin (2004; 16-18) puts 
it, that precedes representation through symbolic language. It is not a thing that can be 
held onto [it is a “memory lapse” (Cixous, 1999: 145) that cannot be contained] or 
reduced to a model o f action-reaction. To the question of “Who created this third 
element, you or I?”, the paradoxical answer is “both and neither”. It is an 
intersubjective space, something like a dance that is distinct from the dancers yet co-
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created by them. It is, as Helene Cixous (1999: 34; 70; 24; 150) writes in The Third 
Body, “that which is projected outside me and covers over me, this body foreign to 
my body that rises from my body and shrouds it”. This ‘third’ between-us is “a place 
where there is no law”, where there is “all this Nothing of Everything, this possibility 
of the impossible that happened”; the scenario of once “I did know it, it did have me 
in it, over there. Not here”. The rhythm of the third is the “unique and unknown body” 
(Cixous, 1999: 153) o f the mother-infant silence, where “something comes to pass 
which does not belong as one’s own to the one or to the other”. This something 
remains indeterminate, “an impossible to say”, something that is no-thing, something 
nomadic that moves beyond the body as it is part of it. It is the “mysterious legacy of 
an encounter” (Irigaray, 2002: 153; 22-23) that cannot be appropriated, corresponding 
neither solely to an internal realm nor to a simply external thing. As Cixous (1991: 
53-54) writes:
...I make love, love makes me, a Third Body (Troisieme Corps) comes to us, a third 
sense of sight, and our other ears -  between our two bodies our third body surges 
forth, and flies up to see the summit of things, and at the summit rises and soars 
toward the highest things; dives, swims in our waters, descends, explores the depths 
of the bodies, discovers and consecrates every organ, comes to know the minute and 
the invisible - but in order for the third body to be written, the exterior must enter and 
the interior must open out.
The spatiality o f  the third forms part o f the in-between, the liminal, that which passes 
through one and the other by offering the gift o f alterity that produces rather than 
reduces differencddifferance and gestures towards the limitless (Bray, 2004). In this 
chapter, I would like to consider how the configuration o f the “dead mother”, as noted 
by the French psychoanalyst Andre Green (1997), impacts on this third spatio- 
temporal potentiality or what I have termed the “third aesthetic”. It should be stressed 
that this chapter is not a comprehensive or exhaustive (if that were possible!) (re-) 
reading of the dead mother constellation, but instead it is concerned with how a 
mother out of tune with her infant, obstructs the passage and flow of the energetics of 
this ‘third’. It will investigate how the mother’s recognition of the infant’s otherness 
or alterity, and a certain quality o f (silent) love that she imparts to the infant, remain 
critical in generating and sustaining the momentum of the third aesthetic. In the
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experience o f a dead mother, a sense of decay and moribundity blocks the mobility 
and rhythmic currency of the third aesthetic. The metonymies of fluidity are 
supplanted by a funereal mechanics of solidification and paralysis which in turn leads 
to the inauguration o f a -O-Function in the infant’s unconscious. The -O-Function is 
the testament to an exquisite corpse-like and desolate universe of cadaverisation, 
entombment and anguished conscription. It signals the avalanche of “stone-felt cold” 
(Kristeva, 1989: 110), the austerity of a macabre dance, the horror of a living tomb, a 
death-ridden shroud o f emptiness - consignation to the nihilism of an ex-sistential 
vacuum.
Frozen Love: The Empire of the Dead Mother
The constellation of the dead mother alludes to mourning which does not pertain to 
the psychical repercussions o f the actual death of the mother, but rather to that “of an 
imago which has been constituted in the child’s mind, following maternal 
depression”. This in turn renders a vital, animated object (the mother) into a distant, 
reticent, toneless figure, profoundly influencing the cathexeses of patients who have 
experienced such a psychical position, as well as altering the destiny of their object- 
libidinal and narcissistic future, their capacity to love and work. The dead mother is a 
mother who is physically alive and present, yet psychically absent and dead in the 
eyes of her infant. Green considers the dead mother configuration in light of two 
ineluctable experiences that remain formative in shaping the organisation of the 
individual’s psyche - object-loss, where a new relation to reality is introduced so that 
the reality principle takes precedence over the pleasure principle which it also 
protects; and the depressive position which was initially formulated by Melanie Klein. 
Green is also concerned with the recourse to metaphor which “holds good for every 
essential element of psychoanalytic theory”, and he refers to the problems relating to 
the dead mother “as to a metaphor independent of the bereavement of a real object”. 
Moreover, the metaphor o f the breast, for example, is symbolic in that the erogenous 
pleasure derived from sucking the nipple also has the puissance to concentrate within 
itself other components that constitute the mother (her smell, skin, demeanour, gaze 
and so on). In this way, “the metonymical object has become metaphor to the object” 
whereby associative factors or elements remain inextricably bound up with the 
metaphor of the object (Green, 1997: 142; 147-148).
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The dead mother complex is revealed in the transferential relationship of the analytic 
process, with problems of impotence and immobilisation evident -  an incapacity to 
withdraw from confhctual situations, to love and to nurture one’s talents, and a sense 
of profound dissatisfaction. A transference depression (an expression that Green 
coins to distinguish it from transference neurosis, whereby classic neurotic symptoms 
are only of secondary value and do not furnish the key to the conflict in this instance) 
indicates a repetition o f an infantile depression which does not concern the loss of a 
real object in that real separation with the object through some form of abandonment 
is not in question here. Instead, “the essential characteristic of this depression is that it 
takes place in the presence o f the object, which is itself absorbed by a bereavement” 
(Green, 1997: 149). For some reason, the mother is depressed (the aetiology may be 
attributed to a variety o f precipitating factors, though among the principle causes of 
this kind of maternal depression, one frequently finds the loss of a significant other), 
and this leads to a lessening of interest in her infant. There is thus is a radical and 
brutal transformation o f the maternal imago and an abrupt truncation of an authentic 
vitality that might have been previously present in the infant. The infant experiences 
the sudden transformation o f its psychical life as catastrophic, and after unsuccessful 
attempts to repair the mother (being at the centre of the maternal universe, the infant 
interprets this deception as the consequence of its drives towards the object), the ego 
deploys a series o f defences. The primary and most critical defence is a unique 
movement with two aspects -  the decathexis of the maternal object and the 
unconscious identification with the dead mother. The decathexis (principally affective 
though also representative) is accomplished without enmity so as not to lend a more 
damaging quality to the mother’s image. This results in the constitution of a hole in 
the texture and fabric o f object-relations with the mother. The identification entails a 
reactive symmetry or complimentarity in an attempt to establish a reunion with the 
mother which aims at generating a continuity with the object (which the infant no 
longer possesses) by becoming the object itself rather than merely like it. This mirror- 
identification, which functions as the condition o f the renouncement of the object yet 
simultaneously its conservation in a cannibalistic manner, is unconscious from the 
start (and hence is fundamentally alienating in characteristic), as opposed to the 
decathexis which is rendered unconscious later on because the withdrawal is 
retaliatory. The subject, under the sway o f the repetition compulsion, will thus
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actively employ the decathexis o f an object when other significant object-relations 
threaten to disappoint, though s/he will remain totally unconscious of the 
identification with the dead mother, “with whom he reunites henceforth in 
recathecting the traces o f the trauma” (Green, 1997: 151).
Green (1997: 151-153) proposes that another significant ramification of the dead 
mother complex is a loss o f  meaning. The ‘construction’ of the breast of which 
“pleasure is the cause, the aim and guarantor” has collapsed suddenly without reason, 
and the entire situation, manifesting as a result of a loss o f meaning, leads to further 
defences. One such defence “structures the early development o f the fantasmatic and 
the intellectual capacities of the ego” whereby there is the development o f a frantic 
need to play which does not manifest in the freedom of playing, but rather under the 
compulsion to imagine. Similarly, intellectual development is inscribed in a 
compulsion to think1. Both o f these defences, as idealised sublimations, attempt to 
“mask the hole left by the decathexis”, to master a traumatic situation. However, they 
invariably reveal a certain incapacity to “play a stabilising role in the psychical 
economy” because the subject, for example, remains vulnerable in his/her love life 
where “a wound will awaken a psychical pain and one will witness the resurrection of 
the dead mother” who dissolves all the subject’s sublimatory acquisitions which are 
not lost but remain momentarily blocked. The dead mother holds the subject prisoner 
so that the incarceration overwhelms the possibility to develop “a deeper personal 
involvement which implies concern for the other”. All that is left is a “feeling of a 
captivity which dispossesses the ego o f itself and alienates it to an unrepresentable 
figure”. The subject’s objects remain constantly at the limit o f the ego, with the dead 
mother occupying the centre.
Behind or underneath the dead mother’s lack of maternal capacity, the shadow o f her 
absence remains “unreachable without echo”. The dead mother takes away the major 
portion o f the love with which she had been cathected before her bereavement - her
1 These two defences (as compensation for lack and emptiness and as an attempt to remedy this 
deficiency) are interesting in light o f Winnrcott’s and Lacan’s writings on play and jouissance 
deficiency respectively. Winnicott (1991: 47) regards play as critical in generating potential space, an 
essential “intermediate playground”, between mother and infant. For Lacan (1998b: 54-55), the quest 
for knowledge through intellectualisation is as a result of the lack of an other (en plus, encore) 
jouissance, the jouissance that ex-sists, the jouissance of the unthought-known (as discussed in chapter
2) (see also Fink, 2002: 34-36).
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gaze, the timbre o f her voice, her smell, the memory of her caress. She remains buried 
alive, with the tomb itself disappearing and leaving a gaping hole that makes solitude 
terrifying so that the subject runs “the risk of being sunk in it, body and possessions”. 
The object is encapsulated and its trace is lost through decathexis, transforming 
positive identification into negative identification, that is, identification with the hole 
left by the decathexis. Green (1997: 156-158) considers the object to be in 
hibernation, “conserved by the cold”, so that the decathexis creates a “love frozen” 
where the subject’s inability to love others (“arrested in their capacity to love”) is as a 
result of his/her love being “mortgaged to the dead mother”. Subjects under the spell 
of the dead mother can thus only aspire to autonomy in that sharing with others is 
impossible given that they remain a “prisoner to her economy of survival”. They 
continuously “complain of being cold even in the heat. They are cold below the 
surface o f the skin, in their bones; they feel chilled by a funereal shiver, wrapped in 
their shroud”. Moreover, their need for love is never completely satiated -  either it is 
completely impossible or it is inhibited. The dead mother remains indefatigable, 
refusing to “die a second death”. Just as the analyst perceives an end to the dead 
mother, a trauma occurs in the transference or in daily life which confers the maternal 
imago with a renewed vitality. She is a “thousand-headed hydra whom one believes 
one has beheaded with each blow; whereas in fact only one o f its heads has been 
struck off’.
Behind the dead mother complex, the blank mourning for the mother, “one catches a 
glimpse of the mad passion o f which she is” whereby the subject’s psychical structure 
is overwhelming geared towards a fundamental fantasy of nourishing the dead mother 
and maintaining her “perpetually embalmed”. The subject spends his/her life 
“nourishing his/her dead, as though s/he alone has charge of it. Keeper of the tomb, 
sole possessor o f the key o f the vault...”2. When the analyst succeeds in touching 
upon a critical element o f this nuclear complex, the subjects feels him/herself to be 
empty and blank as though “deprived of a stop-gap object, and a guard against 
madness”. Contact with the mother has essentially been lost though she is “secretly
2 Even if analysis succeeds in restoring a level of vitality to the subject, s/he will express ambivalence 
concerning the desire to resuscitate the dead mother because rather paradoxically the subject can take 
care of her and attempt to awaken and cure the dead mother in her affliction. She may be dead and 
unavailable to the subject but at least she is present. On the other hand, if the dead mother awakens, the 
subject risks losing her again for she may abandon him/her to continue her life. The subject is thus 
caught between two losses — presence in death, or absence in life.
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maintained in the depths o f the psyche” so that “all attempts of replacement by 
substitute objects are destined to fail”. Interestingly, in considering approaches of 
technique, Green suggests that the classic attitude of silence carries the danger of 
repeating the relation to the dead mother. Instead, he prefers to make use of the setting 
as a transitional space where the analyst is rendered as “an ever-living object...who is 
interested, awakened by his analysand, giving proof o f his vitality by the associative 
links he communicates to him ...”. The analyst needs to remain alert to what the 
analysand narrates without lapsing into intrusive interpretation. In short, the dead 
mother configuration draws the subject’s ego “towards a deathly, deserted universe”, 
which in turn results in narcissistic depletion (expressed phenomenologically through 
a sense of emptiness) and the burying o f a part o f the ego in “the maternal 
necropolis”. The challenge lies in facilitating the death of this dead mother so that 
another may be loved. However, this “death must be slow and gentle so that the 
memory of her love does not perish” but instead may nourish the love that she will 
generously offer the other who takes her place (Green, 1997: 162-170).
The Failure of Recognition
I would like to propose that in the dead mother configuration, the mother, who is so 
completely absorbed by her bereavement, fails to recognise the otherness o f the 
infant, the infant as another, and as a consequence the infant is engulfed and 
overwhelmed by an imperiousness and imposition of sameness -  that which haunts, 
monopolises and occupies the mother’s psyche. While the relationship between a 
mother and infant can never be entirely on equal terms in that the infant depends on 
the mother for his/her survival, there still seems to be an ethical necessity for the 
mother to recognise the alterity o f the infant, the freedom of the infant’s becoming, 
that “the other is and will remain a mystery for me”, even if reciprocity is not 
necessarily a possibility. As Irigaray (2000: 110; 106) writes: “Since the other is -  is 
already, perhaps will be, has been, has in himself a seed o f the to be in so far as he 
exists -  I must respect him as the other which he is”. In an attempt to explicate the 
process of recognition, Irigaray (1996: 104-105) suggests that recognition is 
inextricably connected to an irreducibility, a certain inaccessibility, whereby one 
individual may not be substituted for another -  “Recognising you means or implies 
respecting you as other, accepting that I draw myself to a halt before you as before
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something insurmountable, a mystery, a freedom that will never be mine, a 
subjectivity that will never be mine, a mine that will never be mine”. Recognition 
negates the endeavour to master or colonise the becoming of the other so that between 
two, there ex-sists a transcendence (through differance) that continues to “nourish our 
energy, its movement, its generation, and its creation”. This movement of energy in 
turn prevents paralysis and all forms of totality and totalisation, a unity through 
totalisation and synthesis, so that “neither you nor I are the whole nor the same”, and 
consequently “difference cannot be reduced to one hierarchy, one genealogy, one 
history”. For Irigaray, a difference that is irreducible curbs the capitalisation of mere 
power and authority over another and transforms relations of appropriation and fusion 
into intersubjective exchanges that operate against subjugation and consumption. It is 
this difference that ensures the generation of the “expanse of the third” (Irigaray, 
2002a: 9). While recognising the other facilitates a sense of differentiation, it also 
paradoxically creates a sense o f attunement, a “rhythmicity of affect”, whereby 
something like a rhythmic pattern is co-created by two individuals who surrender to 
it3. This creation permits and presumes separateness, an intermediate in-between 
space which no longer identifiably emanates from one individual or the other, but 
rather mediates between them and effects the flow of energy between (Benjamin, 
2002: 46). In recognition, the individual (the mother) experiences the other (the 
infant) as a subject who can be “felt with”, but who has a separate centre of feeling 
and perception (Benjamin, 1998; 2004).
The dead mother configuration signals a failure “to attain horizontally in 
transcendence” (or at least some kind of horizontally given that the relationship 
between the mother and her infant is never entirely equal owing to the infant’s 
dependence) which would engender respect for the mystery o f the other (Irigaray, 
1996: 116). The mother reduces the infant to her existence and her experience, which 
in turn paralyses the freedom o f the infant’s intentionality and becoming, and 
alienates the infant in a reality o f sameness. The dead mother controls and dominates 
the infant so that the possibility and freedom for the infant’s development ceases to
3 Similarly, Frosh and Baraitser (2003) suggest that it is the mother’s appreciation and recognition of 
the infant’s separateness from her that paradoxically indicates just how much the mother is in contact 
with the infant. Recognition alludes to a certain handling of the trope of similarity/difference whereby 
the possibility of allowing difference is permitted (so that the self does not disappear into the other) yet 
there is also an appreciation of similarity that does not risk absorption or colonisation of the self into 
the other. Recognition is gesture, a “reaching out”, that also lets the other become.
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exist as the infant remains in submission to her. The dead mother fails to contribute to 
a third space by holding in tension her subjectivity/desire/awareness and the needs of 
the infant. For Benjamin (2004: 13), this ability to maintain internal awareness, to 
“sustain the tension o f difference between my needs and yours while still being 
attuned to you”, remains analogous to the ability to protect the child’s future 
development. The position o f the dead mother leads to a failure to “encourage 
something unexpected to emerge, some becoming, some growth, some new dawn,
perhaps (a) way for the not-yet-coded, for silence, for a space for existence,
initiative, free intentionality, and support for your becoming”. The mother fails to 
offer (as guidance) her infant what Irigaray (1996: 117-118) refers to as “a silence” in 
which the infant’s future “may emerge and lay its foundation”. This silence is not 
hostile or restrictive, but rather it is an “openness that nothing or no one occupies, or 
preoccupies -  no language, no world, no God”. It is offered up with no a priori or pre- 
established truth and “constitutes an overture to the other who is not and never will be 
mine” - a “still virgin space-time” for the infant’s “appearance and its expressions”. 
The silence offers “the possibility o f existing, of expressing your intention, your 
intentionality, without you calling out for it and even without asking, without 
overcoming, without annulling, without killing”. It alludes to “one with the other in 
the serenity and the occasion o f being with, respecting difference”, and it ensures that 
“what grows preserves its future” (Irigaray, 2000: 1). In the instance of the dead 
mother, the infant remains entrapped within the horizon of sameness with the you of 
the infant forced into the sameness o f the me of the mother. Difference is subjected to 
sameness in that the mother imposes on her infant the authority of that which holds 
her captive, and the enveloping between the mother and her infant therefore manifests 
in closure - an enclosure that proliferates a state of bondage that annihilates creative 
possibilities, the “creative virtualities that would inscribe themselves in this silence” 
(Irigaray, 1993: 180).
The “soft palpitation” o f silence, the tenderness of its rhythmic repose, plays at the 
limits of the individual -  it lacks contours and definite limits, “still outside, but 
already within” -  and alludes to what is “seemingly nothing, if not the happiness of 
being with her, while remaining myself’ -  “the living matrix for a future”. This 
silence suggests that “between us is something which will never be mine or yours . It 
alludes to “a nothingness in common” which permits the constitution and free play of
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a mobile energy4. In the scene o f the dead mother, however, the “moisture which 
protects silence” between the mother and Her infant is rendered as devitalised so that 
a heaviness annihilates the lightness between them and moves towards an “immobility 
and inertia o f being, which is found in the very horizon of death”, where death is the 
“absolute mistress”. Between mother and infant there is deadness, numbness and an 
exhaustion o f sensation. The horizontally of intersubjectivity is replaced by a vertical 
transcendence (that which holds both the mother and her infant as prisoners of 
sameness) which in turn robs them of a ‘‘third dimension beginning from which we 
approach each other as different others” (Irigaray, 2000: 3-4; 52; 13). The mother fails 
to leave to the infant the possibility for his/her becoming through the colonisation of 
the “silence o f a between-two” that fuels the process of movement which is “assured 
by the difference between subjects”. She fails to contribute to an “open space between 
the one and the other”, to a “path from the one to the other and to the sharing of a still 
free energy and space”, which would safeguard “difference and its productive play”. 
Therefore the scene o f the mother-infant encounter is “closed by what is proper to 
only one” so that the infant is appropriated by a sameness, expropriated and seized by 
sameness, subjected to the assertion of the same (Irigaray, 2002a: 99; 153; 134). 
There is a complete submission to the inexorable force of the dead mother so that 
experience is not created or discovered, but rather suffered, and the infant’s own 
feelings are denied and supplanted by the mother’s reality (Benjamin, 2002). The 
infant is truly a prisoner to the dead mother’s economy of survival.
The dead mother configuration signals the invasion of a third term (that which 
Levinas identifies as a transcendental signifier, referred to in chapter 3), which 
subsequently neutralises the alterity of the third aesthetic, and renders its 
disseminative, metonymic movement into a metaphoric sepulchre. Indeed, the 
intersubjective currency o f the third aesthetic is imposed upon by a Third internal to 
one, the intrapsychic Third o f the dead mother’s bereavement, which in turn steers the 
infant into “the reality and fiction o f death’s being”, into a ‘‘’poetics’ of survival, an 
inverted life, coiled around imaginary and real disintegration to the extent of 
embodying death as i f  it were real” . This tomb of the Third co-opts and subsumes 
both mother and infant into a paralysis of psyche and body, an “irremediable
4 Further on in the text, Irigaray (2000: 64) writes: “Silence, therefore, is nothing. It is not even the 
substantial isation o f itself’.
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dissociation o f astral numbness”. The intrusions of the dead mother’s Third brings 
death through devitalisation and monopolisation of the infant's jouissance of 
becoming and forces the infant into the cloisters of an “imaginary solitude”, a “near- 
aesthetic harmonisation” o f death’s “fictious fullness” (Kristeva, 1989: 73). The third 
aesthetic between mother and infant remains petrified and paralysed resulting in a 
congealment and blocking o f the fluidity of psychic and bodily gestures. The mother 
and infant are confined within “solid walls” o f death that keeps them from “spreading 
to infinity”. This modality o f death propagates a mechanics/mechanisation of 
solidification whereby the precedence o f the Third punctuates and prescribes the 
potentiality of the third aesthetic so that death is projected onto, injected into, the 
interval, the threshold o f liquidity. The “paralytic undersides” of the economy of the 
Third supplants or absorbs the potential fluidity, viscosity and diffusion of the third 
aesthetic into a solidified closed circuit o f death (Irigaray, 1985: 106; 111).
The Third that subordinates the dead mother and the infant to an economy of 
mesmerism and immobilisation, “its prerogatives, its domination, its solipsism”, 
remains dedicated to reproducing a death-like sameness in the intersubjective space 
between so that both the mother and Her infant remain imprisoned -  prisoners of 
“enclosed spaces where we cannot keep on moving, living, as ourselves” (Irigaray, 
1985: 207; 212). The unceasing flow o f the third aesthetic, its metonymic currents 
resisting congealment and solidification, its suppleness, gives way to a hardness 
between-us, a trenchancy and rigidity, the density o f dead bodies entombed crypt-like 
and “restrained by an aching psychic wrapping, anaesthetised, as if ‘dead’” (Kristeva, 
1989: 82). As a result, the dead mother’s infant comes to live for the sake of death, 
experiencing an “emptiness as living dead” (Kristeva, 1989: 82), the “leaden strap” 
(Kristeva, 1986: 185) of death that seals in a hermetic veil o f numbness, hollowing 
out, immobilisation, pulverisation and disintegration. The infant remains absolutely 
and implacably impotent in the face o f this death-bearing all-mightiness, “the death- 
bearing she-Gehenna” (Kristeva, 1989: 28). The potentiality of the third aesthetic is 
replaced by an imposing Third closed off to “the outer-inner music” so that all that is 
left is a wasteland barred and broken, a landscape where “love loses its breath” -  the 
deathly deserted universe o f  the maternal necropolis (Cixous, 1991: 54). The 
“ceaseless transfusion o f life” gives way to decay, to that which is death infused, 
“only death lies on this path”. There is a transcription of the flow-between in
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accordance with the enclosure o f a (degenerative) triad -  the mother, Her infant and 
the Third. The liquidity o f the liminal is strangled by this “captive atmosphere” which 
blocks the circuit o f “airy, mobile” mediation, curbs the residues of metonymic 
excess and thwarts the transmission o f the gift of ex-sistence (Irigaray, 1993b: 33; 46; 
50; 45). Indeed, it is a -O-Function that is inaugurated in the infant’s unconscious 
which derives fr6m the paralysis of this archaic scene of blocked movements and 
arrangements o f sameness.
The -O-Function speaks o f “states o f artificial weightiness, of swept-out dryness, of 
absence against a backdrop o f dizziness, o f emptiness cut out into black lightning”. It 
speaks of absolute impotence and implacable helplessness, “cadaverisation and 
artifice”, where both mother and infant are engulfed in the crypt of a motionless and 
morbid stupor -  the monstrous anguish o f living corpses, the exorbitant intensity of a 
stultifying and devitalising sequestration (Kristeva, 1989: 72-73). The Third of the 
dead mother functions as the statutory/statuary/proprietary between-us, and signals the 
dead mother’s failure to recognise that the infant has a separate and distinct psychic 
life. For Modell (1999: 77-78), this failure is devastating in that recognising the 
uniqueness o f the infant’s inner life is equivalent to recognising that s/he is 
psychically alive. It is as if the dead mother fails to acknowledge the infant’s 
humanity, and this, as Modell suggests, “is a short step to think that if their mother 
does not recognise their psychic aliveness, then their mother wishes that they did not 
exist, that they in fact should be dead”. The infant may thus feel that the dead mother 
is withholding permission to exist, and if one does not have the right to exist then one 
does not have the right to seek out meaningfulness, “to have desires, to want anything 
for oneself’. As Sekoff (1999: 115) writes: “Within her tight embrace the entombed 
child finds solace, a shelter that offers the certainties o f death over the vagaries of life. 
This is her magical bequest: relief from the anxieties of freedom through submission 
to a powerful other”. The -O-Function is a testament to the terrifying beauty of the 
“negative sublime” (Sekoff, 1999: 114), the graveyard or funeral vault of a subject 
subordinated by both reverence and dread for the dead mother. No life or consolation 
is possible beyond the boundary o f the dead mother’s embrace which ensures that 
there will be no unauthorised border-crossings. The dead mother held captive by the 
Third is constricting, compressing and entrapping, a “centrifuge object whose gravity 
won’t let anything escape” (Sekoff, 1999: 121). The infant-adult is thus left with a
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sense of “panic and emptiness”, a fear of falling into an abyss of oblivion (Forster, 
2000: 46). S/he remains buried alive and subsumed by a burden of sorrow tailored out 
of the dead mother’s legacy o f dereliction and entombment. The delicacy of the ex- 
sistence o f the third aesthetic is eclipsed by the puissance and valency of the existence 
of the dead mother and her Third. The -O-Function is thus a testament to the future 
falling back upon the burden o f the past, to a future falling back upon a past ‘"to fuse 
with it and delineate a fate” in which “every adventure would revert into the 
adventure o f a fate”. The —O-Function is the inescapable “crushing responsibility of 
existence that veers into fate” (Levinas, 1969: 272; 282).
The Ethics of Love: Of Herethics and Angels
For Irigaray (2000: 62-63), the capacity “to love each other between us” requires “the 
protection of a space, a place o f silence”, the arrangement of a reserve of silence. 
Silence forms the very basis o f  “love between us”, not however because it “rests at the 
level of nature, o f the drives, o f instinct, but because it maintains itself in difference, a 
difference that cannot be expressed”. This silence cannot “be overcome either in 
words or in representations”, but rather must be “protected, cultivated, generated”. It 
is critically “at least three”, “a two irreducible to one”, so that “a third is created, a 
third generated by the two but which does not belong to either”. This third as silence
or silent third is “a work o f love a labour of love”, which promotes the
circulation o f energy and “sometimes brings rebirth and therefore allows for 
becoming”. It is a certain quality o f love as (silent) mediator or intermediary, the ex- 
sistence o f that which functions between, which facilitates “the encounter and the 
transmutation or transvaluation between the two”. As Irigaray (1993: 21; 111; 201) 
writes: “Everything is always in movement, in a state of becoming. And the mediator 
of all this is, among other things, or exemplarily, love. Never fulfilled, always 
becoming”. To love the other in this sense requires the attainment of “an intuition of 
the infinite” (not an intuition with a goal that marks out, but rather an intuition that 
“inscribes itself in an already insistent field”) without binding the other in accordance 
with sameness, which would ensure that death becomes the dimension of the infinite. 
This love of the other remains irreducible to any overwhelming consumption or 
consummation, to an appropriation o f the freedom o f the other. It stops before the 
inappropriable, leaving a horizontal transcendence between to be so that a culture of
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energy” (Irigaray, 1996: 138) proliferates. Love comes to the assistance of the frailty 
o f the other in that a ‘‘regime o f tenderness” manifests itself at the limits of being and 
non-being as “a soft warmth where being dissipates into radiance”. The extreme 
fragility o f this love (of cinders) lies at the limits of an “exorbitant presence” which 
ensures that “the essentially hidden throws itself towards the light, without becoming 
signification. Not nothingness -  but what is not yet”. This “unreality at the threshold 
of the real” does not offer itself as a possibility to be grasped. It does not exhaust the 
essence of its non-essence. It appears without appearing as a “weight of non- 
signifyingness (non-significance)”, as a “movement unto the invisible” - “as though it
were not ye t which is not”. It withdraws into a future “beyond every possible
promise to anticipation”. It cannot be grasped or touched in that “the secret it forces 
does not inform it as an experience”, and in this way, “it does not denote all that I can 
grasp -  my possibilities”. Indeed, this love “issues in no concept” whereby its 
movement consists in going beyond the possible. It comes from the future, “from a 
future situated beyond the future”, from a not yet more remote than a future -  a 
spatio-temporal not-yet that does not enter into the logical essence of the possible. The 
encounter with this certain love, however, is necessary so that “the future of the child 
(can) come to pass from beyond the possible, beyond projects” (Levinas, 1969: 256- 
268). The mother’s relation with the infant establishes the relationship with this not 
yet future.
The silence o f love or love o f silence (silent love) is the primary gesture of what 
Irigaray (1996: 109-110) terms as “/  love to you”. The ‘to’ in the expression 
confounds any inertia that paralyses movement and creates a scenario of subjugation 
and consumption-consummation. It prevents a relation of transitivity, “bereft of the 
other’s irreducibility and potential reciprocity”. The ‘to’ is a sign of mediation 
between which works against prescriptiveness and the possibility for subjection “to 
these truths, to this order”. It obviates the risk o f annihilating the alterity of the other 
through reducing and transforming him/her into my property-object, into my 
proprietorial terrain, into “what is mine, into mine, meaning what is already a part of 
my field of existential or material properties”. The ‘to ’ acts as a barrier against the 
cessation of the freedom o f becoming through submission to another, and “safeguards
a place of transcendence between us, a place of respect a place of possible
alliance” -  the irreducibility o f a mystery between us (Irigaray, 2000: 19). As
169
Deutscher (2002: 80) writes: “The linguistically mediating ‘to ’ is the symbolic 
emblem o f the necessary mediation between self and other, o f the nonreduction of the 
other to my self-capture” . Recognition of the infant’s immediate difference permits 
love to flourish (Frosh and Baraitser, 2003). An ethics of love between a mother and 
infant would require that which “unites us and leaves a space for us between us”, a 
provision of a space that “brings us together and distances us, of the distance that 
enables us to become, of the spacing necessary for coming together, of the
transubstantiation o f energy ” (Irigaray, 1996: 148-149). It would require
irreducibility between-us that operates against the constraints of fiisional sameness, 
which would intervene between-us by inscribing death and immobility. An 
irreducibility would ensure and safeguard “the two and the between, the us and the 
between-us” (Irigaray, 2000: 16) so that horizontal transcendence cannot be 
overcome. In the instance o f the dead mother, a vertical transcendence of submissive 
and possessive sameness forces the infant to obey the same exigencies and necessities 
as the mother in that the infant (and later the infant in the adult) remains mortgaged to 
the dead mother in “cannibalistic solitude”. The otherness of the infant in its 
becoming is thus radically and overwhelmingly delimited and imposed upon so that 
the infant remains in captivity and is later unable to commit to intimate involvement 
that entails a concern for the other. Modell (1999: 79) writes that patients who have 
experienced dead mothers, “evidence great difficulties in ‘being with the other”’. This 
infant-adult thus strolls amongst others, when leaving his/her “graveyard bed”, like 
“an extraterrestrial, the inaccessible citizen of the magnificent land of Death, of which 
no one could ever deprive him/her” (Kristeva, 1989: 71; 74). The otherness o f the 
infant is eclipsed by a deathly identification with the sameness o f the dead mother.
The dead mother’s wholehearted preoccupation with her loss fails to inculcate in her a 
sense o f wonder and astonishment for the infant, a wonder that “keeps me from taking 
and assimilating directly to myself’, so that the infant “becomes no more than the 
result o f the alchemy” o f the mother’s loss. This sense of wonder is the “motivating 
force behind mobility in all its dimensions” -  there is a need o f wonder to move, for 
the “sap to circulate”, for an interval between self and other to be created, and for an 
excess to proliferate, an excess that resists assimilation or reduction to sameness.
Wonder is the encounter o f the “third dimension an intermediary neither the
one nor the other”, which remains “faithful to becoming, to its virginity, its power of
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impulsion, without letting go the support of bodily inscription” (Irigaray, 1993: 72- 
82). It alludes to “something extra which remains foreign to simple objective 
reduction, a something extra which is left to the other”, where the mother’s perception 
of her infant is accompanied by a respect for the infant as a subject with the 
possibility for becoming. In this way, the mother is able to see, touch and listen to her 
infant, knowing that what she perceives is not hers. The infant is sensed by the 
mother, yet this infant remains other, never reduced to an object. There is always an 
“extra cloud o f invisibility”, something invisible in the gestures between two, 
whereby perception never amounts to an entirety, an absoluteness. As Kristeva (1986: 
162) writes: “From one to the other, eternally, broken up visions, metaphors of the 
invisible”. In the case o f the dead mother, this difference (as invisibility) between is 
annulled through the horizon of sameness so that the relationship between two 
disappears and with that not only all possibility of intersubjective dialogue, but also 
an authentic interiority that would celebrate the freedom of the infant's becoming 
(Irigaray, 2000: 40; 46).
In her experimental essay, “Stabat Mater”, Kristeva (1986: 182; 178-179; 183) 
suggests how the child’s arrival extracts the mother “out of her oneness and gives her 
the possibility -  but not the certainty -  o f reaching out to the other, the ethical”. From 
the very beginning, there is “this other abyss that opens up between the body and what 
had been its inside: there is the abyss between the mother and her child”, the “abyss 
between what was mine and is henceforth but irreparably alien”. Once the umbilical 
cord has been severed, the infant becomes “an inaccessible other” -  “And this, as 
early as the first gestures, cries, steps, long before its personality has become my 
opponent. The child, whether he or she is irremediably an other”5. The possibility to 
reach out, to gesture towards the other as an ethics of love, would entail a respect for a 
connection that celebrates the “overflowing laughter...., softly buoyed by the waves” 
that the “dialectics o f the trinity and its supplements would be unable to subsume”. It 
should be stressed that I am in no way suggesting that the dead mother does not love 
her infant. Instead, I am exploring a certain quality of the mother’s love for her infant 
that may lend itself as the basis o f an ethics o f love, an ethics through love, or what
5 Elsewhere, Kristeva (1986: 206) writes: “The arrival of the child leads the mother into the
labyrinths of an experience that, without the child, she would rarely encounter: love for an other. Not 
for herself, nor for an identical being, and still less for another person with whom ‘I’ fuse (love or 
sexual passion)”.
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Kristeva (1986: 185) coins with the neologism “herethics”, which in turn may 
promote the potentiality o f a third aesthetic6. This heretical ethics of love, as Edelstein 
(1993) proposes, is exemplified by a mother who deals with the other through love. 
Moreover, it is a relational practice and process where one acknowledges (recognises) 
the otherness o f the other, the other as other, or, as Elizabeth Grosz (1989: xvii) puts 
it, there is a “response to the recognition o f the primacy of alterity over identity”7. For 
Kristeva (1986: 297), a mother is precisely someone who can reach out to the other 
through an ethicality of love — “maternity is a bridge between singularity and ethics” -  
an ethics of love enhanced “not by constraint but by a logic, that is always a poly­
logic, of love” (Kristeva, 1987c: 116). This ethics that is a poly-logic of love is an 
ethics o f difference, an ethics-in-process (Oliver, 1993a). The mother may thus 
function as a prototype or metaphor for someone who gestures towards the other and 
facilitates an open space o f love (Edelstein, 1992), which in turn ensures that she 
cannot “crush everything the other (the child) has that is specifically
irreducible smothering any different individuality” (Kristeva, 1986: 185). This
ethics o f love would transfer “a certain gift that presumes a subjectification to the 
other” which works against “the risk o f complete submission, a renunciation of the 
same for the other, and total enslavement” (Kristeva, 1996: 62). It ensures the “ethical
necessity” o f “giving the child to himself. leav(ing) the child to his own
generation” (Irigaray, 1991b: 181).
Kristeva (1986: 185) writes that “herethics is undeath, love (a-mort and amour)”. 
While McAfee (2004: 85) acknowledges that Kristeva’s suggestion of this new kind 
of ethicality is “tantalising but brief’, there may be some interesting possibilities for 
its development in the very fleeting references that Irigaray makes on the idea of
6 Herethics (herethique) is constituted by joining the word heretical (heretique) with ethics (ethique). 
Grosz (1989) suggests that ethics need not imply the institution of a moral or normative code or a series 
of abstract regulative principles. Instead, it is principally concerned with relations between self and 
other, the working out or negotiation with an other. Ethics (of love) in this sense should not be regarded 
as “being the same as morality” (Kristeva, 1986: 185), or “the kind of ‘ethics’ that consists in 
obedience to laws” (Kristeva, 1984: 110). For Kristeva, “the location o f ethical practice should no 
longer lie in the reformulation and attempted perfection of rules and laws” (Ainley, 1990: 55). Ethics is 
necessary insofar as the maternal debt needs to be considered (The maternal considered in relation to 
the broad heterogeneity discussed in Chapter 3.) (Grosz, 1989).
7 This notion resonates with what Levinas (1969: 251) proposes in Totality and Infinity: “....the 
relation between me and the other commences in the inequality of terms, transcendent to one another, 
where alterity does not determine the other in a formal sense, as where the alterity of B with respect to 
A results simply from the identity of B, distinct from the identity of A. Here the alterity of the other 
does not result from its identity, but constitutes it: the other is the Other .
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angels. Angels, according to Irigaray, are yet to be made manifest or seen on the level 
of time and space, traversing distinct categories and forms. They are, as Barnard 
(2002: 183) suggests, “a form of undead or ‘not not being’” as a “nonsignifying 
corporeal mediation” between mother and infant. In considering angels, one needs to 
“rethink and rebuild the whole scene of representation” because angels are “guardians 
of free passage” 'and can never be “captured, domesticated” (Irigaray, 1993b: 42). 
They are go-betweens, creating passages between the visible and invisible (Chanter, 
1995). These angels are never immobile and “circulate as mediators of that which has 
not yet happened, o f what is still going to happen, of what is on the horizon”, 
endlessly reopening all enclosures o f universes and transgressing limits. They destroy 
the “monstrous elements” that may hamper the possibility o f a new ethicality of love,
and function as “messengers o f ethics without it being possible to say anything
more than the gesture that represents them”. They remain “irreducible to philosophy, 
theology and morality”. Gesture seems to be their ‘nature’, “movement, posture, the 
coming-and-going between two”, and they are “imperious in their grace even as they 
remain imperceptible” (Irigaray, 1993: 15-16). They offer a “shape of welcome” 
without assimilating, reducing or devouring, and inhabit a strange world of silence -  
the interval, the residue o f the between-two -  a “wonder-full excess” (Oliver, 1993a: 
172)8. Moreover, they are not useful except insofar as “that which designates a place, 
the very place o f uselessness”. I think that this suggests that they do not measure up to 
a utilitarianism designed to reduce in terms of consumptive exchange or 
consummation, but instead open up a place (as gift) as interval in time-space9. Angels 
tell of another dimensionality, another incarnation, another threshold, “of an opening 
onto something beyond”, o f an opening on to nothing, which gives access to the 
mucous and promotes a celebration as opposed to a disguised form of a master-slave 
relationship. The mucous is “where the borders of the body are wed in an embrace 
that transcends all limits -  without, however, risking engulfment, thanks to the 
fecundity o f the porous”. It is part o f “that experience which is inexpressible yet 
forms the supple grounding o f  life”, which “in its touching, in its properties, would 
hinder the transcendence o f a God foreign to the flesh, o f a God o f immutable and 
stable truth” (Irigaray, 1993: 17-19; 110). This threshold of (angelic) mucosity alludes
8 Lacan (1998b: 8) points out that the word ‘strange’ in French can be broken down -  etrange -  Etre- 
ange -  which refers to “angel-being” or “to be an angel .
9 Interestingly, Lacan (1998b: 21) suggests that he does not believe that angels “bear the slightest 
message, and it is in that respect that they are truly signifying”. Angels do not signify any-thing.
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to a sensible transcendence, as opposed to an abstracted, synthetic transcendence, 
where the “porous nature o f the body” gestures through the intimacy of the mucous 
and creates a “passage or a bridge between what is most earthly and what is most 
celestial” (Irigaray, 1991c: 190)10. This gesture however is “so subtle that one needs 
great perseverance to keep it from falling into oblivion, intermittency, deterioration, 
illness, or death”  ^ The mucous is the space where the mother and her infant give each 
other life or death, regeneration or degeneration. It is held in reserve within the silence
of an energy, “a growth and flourishing still to come.............an overture to a future
that is still and always open”. It alludes to the aporetics o f a “strange advent”, what 
remains unthought or not-yet thought, the “space for the projection of possible 
futures” (Grosz, 1989: 162), a becoming without telos, a movement linked to the 
ethics of love - to herethics (Irigaray, 1993: 17-19). Herethics as undeath and love is 
buoyed up by the laughter o f  the angels as intermediaries of love between, as 
mediating elements o f the nontriangular, as facilitators of love that is “the vehicle
which permits the passage between, the passage to and fro Instead of an abyss, or
an enclosure which defines an inside and an outside, there should be a threshold” 
(Whitford, 1991: 164)11. Herethics is what offers up the possibility to “give(s) birth to 
a third, a mediator between”, a relational scenario where “we are at least three, each
10 The idea of a sensible transcendental takes into account that that any transcendence removed from 
the medium of physicality (the body, its skin and orifices, breath, movement, kinesis, posture etc), 
corporeal mediation (mediation by, of, and in the body), leads to paralysis and immobilisation. It refers 
to the unthought and unthinkable, which brings together what has been traditionally split -  
transcendence and immanence, body and spirit, material and ideal (Whitford, 1991) The sensible 
transcendental is in a sense nothing if  not paradoxical (Chanter, 1995). It “comes into being through us, 
of which we would be the mediators and bridges” (Irigaray, 1993: 129). It is between-us as process and
becoming, as a possibility for a creative response to the other. It is a “vital intermediary a perpetual
journey, a perpetual transvaluation, a permanent becoming” (Irigaray, 1993: 27). Deutscher (2002: 
103) regards the sensible transcendental as “my intimate relation to the infinite” or “in intimacy with 
infinity”.
11 This laughter o f the angels seems reminiscent of what Milan Kundera (1996: 186) rather playfully 
writes: “Things deprived suddenly of their supposed meaning, of the place assigned to them in the so- 
called order o f things....make us laugh”. Cixous (1997: 22) suggests how laughter implies that “we 
escape or we have escaped death”. Laughter opens up a passage towards a joyful and exuberant 
affirmation o f life overcoming the power o f that which is death-bound, the spectre of death (Bray, 
2004). It is “knowledge o f a condition o f possibility which gives nothing to know”. This laughter does 
not laugh at anything. It laughs at nothing, for nothing. It signifies nothing even though it is itself the 
“lightening of meaning”. It is a “strange serenity”, where “in this serenity knowledge lightens itself of 
the weight o f knowledge, and meaning knows itse lf- or senses itse lf- as that extreme lightness which 
characterises the ‘exit from the identical’” (Nancy, 2002: 23-24). This laughter, as Derrida (1992d: 
294-295) writes, is a laughter “o f a gift without debt, light affirmation”, which is haunted by “a 
completely different music” - a music that makes space for the “coming of the other”.
174
of which is irreducible to any of the others: you, me and our work” (Irigaray, 1991b: 
180-181).
In this chapter, I have attempted to explore the ways in which a psychically dead 
mother effects the quality o f the generation of the third aesthetic and the subsequent 
remains o f this third spatio-temporality in the infant’s unconscious, and in doing so I 
have endeavoured to elaborate further on the two non-concepts of the ‘third aesthetic’ 
and the ‘O-Function’. The dead mother fails to recognise the infant as an other 
individual with the possibility for becoming and thus alienates the infant in a horizon 
of sameness. The intersubjective movement between mother and infant is profoundly 
impacted upon by the intrapsychic Third of the dead mother’s bereavement so that 
this Third traps them in a coil o f paralysis and deadness that blocks the flow of 
angelic mucosity and tenderness, which forms the basis of a herethics oFthrough 
(silent) love, and this in turn inaugurates a -O-Function in the infant’s unconscious. 
The -O-Function is a testament to a legacy of entombment, to a reduced existence 
that the mother imparts to Her infant so that the future of the infant’s meaning-making 
experience is overwhelmed and burdened by this funereal past.
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6. THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE: THE SCENE OF WRITING OTHERWISE
I ask of writing what I ask of desire: that it have no relation to the logic which puts desire on the side of 
possession, of acquisition, or even of that consumption-consummation which, when pushed to its limits 
with such exaltation, links (false) consciousness with death.
Helene Cixous (1994: 27)
But I fail to find any such thing, so great is the gap between the words which come to me from the 
culture and this strange being (can it be no more than a matter of sounds?) which I fleetingly recall at my 
ear— Whereby we may understand what description is: it strives to render what is strictly mortal in the 
object by feigning (illusion by reversal) to suppose it, to desire it living: “as if alive” means “apparently 
dead”. The adjective is the instrument o f this illusion; whatever it says, by its descriptive quality alone,
the adjective is funereal.
Roland Barthes (1977: 68)
This is how I write: as if the secret that is in me were before me.
Helene Cixous (1997: 67)
Even going to the depths of what he says, o f what is said with his saying, man does not rejoin what gives
itself this way in silence.
Luce Irigaray (1999: 134)
We judge new work by a template of the past from which it has already escaped.
Jeanette Winterson (1996: 38)
Language is my human endeavour. I have fatefully to go seeking and fatefully I return with empty hands. 
But -  I return with the unsayable. The unsayable can be given to me only through the failure of my 
language. Only when the construct falters do I reach what it could not accomplish.
Clarice Lispector (1988: 170)
We are scientific because we lack subtlety.
Roland Barthes (1975: 61)
Thinking-Writing the Unthinkable: The Cixouscience of Writing1 or Writing the 
Imaginary of the Invisible
What is still provisionally called “writing”, as Derrida (1976: 4) proposes, is the 
wandering o f a “way o f thinking that is faithful and attentive to the ineluctable world 
of the future which proclaims itself at present, beyond the closure of knowledge”. 
Writing, as a possible guide o f the future anterior, is what goes beyond the extension 
of symbolic (phonetic-alphabetic, the language o f words, logocentrism) language. It 
is what transcends the discursive totality of the symbolic horizon as a system of 
signified truth (recognised in its dignity). As a result, writing signals a certain 
exteriority that goes beyond the confines of the privileging o f logos, beyond the
1 The neologism “cixouscience” is used by Eric Prenowitz (3997b: 248) to describe the “exquisite 
extravagance” at the heart of Helene Cixous’s writing, the “carefree poetics of caring and freeing” that 
Cixous’s writing embodies, especially and even exceptionally. Cixous is a poet-thinker, a thinking- 
writer-poet, who inhabits the precinct or mantle of what Derrida (1976: 26) has termed the “thinker of 
writing” (as opposed to the philosopher of the book).
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parameters o f a ‘literal’ meaning attributed to it whereby the signifier would signify a 
finite verity, “eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos”. We 
however, as beings determined by the order of the symbolic, have no guarantee of 
access to this beyond and indeed, at least for now, rely on language o f the symbolic in 
order to conceive intelligibly. All that is available to/for us at this point in time is to 
interrogate the systematic (theocratic) solidarity of concepts and gestures of thought 
that we may rather fallaciously believe to be innocently separated. This would call for 
an unsettling o f the heritage to which concepts belong (totality, truth, evidence, 
essence, verisimilitude, empiricism, logic, meaning, presence, being, logos), though 
of course there is always the risk, the danger of “falling back within what is being 
deconstructed”. The oblique and perilous movement o f deconstruction is an attempt 
to mark the conditions and the limits o f the efficacy of concepts, while also 
attempting to designate or allude to the crevice through which the yet unnameable 
glimmers beyond symbolic closure. In this way, deconstruction draws attention to the 
formidable difference in writing, to differance writing, which cannot be reduced to a 
form of presence nor recognised as the object of a science. The advent of writing in 
differance signals the advent o f the play o f the signifier on the fringes which in turn 
effaces “the limit starting from which one had thought to regulate the circulation of 
signs, drawing along with it all the reassuring signifieds”. Differance writing disrupts 
the ideal synthesis o f  significations of metaphysical truth, of “reason thought within 
the lineage o f logos”, o f all determined endeavours to reappropriate presence and 
irreducible difference within the horizon o f absolute knowledge (of logos) or the 
metaphysics o f the proper (Derrida, 1976: 15; 14; 7; 10).
Differance writing indicates a certain spacing as writing, a horizontally of spacing, 
which opens up writing to the exorbitance o f its other, to a writing “without the line”, 
between the lines through volumes. Beginning to write without the line, to write 
differently, as Derrida (1976: 86-87) suggests, implies beginning to read differently, 
to take into account a different organisation o f time-space, and also to think 
differently because “what is thought today cannot be written according to the line”. 
Thinking about spatial pluri-dimensionality and delinearised temporality (for writing)
requires leaving the continuous line behind for a blank a musical petition
(Cixous, 2002: 188). It requires a type of thinking that, as Helene Cixous (1988: 142) 
proposes, gestures towards a thinking in poetic overflowing , a thinking that does
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not proceed in a restrictive manner, a poetic thinking that “may summon us with a 
larger appeal, and hence greater allure, upon a way of thought that tracks in thought 
what is most thought-provoking” (Heidegger, 1993b: 377). For Cixous (2002: 187; 
194), the poet is not only someone who writes (makes) poems, but also one who 
considers what is outside the logos -  “poets before poetry” who consider the limitless 
realms of language including silence, the body and so on2. One of the mysteries of 
writing, o f language, is that what is written underneath the ground, underneath the 
surface level (while we write or weave something on the surface) is an elsewhere 
“where language goes on weaving kinds o f effects of meaning, of music, and so forth 
which we don’t know o f ’. This elsewhere (of writing), this ‘poem’, designates 
something that refuses appellation, a wordless, nameless “starry wandering about 
which we sense, without ever seeing it, the presence of an order other than our own” 
(Cixous, 1998: 5). What I have (tentatively, cautiously, under erasure) named 
[(re)called] the ‘third aesthetic’ (and its remains in the ‘O-Function’) alludes to an 
other energetic movement o f time-space that indicates a world which is a world in 
itself, something that is “not o f this world, our own, the visible” (Cixous, 1998: 5), 
an other world, a world that is a world that is other, or perhaps even the un-wor(l)d or 
non-wor(l)d within the world. The endeavour to name and describe the third aesthetic 
is effectively an attempt to think the unthinkable, the unthought3, which for Cixous 
(1993: 38) is precisely what thinking is -  “thinking is trying to think the unthinkable” 
-  just as “writing is writing what you cannot know before you have written: its is 
preknowing and not knowing, blindly, with words”. To think the unthinkable, a 
seeming contradiction in terms, requires a “thinking in preparation” (Cixous, 1989: 
38), the “thinking o f tolerance, the thinking that does not sever, the thinking capable 
of concavity, o f turning in on itself to make room for difference” (Cixous, 1997: 83). 
For Cixous (1991: 161), this approach to thinking does not reject the uncertainties of
2 Elsewhere, Cixous (1991: 114) writes about the poet who “must have thoroughly rubbed and 
exhausted one’s eyes in order to get rid of the thousands of scales we start with from making up our 
eyes” -  “I call ‘poet’ any writing being who sets out on this path, in quest of what I call the second 
innocence, the one that comes after knowing, the one that no longer knows, the one that knows how not 
to know”.
3 The notion o f the unthought (bearing in mind Bollas) may take on numerous variations and meaning 
possibilities. It may signal what has not (yet) been thought (and thus what is still to be thought), or 
perhaps what cannot be thought. The ‘un’ may also signal the unconscious of thought. For Blanchot 
(1992: 56), the “not yet” o f thought indicates “the failure of the present in regard to what there would 
be to think”. In all these instances o f the unthought or “not yet” thought, there is a movement away 
from thought in service o f a Cartesian instrumentality to thought that calls into question, to a thinking 
that is questioning as opposed to mere calculation.
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who and where; it is a thinking where one does not necessarily know, where one 
learns knowing how not to know” which is not equated with not knowing but rather 
with knowing how to avoid getting closed in by the hegemony and edifice of the 
logos. It is truly a thinking that is an “apprenticeship o f humility” (Cixous, 1997: 83), 
where “thought has textual space” (Calle-Gruber, 1997b: 144) and thinking raises 
questions about the limits o f knowledge.
Derrida (1976: 93) following Heidegger suggests that “thinking is what we already 
know we have not yet begun”4. Indeed, Heidegger (1993b: 369-370) writes that we 
should be “ready to learn thinking” with the proviso that such learning is invariably 
accompanied by the admission that “we are not yet capable of thinking” because “in 
order to be capable o f  thinking, we need to learn it”. We are still not yet capable of 
thinking because in the case o f the unthought or the not-yet thought which refuses 
arrival, for example, thinking turns itself away and withdraws from us. As a result, in 
order to approach or gesture towards possible ways of thinking the unthought, we 
need to “learn only if we always unlearn at the same time” -  “we can learn thinking 
only if we radically unlearn what thinking has been traditionally”. For Heidegger, 
(1993b: 374; 377-378), what withdraws and refuses arrival, that which cannot or has 
not yet been transposed into the language that we speak, “may even concern and 
claim man more essentially than anything present that strikes and touches him -  
touches him in the surely mysterious way of escaping him by its withdrawal”. The 
way to learning thinking is a long and arduous journey where “we dare take only a 
few steps” which in turn takes us to “places that we must explore to reach the point 
where only the leap will help further” . The leap takes us abruptly to a place where 
everything is other and different, “so different that it strikes us as strange”. The 
abruptness signals a chasm’s edge where “what the leap takes us to will confound 
us”. Thinking is invariably confounding -  “all the more in proportion as we keep 
clear o f prejudice”. To keep clear o f prejudice, “we must be ready and willing to 
listen” since readiness “allows us to surmount the boundaries in which all customary 
views are confined, and to reach a more open terrain”. This more open terrain leads to
4 Elsewhere, Derrida (1981b: 44) suggests that what is called ‘thought’ should be placed in inverted 
commas because it is the “illusory autonomy of a discourse or a consciousness whose hypostasis is to 
be deconstructed”. ‘Thought’ is the effect of a differance of forces and it therefore calls into question 
the “deep-laid metaphysical prejudice whereby the values of truth and reason are equated with a 
privileged epistemic access to thoughts ‘in the mind of those presumed or authorised to know 
(Norris, 2004: xix)
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a thinking that remains unassuming because “its task is only of a preparatory, not of a 
founding character” (Heidegger, 1993c: 436). It is not a thinking that espouses 
through writing an absolute knowledge or ultimate evidence. Instead, it is a thinking 
that goes beyond mere calculation to deepen meditation, a thinking that moves from a 
thinking that merely represents or explains to a “thinking that responds and recalls” 
(Heidegger, 1971: 181). It is a thinking that “cannot be thought without thinking the 
retention of difference”, without thinking difference in remains/reserve (Derrida, 
1976: 46).
Thinking the poetics of the unthought, reminiscent of Bion (1962) in his essay “A 
Theory of Thinking”5, requires another economy of thinking that remains responsive 
to the horizon of the unthought which continually withdraws. This other approach to 
thinking, as Bray (2004: 46-47) suggests, opens up a space that is not restricted by the 
logic of exchange, but is rather “fecund, poetic, maternal” in which the gift of the 
other as unthought operates through the currents o f metonymical movement, creating 
“pools o f significant silence which nourish thought”. For Kristeva (1986b), thought in 
exile from itself, in excess o f itself (alluding to what is not-yet thought, to the music 
of silence), thought as dissidence, as difference, attempts to conjure up, to intimate 
towards, the impossible possibility o f the unnameable, the unrepresentable. It is a way 
of surviving in the face of the dead father, o f refusing to give in to the law of death, 
of refusing to bind oneself to A Meaning guaranteed by the logos o f the dead father. 
Unthought-thought is “paradoxical thought that has no name but resides at the border 
of an art of living and a mode o f writing”. It thinks both with and beyond language in 
the sense that it thinks (rather uneasily through language) what cannot necessarily be 
captured by the dictates of magisterial logocentrism. It alludes to the “distant horizon 
to which thought gains access when it tries to think of itself at the borders” (Kristeva, 
2002: 115; 260). The challenge of thinking-writing the unthought of the third 
aesthetic poses the problem o f thinking-writing the process o f fluid experience that is 
in large part secret and that refuses to yield to the division and reduction of symbolic 
language. It ideally requires, as Kristeva (2002: 252) suggests, a “state of writing, 
outside the rough draft: a sort of timelessness (since the rough draft, when its hour
5 In this essay, Bion (1962) regards thinking as dependent on the development of thoughts. Thinking is 
an apparatus called into existence to cope with thoughts.
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tolls, will settle me into a temporality of production)”6. This state o f writing is 
accompanied by (musical) notes -  a pre-rough draft of fleeting traces that will have 
taken place in a future-to-come prior to the authority of logocentric knowledge. It is 
in a sense “before books, inside of writing” where the eventual unfolding o f words 
will be held out in the other’s direction (Cixous, 1989: 46). It is an attempt to allude 
to a “reality prior to my language (which) exists as an unthinkable thought” 
(Lispector, 1988: 169) - an unthinkable thought that seems authorless and that “frees 
itself from the slavery o f the word” (Lipsector, 1989: 76). Here, the “silence is such, 
that thought no longer thinks” (Lispector, 1992: 85), and “thinking is not what we 
think” (Cixous, 1998: 35).
Cixous (cited in MacGillivray, 1994: xi) proposes that the act o f writing itself 
concerns writing the unwritable, the unthinkable, the “almost impossible to write”. To 
write is to enter into a difficult relationship with language, but this is not without its 
pleasure because as Barthes (1975: 6) suggests, writing can be “the science of the 
various blisses of language, its Kama Sutra” whereby language is redistributed 
according to other mobile and dilatable/dilatory edges, a teeming flux always ready to 
assume different contours. The pleasure o f writing is an attempt to shift discourse and 
“to give it the shock of a question” that refuses to take shelter in a centred system of a 
philosophy o f meaning. Barthes regards this shock of a question as pleasure, though 
he draws the reader’s attention to the “two policemen ready to jump on you” for 
linking the question o f writing to pleasure -  “the political policeman and the 
psychoanalytical policeman: futility and/or guilt, pleasure is either idle or vain, a class 
notion or an illusion” (Barthes, 1975: 64; 47). Writing through language can be the 
colliding with prosodic rhythms which “unsettles the reader’s historical, cultural, 
psychological assumptions, the consistency of his tastes, values, memories, (and) 
brings to a crisis his relation with language”. It can be the “relish for language....an 
element o f the art o f living”, as opposed to a mere “instrument o f decor 
(phraseology)” (Barthes, 1975: 14; 38). Continuing on from this frame between the 
lines, I would like in this chapter to imagine what type of approach to writing, at least
6 Kristeva (2002: 253) regards the rough draft as an “artisanal stage”, the intermediary passage or 
interval from experience to text where the choice of words and construction of phrasing begins to take 
form.
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in theory given that I am writing about writing7, would be needed to think-write- 
consider-negotiate the impossible possibility of the non-concept. I would like to 
attempt to speculate (speculate being the operative word since I am speculating on 
writing that forms part o f the domain of the unexpected future-to-come) on a possible 
orientation to writing needed to explore and delineate the non-concept. The chapter 
will thus necessarily be more experimental and utopian in its aspirations, and as a 
result there is the possibility that it may end up privileging a certain type of ‘good’ 
writing. The affirmation of an almost ideal(istic), utopian speculative, a fantastical 
imagining o f textual aspiration, alludes to an endeavour to consider an alphabet 
(primarily conceptually for now given our dependence on symbolic language) that 
may gesture towards the non-concept and facilitate a more productive negotiation of 
its intricacies. For Barthes (1977), the text is ultimately a utopia in that its semantic 
function attempts to make language signify insofar as it is declared impossible. The 
text hastens towards “a dreamed-of language whose freshness, by a kind of ideal 
anticipation, might portray the perfection o f some new Adamic world where language 
would no longer be alienated” (Barthes, 1968: 88). It should be stressed that this 
chapter is primarily a conceptual or ideas-based exploration of an approach to writing 
the non-concept. Nevertheless, the ideas themselves (for this writing) will demand a 
shift in register and representation (form) in order to approximate some of the 
complexity of what they are trying to gauge. Beginning with Derrida’s musings on 
psychical or dream writing, and moving through Cixous’s work on the poethics of 
writing and Barthes on the voluptuousness o f textuality, I would like to explore how 
these writers have endeavoured to evoke writing’s imaginary (im)possibilities 
through an approach that Cixous (1999b: 211) has identified as “philosophicopoetical 
meditations”, where one allows oneself to speak of writing in a more idealistic 
fashion, to let oneself “be carried off by the poetic word” though there is always the 
obligation or qualification that “my steed or my barge and my poetic body never do 
forget the philosophical rigour” (Cixous, 1984: 152). Finally, I will attempt to 
recapitulate (or possibly capitulate to) the central themes, that is to say the central 
aporias, o f the research project.
7 Writing about writing would be what Barthes (1977: 66) considers as “language to the second degree” 
whereby there is an attempt to reveal in any discourse the disposition or interplay o f its degrees. This 
disposition is ultimately infinite.
182
A Lithography Before Words
In his essay, “Freud and the Scene of Writing”, Derrida (1978: 199-200) suggests that 
there are elements in psychoanalysis that can only be uneasily contained within 
logocentric enclosures, and it is for this reason that during decisive moments of his 
itinerary, Freud resorts to metaphorical models that are not borrowed from spoken 
language, verbal forms or even phonetic writing, but rather from a script that is not 
subject to the spoken word and that does not transcribe living, full speech as present 
to itself. Moreover, it is this type of scriptural gesture that “opens up a new kind of 
question about metaphor, writing, and spacing in general”. Derrida refers specifically 
to Freud’s creation o f a mystic writing pad whereby the structure of the psychical 
apparatus is represented by a writing machine, by “a text whose essence is irreducibly 
graphic”. Derrida is not concerned with whether this metaphor o f the writing machine 
is a good one, but rather, more critically, with questions that pertain to what psychical 
writing may come to mean, what the psyche must be if it is to be represented by a 
text, and what type o f relationship must there be between psyche, writing and spacing 
in order for such a metaphoric transition to be possible. The mystic writing pad (the 
Wunderblock, the bloc magique) proceeds towards a configuration of traces which, 
for Derrida, “can no longer be represented except by the structure and functioning of 
writing” that refuses any appropriation into a simple presence. It alludes to the 
problems of the psychic apparatus in its structure and to the problems of the psychic 
text in its fabric. Writing signifies a structure which is always already inhabited by 
the trace8, and it is therefore rendered as a broader concept when compared to the 
empirical concept o f writing which denotes a system of notations on material 
substance (Spivak, 1976). Nonetheless, writing in its normal sense, as Johnson (1993) 
points out, remains a model for this other ‘writing’ which is its condition. This other 
type of writing, which Derrida (1978: 207-209) links to topographical, temporal and
8 The notion of writing as being haunted by the trace signals, as Blanchot (1992: 17) suggests, the 
“search for what was never written in the present, but in a past to come”. For Kristeva (2000: 194) 
following Barthes, writing does not offer itself to the immediate and therefore needs to be interpreted 
through the immediate, next to the appearance of signs and in addition to what is named. It is the 
“inexhaustible aspect of meaning” accessible only through infinite interpretation that alludes to the 
locus of meaning without necessarily naming it. Writing suggests, in short, translinguistic meanings 
(traces) that are never verbalised in the categories of (symbolic) language. It is, as Norris (1991) 
suggests, an endless dissemination or displacement of meaning that goes beyond the reach of stable, 
self-authenticating knowledge, and it proliferates a shadow which falls between intent and meaning, 
utterance and understanding.
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formal regression in dreams, is a path which leads us back into a landscape of writing 
-  “not a writing which simply transcribes, a stony echo of muted words, but a 
lithography before words: metaphonetic, nonlinguistic, alogical”. It is a writing that 
displaces or disseminates into a “web of silent script”, a “forest o f script”, and thus 
problematises a certain kind of cryptography that makes use o f a decoding method in 
which each sign can be translated into another sign which has a known, discrete and 
specific meaning. This other writing as psychical writing “puts words on stage 
without becoming subservient to them”. It remains irreducible to speech and includes, 
like hieroglyphics, pictographic, ideogrammatic and phonetic elements9. Moreover, it 
cannot be read in terms of a code, even though it works with a mass o f elements that 
have been codified in the course o f an individual or collective history. It inscribes an 
irreducible “idiomatic residue” in its operations, lexicon and syntax. Psychical 
writing, which prefigures the meaning of writing in general, alludes to a kind of 
‘primary’ writing where the difference between the signifier and the signified is never 
radical. While it is “made to bear the burden of interpretation”, it eludes an exhaustive 
or absolutely infallible code of deciphering, of translation, which would permit the 
substitution or transformation o f signifiers while retaining the same originary 
signified. If there is the (impossible) possibility for psychical writing, then it must 
produce the space and materiality o f the signifier itself. Perhaps the attempt to 
reinscribe or reinstate materiality and spatiality may manifest itself as poetry10, 
revolutionary poetic language as Kristeva (1984) would suggest11; however there is 
the need to take into account that such an endeavour may merely translate into yet 
another metaphor about the metaphor of psychical (other) writing.
9 Johnson (1993) points out that the hieroglyph should not be regarded as a dead symbol waiting 
decipherment. Instead it should be seen from the point of view of its production whereby it is the figure 
of a process of writing rather than a static script, and this process is effectively invisible.
10 For Cixous (1994b: lvi), poetry procures for us a beyond of language -  “that which the poem makes 
us hear, its own music plus the echo of that music”. The poem signals not only a certain interiority, its 
message or content-meaning, but also “this beach, this bank, this shore, between its music and silence. 
Poems are surrounded by silence”.
11 As a reminder, Kristeva (2002: 106) suggests how the “germination o f meaning before signification” 
can be found in the “vibration of poetry and in the pleasure of style, the ultimate index o f feeling- 
thinking subjectivity”. Here Kristeva refers to the rhythmic and melodic semiotic modality of language, 
a pre-language prior to the child’s acquisition o f language. This semiotic modality, distinct from a 
symbolic modality with it signs and syntax, makes itself manifest in the vocalisations, rhythm and 
alliteration that the adult savours in poetic language. It is a “state of language”, a “precondition” and “a 
sort of atmosphere or tonality”.
184
The horizontal impossibility o f translating without loss the spatiality and materiality 
of the signifier, the idiom o f the scene of writing, finds its basis in the vertical 
impossibility of the psychic apparatus that refers to the transition of unconscious 
thoughts through the preconscious towards consciousness. For Derrida (1978: 211), 
there is a certain danger in the metaphoric concept o f translation or transcription in 
that it “presupposes a text which would be already there, immobile: the serene 
presence of a statue, of a written stone or archive whose signified content might be 
harmlessly transported into the milieu of a different language, that of the 
preconscious or the conscious”. In attempting to understand how unconscious thought 
makes its way through into consciousness, Freud (1991c: 710) suggests that one 
should not view it as “the forming of a second thought situated in a new place, like a 
transcription which continues to exist alongside the original; and the notion o f forcing 
a way through into consciousness must be kept carefully free from any idea o f a 
change of locality”. In this way, Freud attempts to address the conventional spatial or 
topographical representation o f the psychic apparatus by accounting for its energetics 
whereby the movement from the unconscious to consciousness does not imply a 
simple change o f location, nor that the unconscious thought and its conscious 
‘translation’ subsist in differing locations (Johnson, 1993). The conscious text is not 
a transcription because “there is no text present elsewhere as an unconscious one to 
be transposed or transported”. There is no unconscious truth that may be subject to 
rediscovery by virtue of having been written elsewhere because the unconscious text 
is not conceivable in terms of an originary form of presence, but rather is already a 
weave of traces, “a text nowhere present”. Therefore the transition to consciousness is 
not a transcription duplicating an unconscious writing as a derivative or repetitive 
writing (Derrida, 1978: 211). A formation present in the unconscious does not imply 
a definitive spatial or temporal delimitation (Johnson, 1993). The transition to 
consciousness, or what accedes to consciousness, in its very secondariness, remains 
originary and irreducible, and it is this transition, as Derrida (1978: 212-213) 
suggests, that is useful in considering the “possibility o f a writing advanced as 
conscious and as acting in the world (the visible exterior of the graphism)” in terms of 
a space of psychical writing, o f nontranscriptive writing that refutes the 
immobilisation and congealment o f energy within a “naive metaphorics of place”. 
Some kind o f simple metaphor of location cannot account for the components of 
energy in the functioning of the psychical apparatus. The impossible possibility of
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psychical writing, by necessity, must be accompanied by a radical rethinking of the 
spatiality or topology of this writing because the writing of psychical otherness is 
“not a displacement o f meanings within the limpidity o f an immobile, pregiven 
space” and cannot be understood in terms of a simple, homogenous structure. The 
energetics of this other writing cannot be coded without ceasing to be diaphanous; 
however this does not limit meaning but rather produces it and allows it to proliferate. 
Writing, as the spacing out o f meaning, does not obey the linearity of logical time, the 
time o f consciousness or preconsciousness, and thus the border between this 
psychical writing and “the space of the stage {scene) o f dreams” remains uncertain. It 
is a writing that alludes to the very “strangeness of the logico-temporal relations in 
dreams”, operating as a scene and not a tableau, a painting of signifiers that includes 
within itself spacing as difference (Derrida, 1978: 217), a virtualising o f space which 
signals its “detachment from purely empirical observation or determination” 
(Johnson, 1993: 85)12.
The scene of psychical writing assembles the diversity of the modes and functions of 
signs in dreams so that “every sign -  verbal or otherwise -  may be used at different 
levels, in configurations and functions which are never prescribed by its ‘essence’, 
but emerge from a play o f differences” (Derrida, 1978: 22). Freud (2001b: 177), for 
example, specifies that it seems “more appropriate to compare dreams with a system 
of writing than with language” whereby the interpretation o f a dream is “analogous to 
the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as Egyptian hieroglyphics”, 
and the “ambiguity of various elements of dreams finds a parallel in these ancient 
systems of writing”. Seeking out a space for writing otherwise entails finding a 
different writing space that is not some kind of “pure exterior without relation to 
itself’. Like the mystic writing pad, it is a writing that signifies “a depth without 
bottom, an infinite allusion”. It implicates infinite depth within meaning whereby 
writing is accounted for as a trace that indicates not only the “horizontal discontinuity 
o f a chain o f signs”, but also the “interruption and restoration o f contact between the 
various depths of psychical levels” -  the remarkably heterogeneous spatio- temporal 
fabric of the movement o f psychical permutations. It is a writing that signals neither
12 This notion is especially interesting in light of Cixous’s (1997: 27) suggestion that the dream does 
not cheat with metaphor - “In the dream there is a production which is necessary because it is dictated 
not by a wish or a consciousness o f writing but by the drama that is played out behind thought”.
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the continuity of a line nor the homogeneity of a volume, but instead it functions as a 
differentiated depth, as spacing in differance (Derrida, 1978: 222-224). Its 
maintenance, its present/ce (,maintenant), is not simple in that it is written only as we 
read-write and it cannot be exhausted by one discursive structure alone. “That which, 
in Freud’s discourse,”, as Derrida writes (1978: 228), “opens itself to the theme of 
writing results in psychoanalysis being not simply psychology -  nor simply 
psychoanalysis”. The scene o f psychical writing, caught up in a metonymy 
perpetually at work, indicates a beyond and beneath o f closure, what is spoken 
without being said, what is thought without being thought. It is written and 
simultaneously erased, “designating itself while indicating intraworldy relations”. It 
is, in short, “a writing without ink” (Derrida, 1978: 229) that signals what is “beyond 
the seen of writing”, beyond what is seen of writing in a naive and empirical 
conception o f it as present and open to decipherment. What remains pivotal is not the 
static scene of writing, but rather its dynamic mise en scene (Johnson, 1993: 91).
The Poethics of Writing: From (Closed) Work to (Open Work as) Text
All that falls under the umbrella-term ‘concept’, all that is subjugated and easily 
transmitted and picked up implies a certain stoppage, a loss and caging of an object or 
phenomenon that is “always in the process o f seething, o f emitting, of transmitting 
itself’13. A phenomenon in and o f itself is in reality, as Cixous (1997: 4) points out, a 
“small virtual volcano”, whereas the attempt at description or conceptualisation of 
this phenomenon invariably leads to a certain discontinuity or cut. This is not to 
anathematise conceptualisation, which remains at times indispensable in advancing 
understanding, but rather to highlight its prosthetic status and its caging tendencies 
(Cixous speaks o f it as a “dangerous aid”). There is however the possibility of 
opening up conceptualisation to writing that “chooses the interval space, the between, 
the in-between, the entredeux14', and that works in the place o f otherness” (Calle- 
Gruber, 1997: 8). This writing is a staging of otherness which launches us into a
13 Elsewhere, Cixous (1999b: 211) describes the phenomenon as the “tempest before the 
immobilisation, the capture, the concept. Where there is already the murmur of words but not yet 
proper-name-words. In the time when God is only yet a forename of God”. The phenomenon is the 
“still-boiling” space-time “before the cooled fall-out of the narrative when we feel and it is not yet 
called such-and-such, this, him or her”.
14 ‘Entredeux’ which translates literally as ‘betweentwo’ or perhaps ‘entertwo’ designates an in- 
between of space-time between two things, points or events (Prenowitz, 1997: 113).
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space-time whose coordinates may seem strange in that they “un-recount, un-know, 
un-arrive” (Cixous, 1997: 11). For Cixous (1997: 48), writing is always already in the 
modality of the ‘i f  or the ‘perhaps’ in that it is an extraordinary attempt to “x-ray- 
photo-eco-graph” the space-time of an encounter between two people and “to keep 
the record o f these invisible events” -  “If one could conserve the radiation of this 
encounter in a transparent sphere, and then listen to what is produced in addition to 
the exchange identifiable in the dialogue -  this is what writing tries to do”. Writing is 
an attempt to “hear the rumour o f a great number o f messages that are expressed in 
other ways” -  glances, tensions of the body, continuities and discontinuities. The 
scene of writing or rather its art as theatre is about endeavouring to make this 
invisible vast material, what is expressed otherwise, appear “at sentence-comers, with 
silences, with mute words; all that will not have been pronounced but will have been 
expressed with means other than speech -  and that can be taken up in the web of 
writing”. This web is situated in the “musical and silent environment of the text” 
(Cixous, 1997: 67-68) which produces effects in/through writing where phenomena 
start to self-signify “beyond the simple moment of vibration”, and reverberate 
through echoes of the body and foreign memories. It is a writing that is a “resonance 
chamber made of (the) silences” (Calle-Gruber, 1997: 69), a writing under the sign of 
“poethics” which opens up (gives to itselfgives itself to) a more broad spectrum of 
possibility that gestures towards the “quick o f life under the immurements” (Cixous, 
1997: 82). Poethics as writing is writing by the other for the text, a giving o f the 
word, a giving before the word as in a dream where the dream o f giving “carries 
between the two and beyond the two” to an in-between between the two. It allows the 
gift of the dream to breathe in writing, striding/striving towards the dream, advancing 
on the dream, giving oneself up to it, in advance, while bearing in mind the 
ineluctability of the interpretation-interruption o f the dream -  a certain separation that 
tightens and compresses the dream (Derrida, 1997: 120).
The poethics o f writing initiates a “searching for the names o f the shadows between 
words” (Cixous cited in Calle-Gruber, 1997b: 153), and it is thus an approach of 
“pushing back forgetfulness, o f never letting oneself be surprised by the abyss. Of 
never becoming resigned or consoled”. It is a writing that is never entirely or 
absolutely read and it refutes the possibility o f a conclusion because it always already 
remains to be studied, sought, invented. It gives one the “slow time” to approach the
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betweenus which is needed to open and leave space for the other, for what can only 
be written “in parentheses, as a subtitle”, for the impossible that “can’t be justified 
before a philosophical tribunal, can’t pass the bar of monological discourses or mass- 
mediatised imaginations”. It is what works against our time of the “flat thought-
screen, of newspaper-thinking” (Cixous, 1991: 3; 62; 146; 62), evoking a writing
/
within writing, a dream-writing that returns to writing “that link, that growth, that 
orientation” that alludes to “the stream, the slender silent stream with its singing 
arms, the blood flow in the veins between bodies, the wordless dialogue from blood
to blood the magic flux full o f silent words from the other shore” (Cixous,
1998: 3). The poethics o f writing is an attempt to reformulate existing structures 
through an inclusion o f otherness that refuses to appropriate or annihilate difference 
and instead brings into existence “alternate forms of relation, perception and 
expression” (Sellers, 1994: xxix), and the possibility for an “alternative economy of 
writing and representation” (Shiach, 1991: 39; 68). It exceeds the logic of the binary, 
proffering an “elsewhere” that inscribes “beyond genres and oppositions, where the
real is not definable by an opposite  where, in the plureal, the other place to
come announces itself’. This other place in plureal is what alludes to the threshold of 
the infinite, though as Cixous points out, it is still too early in history to succeed in 
getting there as it remains to be invented on the basis of transformations of thought 
structures that govern Occidental society- “This change is not definable now, within 
our discourse. But it announces itself, outside everything: opposition, aggression, 
enslavement” (Cixous, 1994: 28-33). It is what cannot be appropriated and captured 
‘Tinder the Empire o f the Selfsame” since it ineluctably admits that there is a 
passageway into alterity where an in-between, a space between, inscribes the 
“paradoxical logic o f an economy without reserve” which exceeds sameness through 
difference/ differance, and makes another way of knowing circulate. The poethics of 
writing, in its search for the plureal, affirms that ‘There will be some elsewhere where 
the other will no longer be condemned to death”. It affirms where desire makes a 
certain fiction, a certain virtuality, exist, and it taps into the “uncontrollable 
resources” of writing which “deals with the no-deal, relates to what gives no return”. 
The something (as no-thing) elsewhere can be alluded to with “some love....that 
imposes its necessity as a value without letting itself be intimidated by cultural 
blackmail, the sacrosanction o f social structures” (Cixous, 1986b: 79; 86; 97).
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The poethics o f writing is a writing that “makes love other”. It is permeated with/by 
signs of love. Cixous speaks about the “other-love” as “writing’s first name”, where it 
“dares the other” and, through difference, it refuses to be “shut up inside the paradox 
of the gift-that-takes or in the illusion of onely uniting”15. It is a writing through the
exchange of other-love, a gesture of (m)other love, a “desire-that-gives in moving,
open, transitional space”. It “betweens where one is always infinitely more than
one” (Cixous, 1986b: 99-100). It is a writing that comes “with an angel’s footsteps”,
like “humid silent music going up and down with ancient angels’ footsteps along
the ladder of writing”, where the feet morph into blood and unfreeze the “glacial air 
blowing around the words”. It is a poethics as writing that alludes to the “gardens of 
Encounters, silent at the opening o f memory, before all oblivion-memory” where “all 
is hieroglyph” in this “immensity of the infinite”. It pertains to “all (that) writes, 
about two thousand years before books” where in-between there is “only this river” 
(Cixous, 1989: 10; 62; 48; 70; 68), To admit to this writing is, as Cixous (1981: 254) 
suggests, to work “(in) the in-between, inspecting the process o f the same and o f the
other the ensemble of the one and the other, not fixed in sequences of struggle and
expulsion or some other form o f death but infinitely dynamised by an incessant 
process o f exchange from one subject to another...a multiple and inexhaustible 
course with millions of encounters and transformations of the same into the other and 
into the in-between”. It is a writing that carries rather than contains and is able to 
stand and tolerate (as opposed to arrest) the other’s freedom so that the other is 
approached with a loving fidelity (attention) that lets it come into writing without 
capture, mastery and appropriation. This loving fidelity opens up thought by keeping 
alive the wonderful gift o f the other in its perpetual strangeness through an 
exploration and working through o f the ethical potentials o f the in-between or the 
liminal.
To consider the impossible possibility of a poethics o f writing is to consider a radical 
reconceptualisation o f the frame of a work which segues into a “spiritual glory” of a 
fabric of words. It is an interweaving o f tissue that subverts the notion o f a written 
object whose meaning is “univocal, and definitive, determined by the correctness of
15 Lie (1999: 8) describes this type of writing as a “flooding forth, a gift without any demand of a 
return, a real gift which will not create dependence, but freedom”. It is a writing that is “both process 
and gift, process as gift (without return)” (Manners, 1999: 156).
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the signs which carry it”. The frame of the text (as a work) can no longer be 
considered as a sealed unit whose closure arrests meaning and “prevents it from 
trembling or becoming double, or wandering”. It is not what “closes the work, chains 
it to its letter, rivets it to its signified”, but rather a fragment o f language that calls 
into question the status and usage of its language which cannot be considered as a 
mere instrument or as purely transparent. Effectively, the poethics o f writing would 
necessitate a shift from a work as a computable, finished object to a work as text 
which “can exist only through a language other than itself’ (Barthes, 1981: 32-33; 
40). Indeed, Barthes (1989: 57-60) suggests that while the work is held in the hand, 
the text is held in/through language. The text signals a mutation, an epistemological 
shift from the work as a “fragment of substance” (the format o f the book and its 
position/portion in space through socio-historical determinations) to that which is in 
production and does not stop (at a library shelf, for example)16. Its constitutive 
moment is one of traversal, functioning, in activity, behind the limit o f the doxa, as
/  7always paradoxical . The text refuses to close upon a signified, and instead 
“practices the infinite postponement of the signified” where its field is dilatory, that 
of the play o f the signifier’s infinitude, which is caught up by serial movements of 
dislocations and variations -  the currents of metonymy. The irreducible plurality of 
the text depends on the passage and traversal of dissemination (and not on an 
interpretation, however liberal and polysemic), on “the stereographic plurality o f the 
signifiers which weave it (etymologically, the text is a fabric)”, as opposed to a mere 
“ambiguity of its contents”. It is what alludes to the multiple and irreducible, issuing 
from heterogeneous space-time dimensions whereby the “combinative operation” of 
encounters that are “half identifiable” and “issue from known codes” are rendered in 
difference/differance. Text can only be text in its difference as an echo o f a vast 
stereophonic texture. In considering the readability of Clarice Lispector’s text, The 
Stream o f  Life, Helene Cixous (1989b: ix), for example, suggests that “one may have 
to find other modes, other ways o f approaching it: one can sing it. One is in another 
world”. Indeed, she speaks o f “writing with one’s ears” (1997: 64), writing with “the
16 Derrida (1976: 18) would suggest that the work as book, which stops at the library shelf, refers to a 
totality profoundly alien to the sense o f writing. It is thus the “encyclopaedic protection of theology and 
logocentrism” against the disruption of writing and difference.
17 Barthes (1989: 58) considers doxa to be public opinion powerfully aided by mass communications 
and defined by its “energy of exclusion, its censorship”. It attempts to resist the plurality, the invasion 
of meaning which confers upon existence an infinite intelligibility which cannot be easily arrested or 
determined.
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heart of our ears”, writing with “ears o f meditation” (1989: 66; 18), whereby the 
rhythmic remains o f musicality in writing signals an architec(x)ture o f the mystery of 
difference in what is given to be read. The text of/in writing keeps the “closest- 
possible” to the “more than that” whereby the economy of the text, its woven 
construction, “makes heard” the “prolongations o f meaning”, the vibrations and 
resonance of silence (Cixous, 1997: 65).
The textuality o f a text alludes to the playing of language, on the order o f meaning, 
like a musical instrument (Cixous, 1997). It is productivity, the “very theatre o f a 
production” in that, even when written, “it does not stop working, maintaining a 
process of production”. The text works language by deconstructing the “language of 
communication, representation, or expression (where the individual or collective 
subject may have the illusion that he is imitating something or expressing himself)”. 
It alludes to “another language, voluminous, having neither bottom nor surface”. Its 
space is the mobile play of signifiers that pluralises “the mono logical, legal status of 
signification” by transforming the level of the product o f signification into the 
production of an other logic of signifiance. Signifiance is not a work which 
demonstrates the mastery of language, but rather a “radical work” which leaves 
nothing intact and signals a “without-endness”. It invokes the notion of “an infinite 
labour (of the signifier upon itself)” so that it refutes the notion o f a finished structure 
and promotes a massive overflowing. Signifiance is the “text at work”, the “glow, the 
unpredictable flash o f the infinites of language”, which is “either overflowed or 
overlaid by a plurality of logics other than mere predicative logic”. Its signifying 
work, its signifying overflow, “closely resemble(s) the dream-work” whereby what 
the dream-work and the text-work have in common is their “labour outside exchange, 
inaccessible to calculation” (Barthes 1981: 36-41). Signifiance subverts the
constraints of the traditional ideology o f meaning -  verisimilitude, readability,
expressivity -  by puncturing or perforating its discourse without rendering it
meaningless. It is an overcoming, an undoing that “communicates to its reader a
strange condition: at once excluded and at peace”, and it opens out (between) to a 
“passage from another language, like the exercise o f a different physiology”18. The
18 Barthes (1977: 50; 58; 66-67) even writes about a “third language language upon language”
which scatters signifieds to infinity, to “no last word”. In this way, any language -  as word, proposition 
or idea -  that assumes a set and solid state, any language that is stereotyped (in Greek, stereos means
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text in signifiance, its edges and seams, remains unpredictable and “irregular (in the) 
pattern of its veins” (Barthes, 1975: 29-30; 37). It espouses “floating meanings”, 
“volumes o f meaning, not lines o f meaning” (Barthes, 2004: 27), which proliferate 
metaphors (in profusion) without reducing them to a final signified, to a final and 
absolute secret to be revealed. There is an (ideal) attempt to access “a meaning bathed 
in light, as in a dream” where what is perceived is the excess of a situation, the more- 
than-that. (Barthes, 1977: 80).
The text in signifiance is an attempt to hear the “thrill o f meaning” that corresponds 
to an elsewhere that collapses into in-significance and remains fluid and “shuddering 
with a faint ebullition”. It is punctuated by an “enormous and perpetual rustling” 
which animates the possibility o f meanings that never assume the “definitive form of 
a sign grimly weighted by its signified”. The solidity of meaning gives way to the 
endeavour to listen to what one is excluded from, to what is complex and ineffable, to 
what floats without being pigeonholed, to the “signifier taking up the place of every 
signified”. The writing of the work as text is a writing in perpetual production and 
unconditional dispersion where the words flung upon the page can no longer halt. 
There is a working against what flattens, banalises and codifies through the medium 
or ambience o f horizontality that alludes to the exorbitant play of the signifier in 
metonymy (Barthes, 1977: 97-98; 129). The signifiance o f text is what threads its 
way through the “rigidness of concepts”, enchanting in a mode o f writing sensitive to 
silence and the impossibility or profusion of meaning, the abyss o f a dissemination of 
meaning (Kristeva, 2000: 187). Writing is what is always already inhabited by the 
trace and it is thus rooted in something beyond symbolic language. It “develops like a 
seed, not like a line” and “holds the threat o f a secret”, a secret (pre-symbolic) 
elsewhere foreign to symbolic language, where the “weight of a gaze conveying an 
intention is no longer linguistic”. It is “ceaselessly fascinated by zones of infra- or 
ultra-language” that intimate something (as no-thing) translinguistic and pre-
solid, and Barthes regards the stereotype as the emplacement of discourse where the body is missing), 
is abandoned. As mentioned, Barthes is concerned with revealing “that of the degrees of language”, the 
interplay o f degrees, whereby there is an attempt to expose in any statement “the disposition of its 
degrees”. This disposition is infinite and it opens up a certain abyss in each word - ‘the madness of 
language”. Barthes views this opening up to the abyss as necessary ‘to  break down the infatuation of 
our statements, the arrogance of our science”.
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symbolic, pre-figurable and pre-objectal (Barthes, 1968: 20)19. Writing is an other 
dimension of meaning that emanates through language from the regions of meaning 
before signification. It is an other scene that “dissolves apparent meaning and 
apprehends writing as negativity: an endless refraction and reformulation of the 
system of language” (Kristeva, 2000: 214). It is an attempt to gesture towards a 
“language” in quotation marks that is not a language of signs, but rather of “true 
foreignness, more foreign than any already established idiom”. In this way, as 
Kristeva (2002: 249; 259) suggests, there is an attempt to think-write meaning not as 
a structure but rather as a process which takes into consideration not only signs and 
their syntactic and logical concatenations, but also what pertains to ‘"things having to 
do with the transverbal” -  rhythms, melodies, scansions -  a certain presyntactic, 
semiotic musicality. Given of course the limitations o f the symbolic condition, this 
semiosis is not independent o f language but rather, for the subject o f the symbolic, an 
effect in or through language -  what “interferes with language and, under its 
domination, articulates other arrangements of meaning, which are not significations, 
but rhythmic, melodic articulations”.
The rigour of the process of writing through meaning becomes indistinguishable from 
its productivity, its signifiance, its “performative fecundity”. This rigour intimates 
suppleness, as opposed to a rigidity, which makes the text yield  (to) a dissemination 
of meaning, a flow of hybridisation, which suggests a metonymic operation where the 
uncoded beyond belongs to the framed space of the text (as a haunting) without 
belonging to it. This spectral power of the “subtle beyond” is not entirely subjugated 
to a concept that espouses a distinct and predicative determination. The “concept o f a 
ghost is as scarcely graspable in its self (en personne) as the ghost of a concept”. For 
Derrida (2001b: 40), speciality, the concept of ghosts, the ghosts of a concept, 
implies the concept o f the other in the same, a relationship o f haunting that may 
perhaps be constitutive o f every ‘logic’. In this way, the text is comprised of traces 
and remains of writing marked by a spectral logic (of living/haunting on). The text is
19 This notion is particularly interesting in light of Blanchot’s (1982: 33) suggestion that writing is 
entering into “the affirmation of the solitude in which fascination threatens”. Indeed, to write is to let 
“fascination rule language”, to “stay in touch, through language, in language, with the absolute milieu 
where the thing becomes image again, where the image, instead of alluding to some particular feature, 
becomes an allusion to the featureless, and instead of form drawn upon absence, becomes the formless 
presence of this absence, the opaque, empty opening onto that which is when there is no more world, 
when there is no world yet”.
194
not a finished corpus o f writing, some content enclosed in the margins of a book, but 
rather a “differential network, a fabric of traces referring endlessly to something other 
than itself, to other differential traces”. The text overruns any assignable limits by 
making them more complex through dividing and multiplying strokes and lines, as 
opposed to submerging the limits in an undifferentiated homogeneity (Derrida, 1979: 
84). The text thus calls into question the way one thinks about limits, margins, 
frames, boundaries and borderlines, and inscribes ghostliness in the very structure of 
signification (Royle, 2003b). It takes meaning by tangents, in overflow, and thus 
always already does and says more, so that it is not a finished product, but rather 
process itself - traces traced in the ash of “a scene of writing that has since gone up in 
flames” (MacGillivray, 1998: x). The text o f writing is a tapestry that weaves itself in 
a horizontal manner so that what is given to the text is the chance to take its time to 
make sense, and “sometimes to send meaning quite far off in an afterthought” 
(Cixous, 1989c: 15). If the text always says something more than it intends to say, 
then it is necessary to consider that the text will say more than the author wants to 
express or believes s/he expresses (Cixous, 1988). Indeed, the text in writing is not 
necessarily what is proper to authorial/authoritative intentionality because the text 
“gives itself where by definition there is no property -  but rather expropriation, 
dispossession without end” (Calle-Gruber, 1997b: 140). The author-writer can never 
be in full control o f the medium or meaning o f his/her text because the language that 
the writer writes with cannot be dominated absolutely (Derrida, 1976). “It is language 
which speaks, not the author”. Barthes (1989: 50; 61) suggests that while the work is 
caught up in a process o f filiation in that the author is reputed to be the father of 
his/her work (respect for the manuscript and the author’s declared intentions, the 
postulated legality of the author’s relation to his/her work -  “author’s rights”) 20, the 
text can be read without the Father’s inscription, without the Father’s guarantee. The 
metaphor of the work as an image of an organism that grows by vital expansion and 
development can be replaced by the metaphor of the text as an expansive network of 
combinative (metonymic) operations that proliferate an overdetermined plurality. It is 
not that the author cannot return to his/her text, but if s/he does so, then his/her 
inscription should not be privileged or paternal but rather indicate a certain ludic 
quality, an entering into the play of the signifiers. The process o f the text functions
20 Barthes (1989: 52) writes that that the author is supposed to have “the same relation o f antecedence 
with his work that a father sustains with his child”.
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transgressively by dispersing the empire o f the author as the centre, limit and 
guarantor of truth and a priori meaning21. It is not comprised o f a line of words 
reflecting a single ‘theological’ meaning (the message of the Author-God), but 
instead it is a “multi-dimensional space in which are married and contested several 
writings” - writings which assiduously posit meanings in order to evaporate them. 
Writing refuses to confer upon the text an ultimate meaning, and in this way it can be 
said to be countertheological or “properly revolutionary” because “to refuse to halt 
meaning is finally to refuse God and his hypostases, reason, science, the law”. The 
subversion o f the site o f the Author’s empire leads to the opening up of the traces o f 
writing (Barthes, 1989: 53-54).
The Lover’s Discourse: Writing in the Thrall of the Impossible
The discernment of writing involves the realisation of a “nonsymmetrical division” 
which designates on the one hand the closure of the book as a theological 
encyclopaedia, and on the other the opening o f the text in the fabric of its traces 
without return. For Derrida (1978), the question of writing, the beyond of the book, 
can only be opened up if the book is opened out to an expenditure without reserve, to 
a wandering without return. The text always already indicates something other, an 
elsewhere, which dispossesses the author of his/her narrative continuity and 
intentionality (Barthes, 1977). The demand of writing is such that there is excess even 
with respect to what the author can understand o f what s/he writes because writing 
insists that play and indetermination be left to signify “hospitality for what is to come 
(.I ’avenir)” (Derrida, 2001: 31). The text is an appeal o f the future, an “opening 
towards the non-determinability o f the future”, which overflows, through writing, any 
kind of ontological determination as present to itself. If the text is an “irruption o f a 
future”, an ethic of hospitality which allows for an opening of the other-to-come, then 
it is necessary to consider that it cannot be consumed immediately because a “certain 
zone of disacquaintance, o f not-understanding, is also a reserve and an excessive 
chance -  a chance for excess to have a future, and consequently to engender new 
contexts”. There is the possibility for a textual scenario where “one does not know
21 Derrida (1976: 68) has suggested that “writing can never be thought under the category o f the 
subject” even though it is endowed and modified by consciousness and the unconscious. It is always 
“other than the subject” in that the subject does not necessarily have lull control over the movement of 
writing in differance.
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what it means yet, one will have to start again, to return, to go on” (Derrida, 2001: 20; 
30-31). This indicates, as Cixous (1989c: 1) suggests, a writing that is a question of 
unknown truths, where truth is not necessarily equated with knowledge and 
consciousness, but rather it is a question of writing that makes its way in the darkness, 
into a realm where one does not know, where one cannot know or ascertain for sure, 
where one presages and seeks to translate or transpose into words what has been 
“written in fevers, in heartbeats, in luminous songs”. To write as a question of 
writing, a “question that bears the writing that bears the question”, is to no longer 
allow oneself an unshakeable relation with the being o f order, certainty and “any form 
of taking root”. It is to introduce the thought of the limit, the impossible-to-think (of 
the not-yet thought), the “never and always accomplished crossing o f the limit”, a 
certain overstepping or rupturing, into the scene of writing (Blanchot, 1992: 2; 27). 
Writing about the third aesthetic, for example, can never be entirely accomplished in 
the present in that the attempt to write about the third aesthetic is an attempt to write 
about what ex-sists and thus about what has not taken place in the order o f the 
symbolic as such. Writing takes place precisely as place that transgresses every 
‘taking place’ so that to write, as Blanchot (1992: 55-56) proposes, is not to have 
written, but rather “to have always already written as that which will always write 
itself anew”. Here Blanchot refers to the ineluctable transcendent play o f traces which 
inscribe themselves within writing, through differance, and in spite o f what has been 
written. In this way, writing “carries away, tears away, through the plural dispersion 
of its practice, every horizon as well as every foundation”. The desired intention to 
write is subverted by the movement o f the always already o f the play of the traces of 
writing so that “whoever writes is exiled from writing, which is the country -  his own 
-  where he is not prophet” (Blanchot, 1995: 63). A text (of writing) indicates the 
“disappropriation of the author” whereby the writing is more powerful than the 
writer, and the writer cannot be aware of “all the effects in signifying” (Cixous, 2002: 
186).
The always already o f writing inscribes within what is written the not-yet o f thought, 
the movement of differance. For Blanchot (1995: 41-43), to write, to form where no 
form holds sway, is “to welcome the passive pressure which is not yet what we call 
thought”. The not-yet o f thought is in a sense “thought’s patience” which delicately 
waits at the outer edges where “truth no longer constitutes the principle to which it
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must finally submit”. The nontrue (which is not falsehood) draws knowledge out of 
the system of the symbolic into a time-space o f drifting “where knowledge, without 
passing into un-knowledge, no longer depends upon itself’, upon a precedence of 
imposed conditions that results or produces results. In this way, the domination of 
truth, the dictates o f the symbolic which wields and organises, gives way to an other 
space where “knowledge is no longer a knowledge o f truth”, but instead “a 
knowledge that bums thought, like knowledge of infinite patience”22. If  anything, the 
impossible possibility of writing the third aesthetic and its remains in what I have 
termed the O-Function, pushes knowledge to the far limits o f a fragility of cinders 
where at any moment understanding may cease or disappear, implode in upon itself, 
or perhaps at best there may be some precarious, tentative understanding without the 
possibility for reproduction. However, this latter position, which may seem foreign to 
us because we do not have the means of knowing any further, is also love according 
to Cixous (1997: 17) because “it is to find one has arrived at the point where the 
immense foreign territory of the other will begin”. There is a respect for this infinite 
foreignness, a “loving not knowing. Loving: not knowing” - a loving that relinquishes 
the desire to master and colonise through the bombast of knowledge. To consider the 
third aesthetic is to consider “what breathes between two people” (in this instance the 
mother and the infant). The difficulty lies in the fact that the third aesthetic is not a 
third term that rounds off into a triplicity or that espouses a trinitarian horizon. It is 
not “a block between two blocks” (Cixous, 1997: 53), but rather an exchange of 
intimacy arising from “with/« my unknowing (and not with out my knowing)” (Calle- 
Gruber, 1997: 86). It is what goes from one to the other, that which passes through 
one and the other, unseen and ungraspable, as only appearance can be seen not 
difference -  “the visible does not make the difference” (Cixous, 1997: 53). Difference 
is made in the liminal space between-us, in the ethics of the in-between.
The third aesthetic, a “myriad o f differential qualities” (Cixous, 1997: 53), is the 
infinitesimal and infinite space o f proximity o f the embrace o f the between-two, 
which in turn offers the gift o f  alterity that produces rather than reduces difference. In 
its description, the third aesthetic takes into account another spatio-temporality that 
ex-sists between the mother and the infant. As Lispector (1988: 90) puts it:
22 Derrida (2001c: 84) also speaks of this other (another) knowledge, “a knowledge without truth and 
without revelation”, where truth still seems to wait without its unveiling.
198
Between two musical notes there exists another note, between two facts there exists 
another fact, between two grains of sand, no matter how close together they are, there 
exists an interval o f space, there exists a sensing between sensing -  in the interstices 
of primordial matter there is the mysterious, fiery line that is the world’s breathing, 
and the world’s continual breathing is what we hear and call silence.
The third aesthetic is what is facilitated by the mother’s “in-finity o f empathy” with 
the other, with the infant in his/her responsiveness, which in turn “veils them in 
softness, in folds, in spaciousness”. It is what gestures in silence to the other where 
the “most profound intimacy becomes a protective veil” (Irigaray, 1993: 186; 196; 
191). It is what “dwells in the inappropriation of a silence” (Irigaray, 1999: 141). The 
challenge in attempting to explicate the third aesthetic and its remains in the O- 
Function lies in the attempt to translate this “luminosity (which) smiles in the air”, 
this silence, this intimacy, which becomes a ‘veil’ or perhaps that which lies beneath 
or behind or before the protective veil. As Lispector (1989: 71; 43) proffers with the 
following contemplation-question: “It’s so hard to speak and say things that cannot be 
said. It’s so silent. How do you translate the silence o f the real encounter between the 
two of us?” . For Derrida (2001c: 24-25), to let oneself be caught up in the “veil”, to 
take on the word “veil”, to be able to touch or see “that” which one calls “veil”, is to 
leave “nothing intact, safe and sound, neither in your culture, nor in your memory, 
nor in your language”. This dream of touching the infinity o f the ‘veil’ is a desire to 
seek out and maintain a relevant discourse that would touch-say what the veil shrouds 
properly, “even if it no longer gives anything to be seen”. However, the impossible 
endeavour of unveiling the veil, at least for now, turns out to be an un-veiling that still 
remains in the movement o f veiling whereby the unveiling as veiling proliferates yet 
another veil (shroud-metaphor) over and above the ‘veil’. What withdraws, as 
Heidegger (1993b: 382) suggests, “may remain as veiled as ever”.
Blanchot (1995: 87) writes that “there remains the unnamed in the name o f  which we 
keep stilF. This quote draws the reader’s attention to the aporetics o f naming a certain 
exterior that remains unqualifiable and unnameable within symbolic discourse. As a 
result, there is the need to remain assiduously reflexive of the problem in making use 
o f language to describe that which escapes its parameters. I think that Blanchot (1995:
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92) captures this dilemma of domesticating the strange and familiarising the foreign 
(through nomination and from a position of symbolic authority) in the following 
quotation:
One may well be suspicious of a language and o f thinking which must have 
recourse, in different forms, to negative qualifications in order to introduce questions 
heretofore held in reserve. We investigate un-power, but do we not do so from the 
vantage point o f power? We speak of the impossible, but do we not always say it is 
the outer limit, or the articulation, of possibility? We surrender to the unconscious, 
but without succeeding in separating it from consciousness except negatively. We 
carry on about atheism, which has always been a privileged way of talking about 
God.
If it were possible to escape the oppressiveness, the subordination of the binary 
(hidden with respect to manifest, latent with respect to the disclosed, absence with 
respect to presence), then it would be necessary to reconsider or re-evaluate the 
notion o f truth which could no longer be the “primary trait of all that presents itself’, 
but rather a “secondary privation” of a withdrawal or retreat or “silent secret” which 
is not destined for disclosure (Blanchot, 1995: 92). We still hanker after the 
determination o f a name-concept that would confer upon the thing or phenomenon its 
proper meaning, the determination o f its indetermination. As Helene Cixous (2004: 
5)”, in her inimitable style, puts it: “I don’t know the proper names -  I want them. I 
want their armorial bodies, I would like to be able to catch their varnished shells”. In 
reality however there is the likelihood that that which attempts to determine 
indetermination, the determinants that put indetermination into play (or 
indeterminants which thus determine), draw the saying-writing o f a certain exteriority 
further away from what wants to be said-written (Blanchot, 1995). “Everything I 
don’t know is in ‘X ’”, writes Lispector (1989: 65); “it would take a different 
sensibility to comprehend ‘X ’”. It would also take another ‘third term’ which does not 
yield to the synthesis of a binary dialectic. And it would also take the failure o f my 
language, or perhaps a language which overflows discursive limits.
A/The name cannot name the “punctual simplicity” o f a concept nor can it escape the 
risk o f metaphysical reappropriation/renomination which invariably, ineluctably,
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ensues. It is important to take into account how the striving for new names and 
concepts may reintroduce the very shortcomings or pitfalls that one has attempted to 
avoid (Derrida, 1981b: 71). Ultimately, as Derrida (2001: 67; 63) suggests, the proper 
name is “that which, in the language, is not part of the language, and is thus 
untranslatable”. The proper name means that “there has to be a ‘has to ’ by which I am 
disarmed before the pther”. There has to be a respect for the very ‘thing’ that remains 
untranslatable in the name, a certain “weakness before the ‘there has to be the other’” 
which passes through the existence (as what ex-sists) of proper names. This weakness 
however may transform itself into the greatest strength in that there is a certain ethical 
gesture of hospitality, a certain disarming quality in our relation to the other where we 
expose ourselves to what we cannot appropriate -  “the ‘has to ’ is always the 
recognition of what is stronger than I”. In attempting to facilitate a thesis in 
accordance with this ‘has to be the other’, with the other as the anterior future 
(Vavenir avant), with the other as the (messianic) advance on the future (■avenir), I 
have had to concede, like Derrida (1983: 42) in his opening presentation o f his thesis 
defence, that this research project has called for a different mode of writing that 
transforms the “staging and the particular discursive procedures, which, historically 
determined as they very much are, dominate university discourse, in particular the
9 ' X  •  •type of text that is called the ‘thesis’” . The writing of this project cannot necessarily 
conform to the format required traditionally for a thesis, for the “epoch of a thesis”, 
for the logic of thetic (re)presentation, for the “value of the thesis, o f positional logic 
and its history, and of the limits o f its rights, its authority and its legitimacy”. Instead 
it has required “a kind o f radical patience, a sort o f patience concerning every 
assumption of what is going on in any act of ‘fencing in’” (Royle, 2003b: 4). This 
patience for the “incalculable and unprogrammable, the un-fence-in-able” (Royle,
2003b: 5), this endurance with non-concepts like the ‘third aesthetic’ and the ‘O-
Function’, has in turn demanded the ‘has to ’ of a change in perception and conception 
o f space-time which “assumes and entails an evolution or a transformation of forms, 
o f the relations o f matter and form  and of the interval between” (Irigaray, 1993: 7). It 
has required a way that “give(s) up appropriating only a content o f discourse in order
23 In The Other Heading, Derrida (1992e: 39) speaks about the new censorship of a cultural discourse 
(a centralising authority of academic insistence) which promotes the master word o f ‘transparency’ and 
claims to speak in the name of good, common sense. It thus tends to discredit anything that complicates 
this model by marginalising and relegating to the sidelines that work which does not easily comply or 
cannot accommodate itself to a programme of norms and standardisation, to an accredited model or 
grid of intelligibility, to “channels o f immediate and efficient communication”.
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integrate it among knowledge already gained” (Irigaray, 2002a: x). This research 
project has called for other ways of thinking about the not-yet of the spectrality of the 
future, about that which points from the future, about that which “remains obscure 
and enigmatic, still to be disclosed....still before us” (Derrida, 1984: 113), about the 
“other who comes, who comes to strike dumb the order o f knowledge” (Derrida, 
2001c: 31), about tjhat which pushes the very limits of logic to a place where it 
vacillates. What pushes logic to the limits, even if it does not exist, even if it is no 
longer or not yet, “give(s) us to rethink” (Derrida, 1994: 176), to radically reconsider, 
truth, knowledge, representation, and an authority of meaning in frill fulfilment and 
determination of itself. To (the) end (or merely a venture from the beginning, that 
which can only be but a beginning), I (will) make use o f the provocative, declarative 
musings of Helene Cixous (1991: 98) in response to a certain (historically determined, 
as Derrida suggests) model of the academy that effectively amounts to a censorship or 
dismissal of all that does not conform to its centralising insistence on norms, 
standardisation, compliance and accreditisation:
But perhaps what is most difficult and most necessary is really to forget the judges 
who make us stupidly answer their stupid summons, make us justify the 
nonjustifiable, speak o f silence, crush music under the millstone of words, lie by 
swearing to tell only their truth, plead guilty to a lack of absence and a lack of
weakness, make excuses for every thought After our oppressive and inflexible
era, I would like to live in a time in which the tongue would not be bound, castrated, 
intimidated.
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